The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy by Chua, Amy L.
VOLUME 41, NUMBER 2, SPRING 2000
The Paradox of Free Market Democracy:
Rethinking Development Policy
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Markets and democracy are the twin pillars of prevailing development
orthodoxy.' Many have explored the ways-"theoretical, historical, and
empirical"-in which these two pillars are said to reinforce each other.2
By contrast, this Article will focus on an inherent instability in free
market democracy.
For a long time, leading political philosophers and economists held
that market capitalism and democracy could coexist, if at all, only in
fundamental tension with one another.3 Markets would produce enor-
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1. See Jagdish Bhagwari, Democracy and Development: New Thinking on an Old Question, in CAPI-
TALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY REVISITED 31 (Larry Diamond & Marc E Plattmer eds.,
1993); LESTER C. THUROW, THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 1-5 (1996); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED 3 (1998). I have described elsewhere the recent explosion of
interdisciplinary work on marketization and democratization in the developing world. See Amy L.
Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108
YALE L.J. 1, 14-19 (1998).
2. Larry Diamond, Democracy and Economic Reform: Tensions, Compatibilities, and Strategies for Rec-
onciliation, in ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: REALITIES OF REFORM
107, 108 (Edward P. Lazear ed., 1995); see also PETER L. BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION
73 (1986) (describing the contemporaneous development of capitalism and democracy in Europe
and the United States); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 168 (1998) (suggesting that market
capitalism "creates a large middling stratum of property owners" who "are the natural allies of
democratic ideas and institutions"); Diamond, supra, at 108 (observing that both capitalism and
democracy rest on "fundamental principles of competition and choice" and are threatened by
"excessive concentration of power in the state"); Owen M. Fiss, Capitalism and Democracy, 13
MAICH. J. INT'L L. 908, 911 (1992) ("Both notions are rooted in an assumption of human cation-
ality and self-interest, and thus rely on individual freedom and autonomy as the means for
achieving their ends.").
3. See, e.g., THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, 17 COMPLETE WRITINGS 263-76 (Houghton,
Mifflin and Co. 1900); JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 403-04 (Ohio Univ. Press 1984); KARL MARX, THE CLASS STRUGGLES IN FRANCE
(1848-50), at 69-70 (1934); 7 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 369-70
(Piero Sraffia ed., 1952); see generally STEFAN COLLINI ET AL., THAT NOBLE SCIENCE OF POLITICS:
A STUDY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 102-07 (1983); ROBERT A.
DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 62-73 (1985).
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mous concentrations of wealth in the hands of a few, while democracy,
by empowering the poor majority, would inevitably lead to convulsive
acts of expropriation and confiscation. In Adam Smith's words, "For
one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor .... The
affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often
both driven by want, and prompted by envy, to invade his posses-
sions."4 Madison warned against the "danger" to the rights of property
posed by "an equality & universality of suffrage, vesting compleat
power over property in hands without a share in it."5 David Ricardo
was willing to extend suffrage only "to that part of [the people] which
cannot be supposed to have any interest in overturning the rights of
property."6 Thomas Babington Macaulay went further, portraying uni-
versal suffrage as "incompatible with property" and "consequently in-
compatible with civilization. '7 From this point of view, free market
democracy is a paradox, a contradiction in terms.
As it turned out, the paradox of free market democracy did not
prove insuperable. On the contrary, while "[d]emocracy and market-
4. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
bk. V, ch. I, pt. I, at 232 (Edwin Cannon ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776). In a more
contemporary vocabulary, the "equality of franchise in a democratic society creates a tendency for
government action to equalize incomes by redistributing them from a few wealthy persons to
many less wealthy ones." ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 198
(1957).
5. James Madison, Note to His Speech on the Right of Suffrage (1821), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENnON OF 1787, at 450,452 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
6. THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO, supra note 3, at 370.
7. MACAULAY, supra note 3, at 268.
I am far from wishing to throw any blame on the ignorant crowds .... We ourselves,
with all our advantages of education, are often very credulous, very impatient, very short-
sighted, when we are tried by pecuniary distress or bodily pain .... Imagine a well-
meaning laborious mechanic fondly attached to his wife and children. Bad times come. He
sees his wife whom he loves grow thinner and paler every day. His little ones cry for bread;
and he has none to give them. Then come the professional agitators, the tempters, and tell
him that there is enough and more than enough for everybody, and that he has too little
only because landed gentlemen, fundholders, bankers, manufacturers, railway proprietors,
shopkeepers, have too much. Is it strange that the poor man should be deluded, and should
eagerly sign such a petition as this? The inequality with which wealth is distributed forces
itself on everybody's notice. It is at once perceived by the eye. The reasons which irrefraga-
bly prove this inequality to be necessary to the well-being of all classes are not equally obvi-
ous ....
... And do you believe that as soon as you give the workingmen absolute and irresistible
power they will forget all this? ... In every constituent body capital will be placed at the
feet of labor; knowledge will be borne down by ignorance; and is it possible to doubt what
the result must be? ... What could follow but one vast spoliation? One vast spoliation
Id. at 271-72, 274.
8. Obviously, "markets" and "democracy" could be defined in such a way that no conflict exists
between them. At the extreme, democracy could be "defined" to include a market economy, and a
market economy could be "defined" to include a democratic politics, Such definitional gerryman-
dering, however, would not be particularly illuminating. For a discussion of how these terms are
used in this Article, see infra text accompanying notes 28-30.
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capitalism are locked in a persistent conflict," 9 this conflict has been
more or less successfully negotiated throughout the developed world.
Defining the terms broadly, markets and democracy have coexisted
quite healthily in the United States for two hundred years, and at least
a dozen other developed countries "have remained continuously capi-
talist and democratic for the past half-century."10 That democratic
politics proved compatible with capitalism in the First World-that
the electoral "'power of numbers"' did not overwhelm the "economic
power of property""-is one of the great surprises of modern history.12
Will the paradox of free market democracy be similarly negotiable
in developing societies? Through what institutions? What face will
the paradox assume in the developing world? Law and development,
booming anew today,'3 has systematically ignored this set of ques-
tions-a remarkable omission, given the confidence with which de-
mocracy and markets are being exported all over the Third and post-
communist worlds. 14
9. DAHL, supra note 2, at 173. As Dahl has noted, this conflict "can be understood in two
ways: Democracy may be seen as a danger to property rights; or property rights may be seen as a
danger to democracy." DAHL, supra note 3, at 68. On the first view, the concern is that "[a] ma-
jority made up of the less prosperous will be able to use their equality in the state to appropriate
the property of the wealthier minority." Id On the second view, the danger is that "a minority of
rich will possess so much greater political resources than other citizens that they will control the
state, dominate the majority of citizens, and empty the democratic process ofall content." Id
10. Adam Przeworski, The Neoliberal Fallacy, in CAPITALISM, SoCIALIsM, AND DEMOCRACY
REVISITED, supra note 1, at 47.
11. CLAUS OFFE, MODERNITY AND THE STATE: EAST, WEST 154 (1996).
12. For a particularly interesting discussion of the "peaceful" but "precarious" "coexistence be-
tween democracy and capitalism" in industrialized Western societies, see JURGEN HABERmAS,
The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies, in THE NEW
CONSERVATSM 48, 55-56 (Shierry Weber Nicholsen ed. & trans., MIT Press 1994) (1985); see
also DAHL, supra note 2, at 166-79 (describing the "antagonistic symbiosis" between democracy
and market capitalism); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S PO-
LITICAL-ECoNoMIC SYSTEMS, pt. V (1977) (exploring in Part V "The Close but Uneasy Relation
Between Private Enterprise and Democracy"). For economic models exploring the same phe-
nomenon, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIA-
THAN 147-65 (1975); DowNs, supra note 4, at 198; Allan H. Meltzer & Scott E Richard, A
Rational Theory of the Size of Government, 89 J. POL. ECON. 914, 916 (1981); Sam Peltzman, The
Growth of Government, 23 J. L. & ECON. 209, 222-23 (1980).
13. See generally Chua, supra note 1, at 8-21 (describing the new law and development move-
ment and comparing it to the law and development movement of the 1960s and 1970s); John
Henry Mertyman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the
Law and Development Movement, 25 Am. J. Coat'. L. 457, 472-83 (1977) (describing and critiqu-
ing the earlier movement).
14. The self-confidence characteristic of today's law reform efforts in the developing world
contrasts jarringly with the self-questioning (and in some cases self-flagellation) that accompanied
the decline of the earlier U.S. law and development movement, the basic thrust of which was also
to export (a progressive 1960s version o) democratic capitalism and the rule of law to the devel-
oping world. See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in aw and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062,
1070, 1080. As a number of commentators have suggested, the angst about cultural imperialism
in the 1960s and 1970s was in significant part a product of the Vietnam War. See, e.g., Brian Z.
Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 470, 472 (1995) (re-
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This Article makes four points. The first, a hypothesis I will try to
make plausible but will not be able to prove, is that the paradox of free
market democracy has been mediated in the developed world by a host
of devices substantially de-escalating the conflict between market-
generated wealth disparities and majoritarian politics. These devices,
while varying widely across nations, generally fall into three catego-
ries: material, political, and ideological.
Materially, in all the developed nations, the less well-off have to a
certain extent been "bought out," in part through market-generated
material prosperity, but also in significant part through strong net-
works of redistributive institutions.15 Politically, in addition to a long
history of massive exclusions from suffrage, Western nations have a
variety of institutions that restrain majoritarian confiscatory impulses,
including separation of powers and constitutional property protec-
tions. 16 Finally, these "buy outs" and political restraints have been cru-
cially supplemented by the existence of various market-compatible
ideologies-belief systems that make the less well-off majority more
inclined to accept or at least not to rebel against the extreme income
disparities produced in a market economy. Probably the most promi-
nent of these ideologies in the United States is that of upward mobil-
ity. 
17
Second, these developed-world mediating devices are largely absent
from the developing world, and there is no reason to assume that they
will be spontaneously generated by market and democratic reforms.
On the other hand, many developing countries do have one perversely
effective restraint on democracy: systemic political corruption. In re-
cent years, anti-corruption initiatives have become a major thrust of
international development policy. These initiatives are long overdue
and of the utmost importance, but to the extent that they succeed,
they may sharpen the conflict between markets and democracy.1 8
Third, in critical respects, the paradox of free market democracy is
much more dangerous and potentially explosive in the developing
world. To begin with, in terms of sheer numbers, the poor are vastly
viewing 2 LAw AND DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL CULTURES (Anthony CartTy ed., 1992) and LAw AND
CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds., 1993)). Similarly, the
absence of self-doubt today may reflect the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the sense (at
least in the West) that there is no acceptable alternative to the Western development paradigm.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 32-46.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 47-63.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 66-93. To avoid misunderstanding, I am not concerned
with the origins of these mediating institutions and ideologies. For example, I am not making the
functionalist claim that market-compatible ideologies emerged in the developed nations because
the paradox of free market democracy somehow demanded them. My concern, rather, is with
effects-in particular, with the neutralizing impact that these institutions and ideologies have had
on the conflict between markers and majoritarian politics.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 95-135.
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more numerous, and poverty far more entrenched, in the developing
world today than in the developed world, either today or at analogous
historical periods. 19 In addition, universal suffrage is generally being
implemented in the developing world on a rapid, large-scale basis that
contrasts sharply with the very gradual and incremental enfranchise-
ment characteristic of the history of Western democratization.20 Fi-
nally, in stark contrast to the Western nations and all the East Asian
"Tigers," many developing countries have one or more ethnic minori-
ties who, along with foreign investors, will tend under market condi-
tions to dominate economically the "indigenous" majorities around
them, at least in the near to midterm future. 21 The existence of such
market-dominant minorities, together with other conditions prevalent
throughout the developing world, converts the paradox of free market
democracy into an engine of potentially catastrophic ethnonationalism.
In these circumstances, democracy will often mobilize majoritarian
ehnoeconomic resentment into powerful nationalist movements po-
tentially subversive of both markets and democracy themselves.
22
Thus, the paradox of free market democracy often has an entirely
different face in the developing world. The ethnic and racialist struc-
tures of the developed world typically help defuse the conflict between
markets and democracy, essentially by fracturing the poor majority. In
the United States, for example, racism (together with a thriving ideol-
ogy of upward mobility) arguably makes poor and lower middle class
whites feel more "kinship" with wealthy whites than with African
Americans or Hispanic Americans of comparable economic status. As a
result, racism in the United States creates no particular threat to a
market economy. On the contrary, to the extent that racism helps rec-
oncile a great number of poor and working-class whites to the pre-
vailing economic hierarchy (because there is a group still lower than
they) and impedes political coalitions among the poor, racism helps to
mediate the paradox of free market democracy.
23
By contrast, the distinctive overlapping of class and ethnicity char-
acteristic of many developing countries-in which the "very rich" are
(or are perceived as) ethnically distinct-tends to catalyze the paradox
of free market democracy, with democracy pitting an "indigenous"
majority against an economically dominant "outsider" minority.24 This
dynamic is not present everywhere in the developing world; for exam-
ple, the countries of Latin America differ widely from one another in
19. See infra text accompanying notes 97-99.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 114-116.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 139-156.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 157-164.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 86-89.
24. For the definition of"ethnicity" used in this Article, see infra note 137.
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this regard. 25 Nonetheless, the possible ethnicization of the paradox of
free market democracy is a persistent, lethal reality in many develop-
ing countries, as recent events in Indonesia have once again illus-
trated. 26
Fourth, for all these reasons, it is irresponsible to promote markets
and democracy in the developing world in the absence of institutions
capable of mediating the conflict between them. To be sure, today's
prevailing policy approach to law and development does include pro-
posals that, if successful, would replicate some of the devices that have
helped mediate the paradox of free market democracy in the developed
world-for example, "social safety nets" and constitutional property
protections. But these policies do not grapple with the distinctive and
most dangerous aspects of the paradox of free market democracy as it
presents itself in the developing world, such as the much more massive
extent of poverty, the rapidity of democratization, and the problem of
market-dominant minorities.
Part I of this Article will explore the material, political, and ideo-
logical devices that have helped mediate the conflict between markets
and democracy in the developed world. While some of these devices
will also be desirable in the developing world, others surely will not
be. One of the most important challenges facing developing-world
policy makers is to think much more carefully about how the devel-
oped world "solved" the paradox of free market democracy and
whether these "solutions" could-or should-exist in the developing
world.
Part HI will show how certain conditions characteristic of developing
societies make the paradox of free market democracy especially prob-
lematic and combustible. Contemporary Indonesia is offered as a para-
digmatic example. Part II also discusses economically dominant mi-
norities that existed in the developed nations during earlier (typically
undemocratic) periods. Weimar Germany is then cautiously offered as
a rare instance in which a Western nation pursued-with catastrophic
ethnonationalist consequences-free market democracy under condi-
tions in many respects analogous to those characteristic of many devel-
oping countries today.
Part III will turn to policy. While there can be no "one-size-fits-all"
solution, every developing and transitional country pursuing markets
and democracy-even countries without market-dominant minori-
ties-will have to find ways to mediate the basic tension between these
two goals. In this light, the design of all the latest reform initiatives in
the developing world (including promotion of the rule of law, state-
building, free and fair elections, independent judiciaries, and civil so-
25. See infra text accompanying notes 129-135, 148, 201-206.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 164-196.
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ciety) must be reexamined. These measures are essential for the devel-
oping world. Moreover, if properly designed, they could ultimately
play a valuable role in mediating the paradox of free market democ-
racy. But if care is not taken, these measures may also inadvertently
heighten the conflict between markets and democracy. For example,
the main thrust of today's rule-of-law projects in the developing world
is to facilitate market activity (by strengthening legislative and judi-
cial protections of property and contract). To the extent that such ini-
tiatives succeed, they will accomplish very significant achievements,
but in the process they may intensify the contest between unequal
wealth and majoritarian politics.
As a small, tentative start toward working through some of these
broad policy issues, I will in this Article narrow my lens and focus on
the particularly destructive, ethnonationalist version of the paradox of
free market democracy. Although economically dominant minorities
will not be a problem in every developing country,27 the discussed
policies nevertheless may, with some adjustment, have bearing on all
developing and post-communist countries. This is because foreign in-
vestors-who tend to prosper disproportionately under economic lib-
eralization, characteristically provoking nationalist, anti-market sen-
timent--often occupy a role analogous to that of economically domi-
nant minorities.
I. PARADOX LOST
I begin with a brief terminological note. "Market capitalism" and
"democracy" are notoriously difficult terms to define. Indeed, one of
the main purposes of this Part is precisely to remind us that even in
the West there are many versions of "market capitalism" on which de-
veloping countries might draw; and that the process of "democratiza-
tion" currently being promoted in the developing world is not the
same as the one that Western countries themselves went through at
analogous periods in their history. In general, however, by "market
capitalism" or "market economy" I refer to economic systems based
primarily on private property, contract, and price competition, with
government intervention spanning a wide spectrum from laissez-faire
to extensive regulation and redistribution.28 Similarly, while democracy
can take many forms, I use the term to refer capaciously to electoral,
majoritarian politics. Thus references to democracy, broadly defined,
29
will roughly track Schumpeterian criteria of electoral competition,
27. See infra text accompanying notes 197-211.
28. See JOSEPH E. STIGUTZ, WHITHER SOcIALISM? 231 (1994) (examining "socialism, market
socialism, and capitalism" in terms of a "continuum" of economic roles the state can assume).
29. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAIITAISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269-73 (3d ed.
1950).
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whereas references to more "complete" or "genuine" democracy will
essentially track Elster's definition of democracy as "simple majority
rule, based on the principle 'One person one vote."'30
Why, then, haven't poor majorities in the democratic nations used
their political power to take the property of the wealthy? One answer
is that they have. On this view, the political philosophers of the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries were right: Through the rise of the
welfare state, democracy did indeed prove incompatible with the
"right of property"-understood in its fullest libertarian sense.31 Still,
the fact is that thriving market economies, supporting very consider-
able wealth disparities, coexist with democracy throughout the devel-
oped world. Thus the question remains: Why haven't the less well-off
voted to equalize wealth far more than they have, to an extent that
really would undermine the functioning of a market system?
At a very high level of abstraction, the answer to this question must
be that in one way or another, markets have won the support of the
"median voter." But this statement is more of a conclusion than an
explanation, and may hide more than it illuminates. What is really
needed is some account, at once sociological, political, historical, eco-
nomic, and cultural, of how the developed nations have managed to
avoid irreconcilable conflicts between majoritarian politics and mar-
ket-generated wealth disparities. This story is, however, so complex, so
various across different countries, and so difficult to verify that any
observations about it necessarily involve more hypothesis than proof.
In this spirit, I will explore the following hypothesis: that the ten-
sions between markets and democracy have been substantially allevi-
ated throughout the developed world by institutions and devices that,
while varying widely across countries, generally fall into three catego-
ries-material, political, and ideological. It goes without saying that
the literatures implicated here are too vast even to be summarized in
this Article, much less surveyed comprehensively. My objective is not
to propose a complete theory explaining why markets and democracy
have succeeded in the developed world. Rather, my goals are far more
limited: to initiate reflection on the institutions and devices that have
helped to overcome the paradox of free market democracy; and to sug-
gest that the story behind the success of free market democracy in the
developed world is much more complex-and in many respects much
darker-than is commonly supposed.
30. Jon Elster, IntroduAction to CONSTITUTIONAUSM AND DEMOcACy 1 (Jon Elster & Rune
Slagstad eds., 1988). Needless to say, an ideal democratic society would surely include more
substantive principles, such as equality or human rights, but to build such principles into the
definition of democracy would nor be useful for this Article's purposes.
31. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 167-72 (1974).
294
2000 / The Paradox of Free Market Democracy
A. Material Redistribution
The most obvious accommodation made by the market economies of
the developed world to the demands of the less well-off consists of ma-
terial compensation. In other words, the less prosperous have to a cer-
tain extent been bought out, in part through market-generated mate-
rial prosperity, but also in significant part through redistributive insti-
tutions of the kind that Jiirgen Habermas refers to as "the welfare state
compromise. '0 2 Notwithstanding the recent rollback of welfare pro-
grams," all the developed nations have strong networks of redistribu-
tive institutions, "modulat[ingi the inequalities of wealth produced by
the market.' 'M
The history, form, and mix of redistributive mechanisms vary across
the developed World. Generally speaking, social safety net programs
have been broader, governmental transfers larger, and the role of work-
ers in corporate governance more substantial, in Western Europe and
Scandinavia than in the United States." In England, for example, the
British government continues to provide broad national insurance
benefits for unemployment, sickness, and disability, nationalized
health care, and universally free public education, although there is
constant talk of "radical" welfare reform.3 6 Germany's welfare system is
supplemented by expansive pro-labor legislation.7 Sweden and the
other Nordic countries all have extensive "cradle to grave" social leg-
32. HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 55-56. Today, in one commentator's words,
workers in the richer industrial countries are fat, pampered, and sleek. The workers in Ger-
many or Austria have cars, television sets, and some money in the bank; they have health
benefits and paid vacations; they have rights to overtime pay and unemployment compensa-
tion. Most people in the first world think of themselves as middle class ....
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY 44 (1999).
33. In recent years, the welfare state has come under intense attack, among other things for
encouraging free-riding and dependency, see, e.g., David Schmidtz, Guarantees, in THE WELFARE
STATE 15, 19 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1997), perpetuating poverty and fiscal crises, and
eroding "the social cement of the West." DEEPAK LAL, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 159, 165
(1998). For an empirically based defense of the American social welfare system, see generally
THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA's MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE (1990) (discuss-
ing common fallacies about the objectives and workings of American social welfare policies).
34. Fiss, supra note 2, at 909.
35. See DAVID W. CONKLIN, COMPARATIVE ECONOIC SYSTEMs 81 tbl.3.2 (detailing welfare
state expenditure as a percentage of GDP around 1980 in France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, and the United States); NicHOLAs V. GIANAIs, CONTEMPORARY Eco-
NOMic SYSTEMS 70 fig. 6.1, 71 fig. 6.2 (1993) (showing government expenditure and indirect
taxes, respectively, as a percentage of national income for the European Community and the
United States); id. at 74-75, 102-06; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Pros-
perts for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 669
(1999) (noting "the greater political power of labor across Europe and the more powerful legacy
of the European social welfare state").
36. See Patrick Minford, Reconstruction and the U.< Postwar Welfare State: False Start and New
Beginning, in POsTWAR ECONOMIC REcONSTRUcTION AND LEssoNs FOR THE EAsT TODAY 115,
119-20, 122-24 (Rudiger Dombusch et al. eds., 1993); Thinking the Unthinkable: The Welfare
State, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1996, at 60.
37. See GIANARIs, supra note 35, at 81-84.
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islation, including labor codetermination, maternity and child sup-
port, and rent control."' Japan's distinctive lifetime employment sys-
tem is discussed further below.9
Nevertheless, the basic story is similar throughout the developed
world. Starting in the nineteenth century, the explosion of market ac-
tivity in the West was accompanied by the emergence of redistributive
institutions of unprecedented magnitude.0 In virtually every devel-
oped country, these institutions include not only relief to the ex-
tremely poor, but also progressive taxation, social security, minimum
wage laws, infrastructure spending, antitrust regulation, and worker
safety regulation.
There are many different ways of understanding the political-
economic dynamic behind redistribution in the developed world. For
example, "capitalists" could be viewed as giving "labor" the smallest
amount necessary to keep them from revolting or "trash[ing] the
workplace. ' 2 In theory, this amount could range from very little to
much more significant transfers. (It is often suggested that Bismarck,
who designed Germany's first social security system in the 1880s, did
so "to entice the working class away from socialism."43) Alternatively,
the democratic process might be viewed as functioning so rationally
that the "decisive voter" obtains the highest amount of redistribution
consistent with maximizing his wealth.44 Yet another account would
hold that the welfare state arose out of public-spirited collective deci-
sions about distributive or corrective justice.4,
38. See id. at 102-06; Xan Smiley, Happy Family? The five Nordic countries remain defiantly dif-
ferentfrom the rest of Europe-and from each other, EcoNoMIsT,Jan. 23, 1999, at 3. Not surprisingly,
income tax rates in the Scandinavian countries are among the highest in the world. Id,
39. See infra text accompanying note 85.
40. "Politics in the Western countries, as the franchise spread, became strongly redistributive.
No historical event of the past century is as important as the rise of the welfare state." FRIEDMAN,
supra note 32, at 43-44.
41. See HAROLD L. WILENSKY, THE WELFARE STATE AND EQUALITY 2 (1975).
42. Mark G. Kelman, Progressive Vacuums, 48 ST'AN. L. REV. 975, 986 (1996) (reviewing MI-
CHAEL J. PIORE, BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM (1995)) (discussing the theory of the "'efficiency
wage'"); Samuel Bowles, The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo.Hobbesian,
andMarxian Models, 75 Am. ECON. REv. 16, 19-20 (1985) (discussing "the strategies that capi-
tal may adopt in order to enhance or exercise its power over labor").
43. ERIc OWEN SMITH, THE WEsr GERMAN ECONOMY 103 (1983); see also Ronald J. Gilson
& Mark J. Roe, Lifetime E ployment: Labor Peace and the Evolution ofJapanese Corporate Govrnance,
99 COLUM. L. REv. 508, 522 (1999) (suggesting that a central motivation underlying the crea-
tion of the lifetime employment system in Japan was to reduce labor unrest and "to diminish the
chance of socialist electoral success" in post-war Japan).
44. Meltzer & Richard, supra note 12, at 916, 924-25; see also DOWNS, supra note 4, at 200
(suggesting that equalization of income through redistribution does not occur because "[e]ven
low-income citizens feel that the total output produced by an ultimately unequal income distri-
bution would be much larger than that produced by an equal one").
45. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 256-59, 268-71
(1998); Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace
Cooperation, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1381, 1389, 1392-1412 (1993); William H. Simon, The Invention
and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REv. 1, 4-9, 37 (1985). For a discussion of various
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My concern here, however, is not with origins, but with effects.
Whatever their origins, the spread of redistributive institutions in the
developed world is widely recognized to have helped dampen the
conflict between market wealth disparities and democratic politics.
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B. Political Exclusions and Restraints
At the same time, some would argue that the real reason the poor in
the developed world have not used their political power to equalize
wealth is because, trappings of democracy aside, they have never actu-
ally possessed such political power. There is more truth to this claim
than many would care to admit.
First, until relatively recently, most (if not all) of the Western de-
mocracies had massive exclusions from suffrage. To take the case of the
United States, after the Federal Convention of 1787, the poor were
disenfranchised in virtually every state through formal property
qualifications.4 7 Although such qualifications were largely eliminated
by 1860,48 they were typically replaced by provisions denying suffrage
to the very poor (for example, through tax-paying requirements and
"pauper" exclusions), 49 and throughout the country the great majority
of the population, including women and most blacks and Native
Americans, continued to be denied the right to vote.50 In the years
ways to see the welfare state, see Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need The Welfare State and Theories
ofDistributiveJustie, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 902 (1976).
46. See, eg., HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 55; Fiss, supra note 2, at 909; c. DAHL, supra note 2,
at 175-76 ("In no democratic country does a market-capitalist economy exist (nor in all likeli-
hood can it exist for long) without extensive government regulation and intervention to alter its
harmfiul effects.").
47. The original Constitution left it to the states to determine the voting qualifications for
both national and state elections. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. at art. II, § 1. With the
exception of Vermont, "the early states, for varying durations, retained freeholder or other prop-
erty qualifications for enfranchisement." Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the
Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IowA L. REv. 1319, 1331 (1987); see also JUDITH N. SHKLAR,
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 15-16 (1991). The property qualifications,
carried over from the colonial period, varied:
[11n New York and New England the requirement for voting for members of a colonial as-
sembly was a freehold with a total value of £50 ... in the colonies from Pennsylvania
southward the requirement was a fifty-acre freehold, except in Virginia, where one hundred
acres of unsettled land or twenty-five acres of improved land was required.
FOREST MCDONALD, Novos ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTI-
TuTioN 26 (1985) (citation omitted).
48. See CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY
1760-1860, at 280 (1960).
49. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REv.
335, 353 & n.59 (1989).
50. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 48, at 277-80. In 1862 United States Attorney General Ed-
ward Bates made "bold to affirm" that "viewing the nation as a whole, or viewing the States
separately, there is no district in the nation in which a majority of the known and recognized
citizens are not excluded by law from the right of suffrage." 10 Op. Art'y Gen. 382, 384-385
(1862), reprinted in H. JEFFERSON POwELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GEN-
ERAL, 181-82 (1999).
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preceding the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, supposedly guar-
anteeing black males the right of suffrage, 51 wealthy whites through-
out the South were stricken with the fear that "'the black race will be
in a large majority, and then we will have black governors, black leg-
islatures, black juries, black everything .... We will be completely
exterminated, and the land will be left in the possession of the
blacks. '" 52 Accordingly, even after the enactment of the Fifteenth
Amendment in 1870, and well into the twentieth century, blacks in
the South (and to a lesser extent throughout the United States) were
effectively disenfranchised, first through local violence, ballot-box
stuffing, and complicated registration and voting procedures, and, es-
pecially after the 1890s, through literacy tests, poll taxes, and property
qualifications, together with racially motivated redistricting. 53 Mean-
while, in at least fourteen states, recipients of poor relief were deprived
of the franchise as late as 1934.54
Elsewhere in the developed world, the details differ, but the basic
story is the same. "[Plolitical enfranchisement in most Western liberal
democracies proceeded very gradually and in distinct stages." 55 Argua-
bly, these longstanding political exclusions were important to the suc-
cess of Western nations in establishing stable free market democracies.
Even today, however, with suffrage formally guaranteed throughout
the developed world, it remains open to question whether the poor can
meaningfully effectuate their interests through the available political
channels. 56 Many have argued, for example, that in contemporary capi-
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (providing that the right of citizens to vote "shall not be
denied or abridged [on] account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude").
52. JAMEs OAKES, THE RULiNG RACE 234 (1998) (citation omitted).
53. See AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTr RUDWICK, FRoM PLANTATION TO GHsTro 194-96 (3d
ed. 1976); see also Richard T. Ford, Laws Territory (A History ofJurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REv.
843, 891-99 (1999). Most of "these impediments to voting and representation were finally lifted,
by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and one by one by court decisions." SHKLAR, stipra note 47, at
55. As Lani Guinier and others have observed, however, existing voter registration requirements
continue to exclude disproportionately African Americans and other minorities from the political
process. See L.ANI GuiNIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 32-33 (1994); sce also id, at 41-70
(arguing that voting rights litigation and jurisprudence since the Voting Rights Act of 1965
have led to the triumph of tokenism over "full enfranchisement" of blacks).
54. Steinfeld, supra note 49, at 335.
55. Sumit Ganguly, Ethnic Policies and Political Quiescence in Malaysia and Singapore, in Gov-
ERNMENT POLICIES AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PAcu'c 233, 272 (Michael E.
Brown & Sumit Ganguly eds., 1997). To give just a few examples, in England, a statute from
1430 provided that, in the shires, only those adult males with "a freehold estate the annual in-
come from which was forty shillings" could elect members of the House of Commons. McDoN-
ALD, supra note 47, at 25. Forty shillings was the amount that in 1430 supposedly would "furnish
all the necessaries of life, and render the freeholder, if he pleased, an independent man." Id. at 25-
26. In France "property and tax-payment qualifications" severely limited the franchise during the
revolutionary period. HENRY W. EHRMANN & MARTIN A. SCHAIN, POLITICS IN FRANCE 199-
200 (5th ed. 1992). After 1848, suffrage was extended to all males over age 21, making France
"the first European country to enfranchise a mass [male] electorate." Id.
56. See, ag., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CON-
STITIJTIONALisM 212, 214-16 (1990) (lamenting the "virtual exclusion" of the poor and low
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talist countries, "highly expensive public relations campaigns on tele-
vision and in other media often determine the outcomes of elections,
requiring candidates to become dependent upon, or at least more re-
sponsive to, those with greater wealth." 7 On this view, "[despite the
rhetoric of 'one person, one vote,' powerful economic interests are able
to exert disproportionate political influence and are likely to capture
the state apparatus and use it to their advantage."' 8 According to Mi-
chael Walzer, "[t]he most common form of powerlessness in the
United States today derives from the dominance of money in the
sphere of politics."'59
At the same time, Western nations have a variety of political insti-
tutions that restrain majoritarian confiscatory impulses. Beyond the
express constitutional guarantees of property--contained in the
United States, for example, in the Takings, Contracts, and Due Process
Clauses-a number of structural political features have the same effect.
The separation of powers, for example, creates an institutional bias
toward the status quo, either promoting valuable stability or inhibit-
ing valuable change, depending on one's perspective. 60 (The disgust
often expressed about government paralysis or "gridlock" is a back-
handed confirmation of the effectiveness of our constitutional separa-
tion of powers. 61)
Indeed, there is a case to be made that in the United States the in-
sulation of "property and inequality from democratic revision" is a
calculated feature of the American form of government.62 James Madi-
status groups "from the actual practice of politics" in the United States); see also UNGER, supra
note 1, at 4 (noting that even "ordinary, working citizens" in the United States "are likely to feel
themselves angry outsiders, part of a fragmented and marginalized majority, powerless to reshape
the collective basis of the collective problems they face").
57. Fiss, supra note 2, at 913. For empirical support for the proposition that money has "out-
come-determining effects on the electoral process," see sources cited in Samuel Issacharoff &
Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 Tax. L. REv. 1705, 1709 n.19
(1999). On the other hand, "'disproportionate influence' is hard to measure, and absent particu-
larly nefarious patterns perhaps is defensible as an inevitable phenomenon in any real world of
power." Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending
Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 CoLum. L. REv. 1281, 1282 (1994).
58. Fiss, supra note 2, at 913.
59. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 310 (1983). Moreover, Professors Issacharoff and
Karlan have provocatively suggested that many of the current proposals for campaign finance
reform may perversely increase the role of money in politics, making politics even less "account-
able to democratic control." Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 57, at 1707; cf Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311.
60. Compare NEDELSKY, supra note 56, at 222 (arguing that the structure of the American
"constitutional system has fostered too little experimentation with democratic control of the
economy and democratic restructuring of the sources of economic power"), with BRUCE ACKER-
MAN, THE FURURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 16 (1992) (attributing the longevity of the Ameri-
can Constitution and its ability to incorporate revolutionary changes such as the New Deal to its
"distinctive two-track structure").
61. See, e.g., Robert D. Novak, Gridlock is Back on Capitol Hill, SAN DINGO UNION-TalE., Mar.
11, 1999, at B10.
62. NEDELSKY, supra note 56, at 3; see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
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son expressly defended representative democracy across a large nation
as a way of stymying the mobilization of a concerted majority party
representing the poor:
Those who hold and those who are without property have ever
formed distinct interests in society ....
... Extend the sphere [of the republic] and you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will
be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength
and to act in unison with each other.63
C. Ideology
The preceding two Sections, exploring the "buy-outs" and political
restraints that I suggest have helped stabilize free market democracy in
the developed world, assume a kind of unidimensional process in
which the poor want only one thing from democracy-to appropriate
wealth from the rich. Although this simplified picture can be useful
analytically and has been pursued in a number of different literatures,6
it is plainly incomplete. Consider the United States. To explain Ameri-
can voters' tolerance for wealth disparities solely on the ground that
the poor have been "bought out" or prevented from exercising their
political power seems to leave out much that is distinctive about U.S,
history and culture. What, for example, about "the American dream"
or the "peculiarly American resistance to government"?65 What about
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 432-40, 480, 626 (1969).
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79, 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Necd-
less to say, Madison's thought was also pro-democratic in many respects. See Akhil Reed Amar
Philadelphia Revisited Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1043, 1050
(1988); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Ma.
jority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLo. L. REV. 749, 756-59 (1994). The exclusion
of the less well-off is reflected in other aspects of the American political system as well. With
respect to the judiciary, quite apart from the "counter-majoritarian difficulty," ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962), federal judges are "overwhelmingly
Anglo, male, well-educated and upper or upper middle class." Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S.
CAL. L. Rnv. 661, 664 (1985). Similarly,
members of Congress 'are better educated, possess higher status occupations and have more
privileged backgrounds than the people they "represent."' . . . It is clear that Congress is
hardly the mirror of the population that Wilson and the Anti-Federalists hoped for, and that
the lowest economic and status groups are virtually excluded.
NEDE SKY, supra note 56, at 216 (citations omitted). "The expected difference between the
House and Senate also appears, the Senate being even more elite." Id.
64. See, eg., MACAULAY, supra note 3, at 268-76; Meltzer & Richard, supra note 12.
65. Thomas C. Heller, Modernity, Membership, and Multiculturalism, 5.2 STAN. HUMAN. REV. 2,
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the fact that throughout much of U.S. history many of the less pros-
perous have actually seemed to like market capitalism, wealth dispari-
ties and all? And finally, what about the fact that lower class whites
have consistently turned on lower class blacks and immigrants?
This Section suggests that certain market-compatible ideologies
have helped mediate (perhaps crucially) the paradox of free market
democracy in the developed world. By a market-compatible ideology, I
mean a belief system that, if held with sufficient strength by sufficient
numbers, makes the relatively worse-off majority more inclined to ac-
cept or at least not to rebel against the income disparities produced in
a market economy. What sort of belief systems could play this role? I
will identify five different market-compatible ideologies that could
plausibly be thought to operate in the developed world.
I offer these five ideologies only as heuristically useful illustrations,
with no pretensions to completeness or systematicity. They are not
supposed each to conform to the actual belief systems of any particular
developed country. The actual sociological proof of the existence of
these ideologies, or of their relative strength in any particular country,
would be extremely difficult and is in any event beyond the scope of
this Article.
I am aware that the introduction of cultural or ideological variables
raises a host of methodological difficulties, including problems of ad
hoc residualism and non-falsifiability. Perhaps for just this reason,
most policy-oriented political-science and economic analyses of mar-
ketization and democratization in the developing world attempt to
bracket such variables. In my opinion, however, it is a far greater dan-
ger in the law and development context to ignore culture and ideology
than to attempt, albeit imperfectly, to understand them. This is par-
ticularly true if the project is to export markets and democracy to the
developing world. Even more so than economic and political institu-
tions, ideologies cannot easily be transplanted from one context to an-
other and expected to take root.
With these caveats in mind, I will now sketch out five highly ab-
stracted market-compatible ideologies that all seem to have some pur-
chase in developed-world societies.
1. Upward Mobility
The ideology of upward mobility holds that anyone, high or low,
can move up the economic ladder, as long as he or she is talented,
hard-working, entrepreneurial, and not too unlucky. This ideology is
16 (1997); see also MiRjAN R. DAMA KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 44 (1986) ("[I]f ever there was a general
political consensus in America, it was--and perhaps still is-an antipathy toward bureaucracy
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typically expressed in rags-to-riches narratives, 66 proclamations of
equal opportunity,67 and so on. Ideally, upward mobility gives every-
one a stake in the continuing success of the market economy.68 At its
extreme, it teaches the worse-off that their plight is the result not of an
unfair or invidious economic system, but rather of their own
deficiencies. 69 In both these ways, upward mobility makes the income
disparities of a market system less likely to provoke popular furor.
Among Western countries, the ideology of upward mobility has
probably been most successful in the United States.70
66. Examples abound in American literature, both fiction, see, e.g., HORATIO ALGER JR., RAG-
GED DICK, OR STREET LIFE IN NEW YORK, reprinted in RAGGED DICK AND STRUGGLING UP-
WARD (Carl Bode ed., Penguin Books 1986) (1868); EDNA FERBER, EMMA MCCHESNIY & CO,
(1915); E ScoTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1925); STE-
VEN MILLHAUSER, MARTIN DRESSLER: THE TALE OF AN AMERICAN DREAMER (1996), and
nonfiction, see, eg., BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AUTOBIOGRAP14Y (Vintage Books 1990) (1790);
BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY (Doubleday 1998) (1901); ANDREW CARNEGIE,
THE EMPIRE OF BUSINESS (Doubleday, Doran & Company 1933) (1902); YOUNGHILL KANG,
EAST GOES WEST: THE MAKING OF AN ORIENTAL YANKEE (1937); LEE IACOCCA & WILLIAM
NOVAK, IACOCCA: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1984); GEORGE BUTLER, ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER:
A PORTRAIT (1990). There is also a long history of commentary that has transformed "the ethos
of entrepreneurial success into the quintessential American dream." JEFFREY LOUIS DECKER,
MADE IN AMERICA: SELF-STYLED SUCCESS FROM HORATIO ALGER TO OPRAH WINFREY xiii
(1997); see, e.g., IRVIN G. WYLLIE, SELF-MADE MAN IN AMERICA: THE MYTH OF RAGS TO
RICHES (2d prrg. 1966); JOHN CAWELTI, APOSTLES OF THE SELF-MADE MAN (3d impression
1972). Political figures in the United States have long drawn on "the normative power of the self-
made man." DECKER, supra, at xvii; see, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt, Character and Success, 725 OUT-
LOOK 64 (1900); Clarence Thomas, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1987, at 21 (letter to the editor).
67. To quote one recent statement of this ideology:
America has created a system in which anyone with talent and energy has access to the
financial resources needed for success. That alone won't lead to fortune, but it pretty much
guarantees that talented people don't fail for lack of capital.
Today banks, venture capitalists, underwriters and stock brokers here don't much care
who your grandfather was or whether you went to a prep school or dropped out of college.
All they care about is: Can we make some bucks by backing this guy (or gal)?
This is not true in Japan. It is not true in Brazil. It is not even true in France or Germany
.... In Germany, Bill Gates might well have had to go to work for Siemens. In Japan,
Gates most certainly would have ended up as salaryman for Hitachi ....
Reuven Brenner, Land of Opportunity: For a Certain Kind of Immigrant the Streets of America are Indeed
Paved with Gold These Days, FORBES, Oct. 12, 1998, at 66.
68. Some economists describe this dynamic in terms of uncertainty. See, e.g., DowNs, supra
note 4, at 200 ("fUincertainty allows low-income citizens to believe that someday they too may
have high incomes; hence their desire to 'soak the rich' is mitigated by the hope that they them-
selves will be rich.").
69. In Duncan Kennedy's words,
T]he culture of individualism, materialism, and philistinism combined with the appearance
of endless opportunity creates an illusion of accountability for one's economic fate. The poor
are poor because they lack initiative or talent or because they are ethnically or racially infe-
rior, according to the popular understanding. In this way, popular culture generates self-
hatred rather than proud working-class consciousness ....
DUNCAN KENNEDY, SExy DRESSING, ETC. 4 (1993). It is not entirely clear, however, the extent
to which Kennedy endorses this view or is merely describing it. See id. at 1, 10.
70. By "successful," I do not mean that there is actually more economic mobility in the
United States than elsewhere, although there is certainly evidence for this proposition. See Peter
M. Blau & Otis Dudley Duncan, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE 401-42 (1967), I
simply mean that the belief in the possibility that anyone, high or low, can become rich is rela-
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2. Self-Reliance
The ideology of self-reliance holds that a person's chief concern ought
to be his independence and particularly his ability to meet his own
economic needs (or those of his family) without being dependent either
on the state or anyone else.71 Perhaps the archetype of self-reliance is
the "lone frontiersman" or the "yeoman farmer," but the ideology of
self-reliance can also flourish among participants in a market economy:
"artisans, farmers, laborers, and also merchants and entrepreneurs." 72
In such circumstances, self-reliance gives individuals, even if they are
not wealthy or even upwardly mobile,73 a stake in the continuing suc-
cess of the market.74 At the same time, the self-reliant individual is
less inclined to envy the rich ("riches are no proof whatever of moral
worth"75) and may well be disdainful of poor persons who are unable to
pull their own weight.76 Like the ideology of upward mobility, the
tively widespread in this country. See Mortimer B. Zuckerman, American Economic Stability: Is it a
Fluke?, 404 CURRENT 3 (1998).
71. In the United States and Britain, the ideology of self-reliance reached something of a hey-
day in the latter part of the 19th century, as exemplified in the huge range of writings during
that period (self-help advice manuals, political tracts, periodicals, fiction, and nonfiction) glori-
fying the ideal of personal, including economic, independence. See Stephen Davies, Two Conceptions
of Wlfare: Voluntarism and Incorporationism, in THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 33, at 39, 42-43;
MRS. G. LINNAEUS BANKS, THE MANCHESTER MAN (Victor Gollancz Ltd. 1970) (1876); WL-
LIAM ELLERY CHANNING, SELF-CULTURE (1838); GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE, SELF-HELP A
HUNDRED YEARS AGO (2d ed. 1890); THOMAS MACKAY, METHODS OF SOCIAL REFORM (1896);
SAMUEL SMILES, SELF-HELP (John Murray Publishers 1969) (1859).
72. Davies, supra note 71, at 51. There is actually something of a debate over whether the
yeoman farmers of early 19th-century America were entrepreneurs, see, e.g., JAMES T. LEMON, THE
BEST POOR MAN'S COUNTRY (1972); Richard Hofstadter, The Myth of the Happy Yeoman, 7 Am.
HERITAGE 43 (1955), or subsistence farmers reluctant to engage in market transactions, see, &g.,
STEVEN HAHN, THE ROOTS OF SOUTHERN POPULISM: YEOMAN FARMERS AND THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE GEORGIA UPCOUNTRY, 1850-1890 (1983). See generally BRUCE LAURIE, ARTI-
SANS INTO WORKERS: LABOR IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 223 (1989).
73. Although "individualism" is often associated with entrepreneurialism and upward mobil-
ity, see, e.g., Zuckerman, supra note 70, the main point of achieving self-reliance is neither to
acquire wealth nor "to enable the individual to rise in society to a higher social position" (al-
though these things may happen) but rather "to free the individual from the condition of servility
and dependence." Davies, supra note 71, at 49-5 0.
74. For an innovative welfare reform proposal based on the premise that individualism and
having a stake in the marketplace are inextricably related, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE AL-
STOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SoCIETY 4-9, 191-94 (1999) (proposing that each American be
given a one-time grant of $80,000 upon reaching early adulthood).
75. SMILES, supra note 71, at 298.
76. For many advocates of self-reliance, "'standing on one's own feet' ... means economic in-
dependence, being able to support oneself, and is therefore incompatible with being a recipient of
charity or relief." Davies, supra note 71, at 44. Thus, the anti-welfare movement in the United
States reflects "the implicit (sometimes explicit) competition between social welfare programs and
one of America's guiding social myths-rugged individualism." MARMOR ET AL., supra note 33,
at 4. In fact, Professors Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey have argued that one of the principal aims
of the American social welfare system is "to promote family independence and self-support." Id.
at 125.
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ideology of self-reliance, often associated with classical republican
thought, has been influential in the United States. 7
3. Worker Control
The ideology of worker control operates in advanced capitalist sys-
tems that have institutionalized to one extent or another some form of
industrial or workplace democracy. This kind of worker control is not
to be equated with socialism or communism; it is an accommodation,
within a capitalist system, of workers' demands for greater participa-
tion in the decisions that shape industrial and workplace policy. This
participation can be achieved either through outright worker owner-
ship of a firm78 or in more moderate forms, such as corporate "code-
termination" regimes7 9 and "cooperative" workplace arrangements.8 0
In addition to material benefits, worker control arguably gives to
workers the sense of recapturing a measure of the liberty and self-
governance promised to them by democracy but seemingly betrayed
77. Prominent American exponents of the ideology of self-reliance include Thomas Jefferson,
see Notes on Virginia, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 187, 280
(Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944) ("Dependence begets subservience and venality
.... "); Letter to John Jay, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, jtupra,
at 377, 377 (describing farmers as "the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the
most independent, [and] the most virtuous"), Ralph Waldo Emerson, see Sc/f-Reliance, in RALPH
WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS 35 (Macmillan and Co., Ltd. 1901), and Henry David Thoreau, sce
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN (1854) (Princeton Univ. Press 1971). That the ideology of
self-reliance still has much potency in the United States today can be seen in the multimillion-
dollar self-help industry, see Lisa Gubernick & Philippe Mao, The Happiness Hucksters, FORBES,
Oct. 9, 1995, at 82, and in movements as diverse as the Militia of Montana, see Mike Tharp &
Wlliam J. Holstein, Mainstreaming the Militia, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 21, 1997, at 24,
and inner city, anti-welfare campaigns such as Ted Hayes' "self-respect" program for the homeless
in Los Angeles, see The Inner Cities: Breathless Hh in the 'hood, ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1998, at 25.
78. Probably the most prominent example of industrial worker cooperatives in a market econ-
omy is the "well-established group of closely affiliated worker cooperatives in Mondragon, Spain."
HENRY HANSmANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 68 (1996). In the United States, em-
ployee ownership is rare in the industrial sector but "has long been the prevailing mode of or-
ganization in the service professions, including law, accounting, investment banking, manage-
ment consulting, advertising, architecture, engineering, and medicine." Id. at 66-67.
79. Germany and Sweden have well-known codetermination laws guaranteeing board ofdirec-
tor positions to worker representatives. See GiANARiS, supra note 35, at 74, 84, 103; HANSMANN,
supra note 78, at 110-12. Even in these countries, however, worker representatives on the super-
visory board often "serve as informational conduits" but do not exercise meaningful control over
firm decision-making. Id. at 112.
80. In Japan, what Professors Charles Sabel and Michael Dorf have called "learning by moni-
toring" governance systems, in which "[g]roup deliberation in benchmarkIng, simultaneous
engineering, and error detection become central to all decisions," have "introduc[ed] a kind of
workplace democracy." Michael C. Dorf & Charles F Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Expcri-
mentalism, 98 COLUM. L. RE. 267, 313 (1998). In the United States, the 1980s and 1990s saw
"the spread offfull-blown cooperationist models of labor-management relations." Barenberg, supra
note 45, at 1384; see also PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 225-306 (1990). One
well-known example is flexible specialization. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE
SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE 28-35 (1984). "[H]ow widespread these innovations are in prac-
tice" is "highly contested among political economists." Barenberg, supra note 45, at 1385.
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by the realities of wage labor. It brings labor into the capitalist fold
and palliates in significant ways the conflict between democracy and a
market economy.
4. The Valued Employee
The ideology of the valued employee confers respectability and de-
sirability on the position of the lower-ranking, lesser-paid employee.8 1
This ideology may be sustained in a number of ways. In many Euro-
pean countries, apprenticeship systems for lower-echelon workers (both
blue- and white-collar) appear to foster professional pride in work and
the sense of belonging to an esteemed trade.8 2 In Germany, for exam-
ple, a person trains for three years to be a department store clerk and
receives certification by taking a detailed examination at the end of
this training;8 3 similar requirements apply to bakers, mechanics, secre-
taries, and many other vocations.8 4 The ideology of the valued em-
ployee can also take the form of the firm-as-extended-family. Japan's
corporate culture, in which firms promise (or used to promise) lifetime
job security, and executives routinely socialize after hours with subor-
dinates, provides an example.8 5 Where this ideology flourishes, lower-
paid employees feel strong corporate loyalty as well as a sense of having
a stake in the success of the economy as a whole, regardless of whether
there is upward mobility, self-reliance, or worker control.
5. Racism
Finally, in at least some developed countries the ideology of racism
has arguably been a powerful force fracturing the "lower class" and
inducing large numbers of the less well-off majority to vote in defiance
of what might be expected to be their rational economic self-interest.8 6
81. In the three preceding ideologies, such positions are not valued, at least not in themselves.
At best, the ideology of upward mobility regards such positions as a means toward moving up.
The ideology of self-reliance generally disdains menial, subordinate positions. The ideology of
worker control tells lower-rung employees to be satisfied with their lot only if they achieve con-
trol or codetermination of the workplace.
82. See FRANCIS FUKUYA A, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPER-
rry 237-38,241 (1995).
83. "[Aln American in a comparable position at JC Penney will have received three days of
on-the-job training." Id. at 238. The German apprenticeship system is much more extensive
"than that of Britain, where it exists only in certain industries like engineering, building, and
construction, or in France, where it feeds the traditional artisanal sector. Some seventy percent of
all young Germans start their working careers as apprentices." Id. at 237. "There are apprentice-
ships in virtually all sectors, for both blue- and white-collar work." Id.
84. See id. at 237-38.
85. See id. at 187-89. "Japanese employers are famous for taking a paternalistic attitude to-
ward the personal lives of their workers. A supervisor will attend weddings and funerals of the
people he supervises and may even act as a go-between in arranging marriages." Id at 189.
86. See MCIcHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE COLOR OF POLrrscS: RACE AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 30-31,308-09 (1997); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE 7, 191-
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Racism is not inherently pro-market or anti-market. But in the United
States, for example, racism has likely operated in service of market
capitalism in two different ways. First, like the previous four ideolo-
gies, racism (and the creation of a large racial underclass) has arguably
made poor and working-class whites feel better about their relative
plight, giving them a consoling sense of superiority and status vis-A-
vis African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and other groups of color
perceived (in many senses correctly) as "the sediment of the American
stratificational order."87 Second, racism may hinder the formation of
political alliances between poor and working-class whites on one hand,
and poor and working-class minorities, on the other hand.88 This is
consistent with the absence of a powerful working-class political party
in the United States. 89
Elements of all five of these ideologies are probably present in all
developed countries. Even in Japan, famous for its hierarchical struc-
93 (1994); see also Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV, L. REv. 1331, 1374 (1988) (suggesting that
"ffrom the seventeenth century onward" the power of racism convinced non-slaveholding whites
to support a system that was opposed to their own economic interests").
87. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A Nnw
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 5 (1995); see also DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF
WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991) (suggesting
that in the 19th century racism and "the benefits conferred by whiteness made white Southern
workers forget their 'practically identical interests' with the Black poor and accept stunted lives
for themselves and for those more oppressed than themselves"); Crenshaw, supra note 86, at 1374
(suggesting that "racial 'privilege could and did serve as a compensation for class disadvantage'
(citation omitted)).
88. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 86, at 30-31; FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD,
THE BREAKING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL COMPACT 12, 29, 92 (1998). Thus, after World War
II, the Congress of Industrial Organization's (CIO) mass unionism campaign in the southern
states ("Operation Dixie") failed dismally, unable to overcome "the insuperable task of forming
unified workplace movements between white workers, who attended Klan meetings after work,
and black workers." Mark Barenberg, Federalism and American Labor Law: Touard a Critical Map-
ping of the "Social Dumping" Question, in HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS
93, 110 (Ingolf Pemice ed., 1996). More generally, "[the 'identity politics' of white supremacy
in the South and of white ethnic parochialism in northern cities, was the glue of Democratic
constituency building." PIVEN & CLOWARD, spra, at 91-92; Barenberg, supra, at 110-11. In the
1960s,
[a]s newly urbanized blacks rose up and made demands for racial equity, an already fragile
party coalition was sundered: the white South turned Republican, first in presidential elec-
tions and then in congressional elections, and many white working-class voters in the North
responded to third party or Republican racial demagoguery by deserting the Democrats.
PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra, at 12. In recent years, nor just in the United States but in many devel-
oped countries, political elites have played on racism and xenophobia, seeking to gain advantage
from popular division. Thus,
Le Pen's Front National in France, the Christian Right in the United States, the Freedom
Party in Austria, the Falangists in Spain, the Lombardy League in Italy, or the Republicans
in Germany where half a million immigrants arrived in 1992 alone - work to stoke the an-
ger against outsiders. They draw popular attention away from the economic transformations
underway, and try to hold or win anxious voters by directing resentment against outsiders,
Id. at 53.
89. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 86, at 30-31; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 88, at 4, 91, 93;
Barenberg, supra note 88, at 111.
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tures and worker loyalty, the ideology of self-reliance has had its ap-
peal. 90 Similarly, in Britain, despite its well-known class distinctions,
the ideology of upward mobility flourished to a surprising extent in
the late eighteenth century.91 Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that the
ideologies of upward mobility and self-reliance are today more promi-
nent in the United States than in Western Europe and Japan, 92 whereas
the opposite is true of the ideologies of worker control and the valued
employee.
To repeat, the foregoing list of market-compatible ideologies is
meant only to be suggestive. Again, I am not concerned with the ori-
gins of these ideologies (which no doubt are rooted in some unknow-
able combination of history, geography, culture, and serendipity).93
More specifically, I am not making the functionalist claim that a capi-
talist system somehow produces such ideologies to sustain itself (a
claim for which Marxist theory is often criticized). On the contrary, as
I have demonstrated in earlier work and elaborate further below, the
volatile conjunction of markets and democracy can also yield poten-
tially market-subversive ideologies-socialism and ethnonationalism
are two prominent examples.
In sum, I have tried in this Part to make plausible the following hy-
pothesis: The tensions between markets and democracy in the devel-
oped world have been substantially alleviated by a host of redistribu-
90. As Frances Fukuyama has described:
There was in fact a tradition dating back to Tokugawa times [1603-1868] of highly mobile
artisans, who moved from workplace to workplace as the mood struck them. These workers
took pride in their intolerance of routine, in their rebelliousness, in their ability to sell their
labor where they chose, and in their high living and frequently unconventional lifestyles, all
characteristics we tend not to associate with contemporary Japanese.
FUKUYAMA, supra note 82, at 191 (citation omitted).
91. According to David Landes, British society during the Industrial Revolution was far more
open and fluid than in Europe:
Not only was income more evenly distributed than across the Channel, but the barriers to
mobility were lower, the definitions of status looser ....
... This was a people fascinated by wealth and commerce, collectively and individually
... Business interests promoted a degree of intercourse between people of different sta-
tions and walks of life that had no parallel on the Continent.
DAVID S. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS 48, 66,70 (1969). See generally id. at 39-122.
92. For a subtle historical discussion of the complex ideological structures distinctive of
"American modernity," see Heller, supra note 65, at 13-30.
93. There may be interesting relationships between particular market-compatible ideologies
and levels of redistribution. For example, one might expect that the more robust the ideology of
upward mobility in a particular country, the smaller material wealth transfers will have to be.
This is consistent with the fact that governmental transfers are smaller in the United States than
in a country such as England with relatively rigid class structures, where arguably the absence of
a strong upward-mobility ideology is compensated for by larger government transfers to the less
well-off. Similarly, a flourishing self-reliance ideology might produce opposition to, or even dis-
dain for, welfare-style redistribution among the less well-off.
Harvard International Law Journal / Vol 41
tive, political, and ideological devices that vary from country to coun-
try. To be sure, it is impossible to prove that without such devices free
market democracy in the developed world would not have survived.
But if we believe that the cumulative effect of these devices has been to
help preserve the "antagonistic symbiosis""' between markets and de-
mocracy in the developed nations, this obviously has bearing on the
project of exporting sustainable market democracy to developing coun-
tries. As Parts II and III will suggest, one of the most important chal-
lenges facing developing-world policy makers is to analyze candidly
which developed-world "solutions" to the paradox of free market de-
mocracy could-or should-be promoted in the developing world.
II. PARADOX UNLEASHED
This Part will explain why the paradox of free market democracy is
far more dangerous and potentially explosive in the developing world
than in the developed world. Section A will highlight the general ab-
sence in developing countries of the material, political, and ideological
mediating devices found in the developed world-an absence made
especially problematic given the extent of poverty and the rapidity of
democratization in the developing world. Section B will show how in
many developing countries this conflict is magnified immeasurably by
the phenomenon of market-dominant minorities-ethnic minorities
who, along with foreign investors, tend under market conditions to
dominate economically the impoverished majorities around them. This
particular mapping of ethnicity onto class-common in developing
societies but rare today in the developed world--converts the paradox
of free market democracy into an engine of potentially catastrophic
ethnonationalism. Contemporary Indonesia is offered as a paradigmatic
illustration. Section C discusses developing countries without eco-
nomically dominant minorities (for example, Argentina and China).
Conversely, Section D discusses economically dominant minorities that
existed in the developed nations during earlier (typically undemo-
cratic) periods. In Section E, Weimar Germany is cautiously offered as
a rare instance in which a Western nation pursued-with catastrophic
ethnonationalist consequences-free market democracy under condi-
tions in many respects analogous to those characteristic of many devel-
oping countries today.
94. DAHL, supra note 2, at 166.
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A. The Absence of Institutions in the Developing World Mediating the
Paradox of Free Market Democracy
1. Material Redistribution
Whereas the relatively less well-off in developed countries to a
significant extent have been "bought out," the same cannot be said of
the hundreds of millions of chronically poor throughout the develop-
ing world. The "poor" in developing countries are not an undifferenti-
ated mass, and modest opportunities for occupational and economic
mobility probably exist everywhere.9' "By virtually any objective crite-
rion," however, the problems of urban and rural "poverty in Asia, Af-
rica, and to a lesser degree Latin America are staggering.
9 6
In part, the problem is one of drastically insufficient funds. Almost
by definition, the poor are far more numerous (and generally speaking
far poorer) in the developing world than in the developed world. The
ongoing population explosion in the developing world--one of the
greatest sources of pessimism for developmental economists-contrasts
markedly "with the history of the presently rich industrial nations
when they were in earlier phases of their development." 97 For example,
"in their nineteenth-century pre-industrial phase, the countries of
Western Europe had a population growth that was generally less than
half the rate now existing in the poor countries."98 If current World
Bank projections are correct, the population in countries now classified
as developing is expected to increase from roughly 4 billion today to
roughly 8 billion by the year 2050. 99
As a result, throughout the developing world, a minimally accept-
able standard of living for the poor is far more difficult to achieve than
in the developed world, because, to put it mildly, there is much less to
be spread across many more. At the same time, developing-country
elites are obviously resistant to redistribution, 100 and the understand-
able focus on growth among developing-country leaders and interna-
tional policy makers tends to deprioritize redistributive programs.
There are some qualified exceptions. A few developing countries, for
example Bolivia, have implemented genuine, large-scale, redistributive
agrarian reforms.' 0' In India, some redistribution has occurred through
95. SeeJoAN M. NELSON, ACCESS To POWER 47 (1979).
96. Id.
97. GERALD MEIER, LEADING ISSUES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 276-77 (6th ed. 1995).
98. Id.
99. See Nancy Birdsall, Population Growth, FIN. & DEv., Sept. 1984, at 10-14.
100. See Alain de Janvry & Elisabeth Sadouler, A Study in Resistance to Institutional Change: The
Lost Game of Latin American Land Reform, 17 WORLD DEV. 1397-99, 1405-07 (1989).
101. See ROBERT BARTON, A SHORT HISTORY OF BOLIVIA 262-66 (1968); infra note 115.
But despite agrarian reform, Bolivia still "has one of the worst distributions of wealth in the
Americas (the wealthiest 5 percent control 39 percent of the national income and the poorest 20
percent, only 2 percent)." WALTRAUD QUEISER MORALES, BOLIVIA: LAND OF STRUGGLE 203
Harvard International Law Journal / Vol, 41
affirmative action quotas for lower castes and tribes.0 2 Nevertheless, it
remains the case that "extreme inequalities ... largely unqualified by
effective compensatory devices" are the norm throughout the develop-
ing world, 10 3 including many countries in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union.10 4
To be clear, buy-outs occur all the time in the developing world;
they are a part of daily life. Many developing countries, for example,
are characterized by extensive patron-client relationships; local and
even higher-level politicians often offer important constituents "such
things as hospital beds, loans, jobs, permits, places in schools, irriga-
tion projects, roads and repairs, even train reservations. ' ' Typically,
however, by far the largest pay-offs in developing countries are made
by the wealthy (including foreign investors) to corrupt officials and
bureaucrats in the form of bribes, speed money, kickbacks, embezzle-
ment, extortion, or other illicit activity. 0 6
The problem, therefore, is not only that of insufficient funds. It is no
secret that most developing and post-communist countries lack strong,
accountable institutions capable of administering a regulatory welfare
state. It was often hoped that privatization, by eliminating bloated
bureaucracies and state-owned enterprises, would both substantially
reduce corruption 10 7 and leave behind a pared-down and better-
functioning state apparatus, capable of administering regulatory and
redistributive institutions.10 8 Unfortunately, to date, privatization gen-
erally has done neither. Instead, in many developing countries, the
privatization process itself has been corrupted, with transfers of wealth
going not to the relatively poor but rather to those rich enough to bid
(1992).
102. See Kanti Bajpai, Diversity, Democracy, and Devolution in India, in GOVERNMENT POLICIES
AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, supra note 55, at 33, 53-54, 78. "[TMhose
who have benefited from reservations have tended to be a small elite within the scheduled caste
and tribe communities." Id. at 54.
103. UNGER, supra note 1, at 53; see MElER, supra note 97, at 23-24.
104. See, e.g., John Thomhill,John Thornhill Reports from Volgograd on Election Politics in Rusia's
Red Belt, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 10, 1999, at 9; Partitioned Again, ECONOMIST, Apr. 16,
1994, at 5.
105. Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Allocation of Government Authority: Does
Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 VA. L. REv. 1521, 1537 (1977); see also NELSON, supra note 94, at
187-88. Jonathan Fox has described clientelism as "a relationship based on political subordina-
tion in exchange fbr material rewards." Jonathan Fox, The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to
Citizenship: L sonsfrom Mexico, 46 WORLD POL. 151, 153 (1994).
106. See SUSAN ROSE-AcKEP, xA,, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSE3-
QUENCES, AND REFORM 10-13, 15, 18, 31, 53, 114-21 (1999).
107. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Development, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CON-
FERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1997, at 35, 46 (Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E. Stiglitz
eds., 1997).
108. See, e.g., Roman Frydman et al., Investing in Insider-Dominated Firms: A Study of Russian
Voucher Privatization Funds, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA 187-
241 (Roman Frydman er al. eds., 1996); Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corpo-
rate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming June 2000).
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and bribe,10 9 to corporate insiders, 1 0 to government officials and their
families and friends,' and, in some cases, to organized crime
groups." 2 Further, even when the privatization process has been rela-
tively transparent, the main beneficiaries of state divestment-at least
in the short run-tend to be foreign investors and their wealthy do-
mestic business partners, while the losers tend to be labor and those
most dependent on (inefficient) state support."5
In sum, in the developing world today the poor are far more numer-
ous, and poverty far more entrenched, than in the developed world,
either today or at analogous historical periods. Moreover, the version of
market capitalism being exported to the developing world does not, as
a practical matter, include redistributive institutions of the kind that
have helped mute the harshest effects of capitalism in the West.
2. Political Restraints and Political Exclusion
Similarly, it is crucial to recognize that the process of democratiza-
tion that developing societies are being asked to embrace is not the same
as the one that the Western democracies themselves went through. In the
West, as mentioned earlier, universal suffrage emerged only gradually
and incrementally.114 By contrast, in the developing world, universal
suffrage generally has been or is being implemented on a massive scale
109. See, eg., RosE-AcKRmAN, supra note 106, at 35-36; David Luhnow, Mexico's Electricity
Plans Opposed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 13, 1999, at C2.
110. See Frydman er al., supra note 108; John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Govern-
ance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CoRP. LAw 1 (1999); Black et al., supra note
108.
111. Examples of nepotism and cronyism in developing-country privatizations abound. See,
e.g., ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 106, at 36 (noting that "[i]n Brazil when it became clear that
an ally of President Fernando Collor de Mello was in line to receive a privatized firm, others
withdrew their offers"); Andrew Downie, Mexican Official WIns Fertilizer Plant Bidding: Deal Cited
as Example of Corruption, HousToN CHRON., Nov. 8, 1996, at 4 (describing charges of "wide-
spread corruption surrounding former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's privatization pro-
gram"); S. Jayasankaran, Problems in Private: Malaysian Firms Hand Back Projects to the Government,
FAR E. EcoN. REv., Apr. 23, 1998, at 75 (describing major privatization projects in Malaysia
awarded to Prime Minister Mahathir's son and former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's
supporters); William Wallis, Teething Troubles Abound as Nigeria Tries to Wean Itself Off State Own-
ership ofIndustry, FIN. TllEs (London), Mar. 30, 1999, at 5 (describing "renewed public fears" in
Nigeria "that privatization is intended less as the motor of national economic growth than as a
route to the further enrichment of the [ruling] generals and their cronies").
112. See ROsE-AcKEnRAN, supra note 106, at 24.
113. See, e&g., Anthony Faiola, Ecuador Not Ready to Go to Market; Economic Reforms Are Slowed by
Strikes, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1999, at A17; Luhnow, supra note 109, at C2; Plan to Privatize
Seaport Operator Opposed, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 6, 1999; Partitioned Again, supra note 104, at 5; Kurt
Shillinger, Advances in S. Africa Leave Workers Behind, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 1998, at Cl;
Alisa Yamnarm, The Crisis of Unemployment and the Future of Reform in Central and Eastern Europe:
Hungary as a Model, 3 CARDOZO J. INT'L & Comp. L. 181 (1995). In cases where privatized firms
are sold as monopolies, the benefits of privatization may largely be limited to the new owners.See
ROsE-ACKERMAN, supra note 106, at 37-38.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 47-55.
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and almost (by comparison) overnight. 115 This sudden, unmediated
process of democratization makes the transition to free market democ-
racy particularly volatile and the need for other mediating devices
more pressing.
To be sure, many developing and post-communist countries now
have on paper various constitutional property safeguards and guaran-
tees, in some cases copied almost verbatim from Western constitu-
tions. 116 There is nothing inherently wrong with (even verbatim)
copying; there is a long history of legal institutions successfully "bor-
rowed" from one context and "transplanted" to another.117 The prob-
lem is, however, that in most developing countries, these paper consti-
tutional protections are uninternalized,"l8 unsupported by a viable in-
stitutional framework," 9 and in some cases, completely unserious. 120
Efforts to address the problem of "constitutions without constitution-
alism" 21 are of crucial importance. For the time being, however, insti-
tutions capable of giving meaningful content to paper constitutional
protections remain severely lacking in the developing world.
115. A number of developing countries have had universal suffrage (at least on the books) for
many decades now. India, for example, has had universal suffrage since independence. See Gurcha-
ran Das, The Hindu-Editorial: The wise elephant, THE HINDU, Jan. 1, 2000; see also DENNIS Aus-
TIN, DEMOCRACY AND VIOLENCE IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA (1994). In Bolivia, one of the first
acts of the Movimento Nacionalista Revolucionario, after taking power in 1952, was to extend uni-
versal suffrage to Indians. Shortly afterwards, estates over fifteen hundred acres were confiscated,
and extensive agrarian reform undertaken. See BARTON, supra note 101, at 263-66.
116. See, e.g., REr R. LuDwIKOwsKI, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE PEGION OF FORMER
SovIET DOMINANCE 1-3 (1996); Fidelis Edge Kanyongolo, The Constitution and Democratization
Process in Malawi, in THE STATE AND CONSTITUTIONAUSM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 1, 1-11 (Owen
Sichone ed., 1998).
117. See, eg., JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., LAW IN RADICALLY DIFFERENT CULTURES 36 (1983)
(noting that Egypt's "current judicial system ... is modeled very closely on the French pattern");
Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 L. & Soc'Y REv. 29, 42 (1969)
(observing that "Japan and Turkey are among the countries that have borrowed Western codes,
lock, stock, and barrel."); Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law Re-
form and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 267-73, 574 (1994) (describing the
successful incorporation of English law into Malaysian Islamic law); Stanley Lubman, Introduction:
The Future of Chinese Law, CHINA Q., Mar. 1995, at 1, 18 (stating that China's current civil code
"is closely modelled on the general part of the German Civil Code, which influenced the Civil
Code presently in force in Taiwan").
118. In one commentator's words, referring to constitutions newly adopted by Malawi, Na-
mibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, unless serious attention is paid to "internalizing the
values of democracy" and to ensuring that universal principles are articulated "in a way that
makes [them] accessible in indigenous discourse," "the region's liberal democratic constitutions
will join the numerous white elephants which litter the African landscape like some haunting
reminders of... misguided paternalism." Kanyongolo, supra note 116, at 11.
119. See, e.g., David Bourchier, Magic Memos, Collusion and Judges with Attitude: Notes on the
Politics of Law in Contemporary Indonesia, in LAW, CAPITALSMs AND POWER IN ASIA 233 236-37
(Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999); Khoo Boo Teik, Between Law and Politics: The MalaysianJudciary
Since Independence, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA, supra, at 205, 224.
120. See, eg., Chua, supra note 1, at 84 (noting the purely formal separation of powers in Ka-
zakhstan).
121. Issa G. Shivji, Problems of Constitution-Making as Consensus-Building: The Tanzanian Expe-
rience, in THE STATE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 116, at 23, 42.
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On the other hand, many developing countries do have one per-
versely effective restraint on democracy: systemic political corruption.
As discussed further below, even in nominally democratic countries,
rigged elections, rampant bribery, and, more subtly, extensive patron-
clientelism often create substantial obstacles to genuine democracy in
the developing world (as of course they sometimes have done in the
developed world). 122 In recent years, anti-corruption initiatives have
become a major thrust of international development policy.123 These
initiatives are long overdue and of the utmost importance, but to the
extent that they succeed, they may sharpen the conflict between mar-
kets and democracy.
3. Market-Compatible Ideologies
As market institutions are exported to the developing world, there
is a tendency to assume that the generally market-supportive beliefs
and cultural attitudes familiar to us in the West will be exported along
with them. This assumption is deeply problematic. Ideologies do not
come "attached" to institutions. State-building, as recent years have
shown, is difficult enough; ideology-building is something else alto-
gether. For example, it seems implausible that an American-style,
rags-to-riches ideology of upward mobility, which does not travel par-
ticularly well even to Europe, could exist robustly amidst the chronic
hunger, malnutrition, and entrenched poverty characteristic of much of
the developing world.' 24 "People whose physical survival is imperiled
cannot think about the future"12 5-- 1et alone experience an enriching
sense of having a stake in the marketplace. Nor is it realistic that mar-
kets will spontaneously generate an ideology of "valued employees" (or,
with one exception to be discussed momentarily, any of the other de-
122. See RosE-AcrEPmAN, supra note 106, at 137-38; see infra text accompanying notes 460-
467.
123. See RosE-AcKaRmAN, supra note 106, at xii, 177, 182-84.
124. See MEIER, supra note 97, at 25-28; The Hungry Are Always with Us, ECONOMIST, Oct.
16, 1999, at 49 (describing the pervasive hunger in the developing world, as recently docu-
mented by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation). Needless to say, "the devel-
oping world" is not monolithic. Several of the post-communist states (for example, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, and Hungary), which are sometimes classified as part of the developing world,
have much more advanced economies than other developing countries. Argentina enjoyed a pe-
riod of upward mobility, both actual and perceived, in the early decades of this century, and even
today arguably has more in common with the United States than with (say) Bolivia or Guate-
mala. See MEIR, supra note 97, at 14-16 (offering comparative statistics on "basic indicators" of
development). More generally, a number of developing countries have begun to establish a sub-
stantial (if precarious) middle class, and pockets of upward mobility and economic self-reliance
certainly exist. In Shanghai, the market reforms of the last decade have enabled substantial num-
bers of average citizens to go "from rags to riches." Unfortunately, these are the exceptions rather
than the rule. In Shanghai, for example, the market reforms just mentioned also have led to thou-
sands of other (typically older, less educated) Shanghainese being laid off. See Women hold up half
the sky, yet find no place in the sun, HINDUSTAN TsMES, Mar. 18, 1999.
125. ADAM PZEWORSKI, SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY 76 (1995).
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veloped-world market-compatible ideologies described earlier) in so-
cieties where cheap labor has been so consistently exploited 26
To be sure, market-oriented reforms have during some periods en-
joyed broad, even euphoric, enthusiasm among developing-country
populations. While some of this enthusiasm may be realistic and dura-
ble, it should not be equated with what I have called market-
compatible ideologies. The initial enthusiasm for free market democ-
racy in the developing world has often been based on extremely unre-
alistic expectations.
In South Africa, for example, in the euphoria following the collapse
of apartheid, millions-according to one poll, an 81% majority-of
black South Africans hoped that the new government would "make
sure that 'people like me can live like most whites."' 127 But such hopes
of rapid economic empowerment, often encouraged or even generated
by vote-seeking politicians, are very different from a sustained, histori-
cally rooted ideology of upward mobility. Far from being capable of
maintaining support for markets among the less well-off even in the
face of ongoing, market-generated, extreme income disparities, dan-
gerously inflated expectations can be expected to do just the opposite:
produce widespread disappointment, anger, and rebellion when it be-
comes clear that rapid riches will not come. 128
On the other hand, one (and unfortunately the darkest) of the mar-
ket-compatible ideologies described above does seem to have some
purchase in certain developing societies. Just as racism has operated to
fracture poor majorities in some developed countries, so too racism and
other forms of ethnic conflict, including caste, religious, and tribal
divisions, may impede the formation of class-based coalitions in some
developing countries. Brazil provides a possible (and characteristically
complex) example of this.
Race consciousness is much more muted, and racially based mobili-
zation much less salient, in Brazil than in the United States.'29 One
view of this "low-level of racial identity consolidation," consistent with
Brazil's dominant official discourse, emphasizes the absence of racial
discrimination in Brazil and the fact that most Brazilians are to some
126. See David Moberg, Can Workers Tame Unrestrained Globalization?, WVORKING USA,
Mar./Apr. 1999, at 8, 8-17; Fred Rosen, Workers oftke World, UNITE!, NACLA REPORT ON THE
AsmnmcAs, May/June 1997, at 5; Helen 1. Safa, Where the Big Fish Eat he Little Fish: Women's Work
in the Free-Trade Zones, NACLA REPORT ON THE AmERICAS, Mar./Apr. 1997, at 31, 32-36.
127. Hermann Giliomee & Charles Simkins, The Dominant Party Regimes of South Africa, Mex-
ico, Taiwan and Malaysia: A Comparative Assessment, in THE AWKWARD EMBRAcE: DEMOCRACY
AND DOMINANT-PARTY RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA, MEXICO, TAIWAN, AND MALAYSIA 1, 24
(Hermann Giliomee & Charles Simkins eds., 1998).
128. See TED ROBERT GuRu, WHY MEN REBEL 9, 12-14, 360-67.
129. See Anthony W. Marx, Contested Citizenship: The Dynamics of Racial Identity and Social
Movements, reprinted in 40 INT'L REV. Soc. HIST.: CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY, AND SOCIAL HISTORY
(Supp. 3) 159, 177-79 (Charles Tilly ed., 1995).
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degree "mixed" and thus equal members of the "Brazilian race." 30 An-
other view, more skeptical of Brazil's "myth of racial democracy,""'
emphasizes Brazil's evident pigmentocracy,3 2 the disenfranchisement of
many poor blacks until as late as 1988 on illiteracy grounds,'33 and the
common perception that "whitening" (through miscegenation or
passing) is a key route to social advancement.' From this point of
view, racism in Brazil has had an effect on the paradox of free market
democracy highly analogous to its effect in the United States. As with
poor whites in the United States, racism may encourage mulattos in
Brazil to disassociate themselves from the generally "poorer, less edu-
cated, and less respected" black population, impeding social mobiliza-
tion."'
Frequently, however, ethnic conflict in the developing world will
not mediate but rather catalyze the paradox of free market democracy.
This is the subject of the next Section.
B. The Problem of Ethnonationalism
Many developing nations not only lack market-compatible ideolo-
gies, but also tend to be in the grip-or prone to the grip-of a par-
ticularly lethal and potentially market-subversive ideology: ethnona-
tionalism.
Ethnonationalism is that form of nationalism in which the nation is
"defined in terms of assumed blood ties and ethnicity."136 " [Mlix[ing]
facts with fiction," and "always involv[ingl a measure of political ma-
nipulation,"'137 ethnonationalism has been one of the most potent po-
130. Id. at 178-79.
131. Id. at 182.
132. The stark (but unspoken) reality in Brazil is that "Itihe top jobs in business, politics and
academia are held by those with light skin." David L. Marcus, Melting Pot Coming to a Boil. Bra-
zilians Blur Color Lines, But Racism Stands Out Clearly, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Jan. 16, 1994, at
1A. By contrast, African Brazilians have historically filled "subordinate economic roles." Marx,
supra note 129, at 178-79. Meanwhile, "mulattos" or persons of "mixed-race" are generally ac-
corded greater privileges than blacks, but fewer privileges than the "white" minority. Marcus,
supra, at IA.
133. Marx, supra note 129, at 179. Such "exclusion from full citizenship was not explicitly
based on race." Id.
134. Id. at 181.
135. Marcus, supra note 132, at 1A; see CARL N. DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE:
SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRAziL AND THE UNITED STATES 245 (1971). Effectively,
mulattos act as a buffer class between elite whites and economically exploited blacks, reinforcing
a system of white dominance. See Marcus, supra note 132, at 1A.
136. Rend Lemarchand, The Siren Song of Self-Determination, UNESCO COURIER, June 1993, at
29,30.
137. Id. at 31. Ethnicity is an elusive and controversial concept that has generated consider-
able debate among social scientists. For purposes of this Article, I adopt a broad conception of
ethnicity, which acknowledges the importance of subjective, "constructed" perceptions of identity
and encompasses differences along racial lines, lines of geographic origin, and linguistic, relig-
ious, tribal, or other cultural lines. See Chun, supra note 1, at 10.
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litical forces of the last two hundred years and flourishes widely
throughout the developing world.
Ethnonationalism in itself, like racism, neither favors nor disfavors
markets. In a given society, ethnonationalism can coexist robustly with
markets. Arguably Japan, with its relatively high degree of "ethnocul-
tural homogeneity resulting from two and a half centuries of isola-
tion," is an instance of this. 138 As the next Section discusses, however,
ethnonationalism will, under certain conditions characteristic of the
developing world, tend to be a profoundly market-subversive force.
1. Market-Dominant Minorities and the Ethnicization of the Paradox
of Free Market Democracy
Although those shaping law and development today almost never
acknowledge the phenomenon, historians and sociologists of the devel-
oping world have long recognized the presence of ethnic minorities
who historically have dominated economically the indigenous majori-
ties around them.139 These minorities, who may be economically
dominant at the national or regional level, can be found throughout
South and Southeast Asia, 140 Africa, 14 1 the Caribbean and the West
138. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 95 (rev. ed. 1991). The "nation" in Ja-
pan has always been conceived of in strongly ethnic terms:
Citizenship law [in Japan] smacks strongly of jus sanguinis. Japanese children born to Japa-
nese parents are citizens from birth. But it is very difficult to become Japanese; this is open
only to people of Japanese ancestry. People of Korean ancestry-who number perhaps half
million in Japan---are not citizens and cannot become citizens, no matter how many genera-
tions have lived in Japan.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 161 (citation omitted).
139. See generally Chua, supra note 1, at 21-26; DONALD L. HOROWIT-Z, ETHNIC GROUPS IN
CONFLICT 105-228 (1985). As Professor Horowitz has observed, claims of majority indigenous-
ness are frequently highly artificial and often the product of elite manipulation. See id at 202-09.
140. Along with many others, I have elsewhere documented the startling persistence and ex-
tent of Chinese economic power in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam,
See Chua, supra note 1, at 22-23. Most recently, the astounding resurgence of ethnic Chinese
economic dominance in Mandalay, Burma, see Stephen Mansfield, Alyanmar's Chinese connection,
JAPAN TIMES, May 12, 1999, has become a source of potential regional destabilization. Other
economically dominant minorities in South and Southeast Asia have included Indians in Burma;
Ceylon Tamils in Sri Lanka; Vietnamese in Cambodia; and within India, Bengalis in Assam,
Coastal Andhras in Telengana, and South Indians in Maharashtria. See Chua, supra note 1.
141. Indians and Lebanese have long been economically dominant "pariah" (non-African) mi-
norities throughout East Africa and West Africa, respectively. See Chua, supra note 1, at 23-24
n.113. Economically dominant African minorities include the Baganda in Uganda, Bamileke in
Cameroon, Chagga in Tanzania, Ibo in northern Nigeria, Kikuyu in Kenya, and Tutsi in Burundi
and Rwanda. See HOROWITZ, supra note 139, at 37, 152-53; James Brooke, Informal Capitalism
Grows in Cameroon, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 30, 1987, at D8; Chua, stmpra note 1, at 24 n.114; Richard
Everett, The Bamileke-Merchant Tribe of Cameroon, RECORD, Aug. 10, 1986, at A48. Until recent
expulsions, ethnic Eritreans "constituted a successful merchant class" in Ethiopia (mainly in
Addis Ababa). Noah Benjamin Novogrodsky, Identity Politics: Forced Deportations Threaten to Turn
the Ethiopian-Eritrean Border War into Ethnic Conflict, 24 BOSTON REV. (Summer 1999) (visited
Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.bostonreview.mit.edu/BR24.3/Novogrodsky.html>. In Mauritius,
Euro-Mauritians, who comprise just 2% of the population but own "over 65 percent of the stock
of productive assets and over 75 percent of the land area" are economically dominant vis-h-vis the
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Indies, 14 2 in some countries in Latin America, 143 and in parts of the
former Soviet Union.144 To be clear, by economic dominance, I am re-
ferring not to vague stereotypes, but rather to actual, starkly dispro-
portionate control over major sectors of the economy. In Indonesia, for
example, the Chinese comprise only roughly 3% of the population, 145
but until recently controlled up to 70% of the private economy under
a number of different measures. 146 Similarly, in South Africa, the white
minority constitutes roughly 13% of the population, but, at least until
recently, owned over 85% of the country's arable land and controlled
all of the country's largest conglomerates. 147 In Guatemala, a tiny mi-
nority of generally light-skinned elites control most of the nation's
wealth, while Mayan Indians, comprising two-thirds of the popula-
tion, live in abject poverty.14s
In some cases, for example when a particular ethnic group owes its
economic dominance in part to political favoritism or military force,
market reforms might in theory be expected to undercut the minority's
politically dominant Indo-Mauritian majority. Percy S. Mistry, Mauritius-Quo Vadis?, 98 AFRI-
CAN AFFAIRS 551 (1999). In both South Africa and Zimbabwe, whites continue to represent a
starkly economically dominant minority. See Chua, supra note 1, at 49 n.262, 65.
142. In the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad, the Lebanese minority con-
tinue today to dominate commerce and industry. See Chua, supra note 1, at 24 n.115. In Guyana
and Trinidad, Indians generally outperform their Creole counterparts in trade and business de-
spite repeated backlashes. See id.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 201-206.
144. Throughout the Central Asian republics, the predominantly urban Russian minorities
still tend to dominate those countries' communications, construction, engineering, electronics,
science and computer technology, transportation, and industrial sectors, although such domi-
nance may dissipate with market reforms. See Chua, supra note 1, at 26, 86-88. At the same time,
in many Central Asian countries the Uzbek and the (relatively small) Korean minorities have
tended to be disproportionately prosperous vis-i-vis the indigenous minorities around them. See
id. at 26 n.127.
145.
No reliable figures on the number of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have been collected since
the 1930 census; all later estimates... appear to be based on calculations that they still rep-
resent either 3 or 4% of the total population, although even that can be only an informed
guess.
Jamie Mackie, Economic Systems of the Southeast Asian Chinese, in SOUTHEAST ASIAN CHINESE AND
CHINA: THE POLITIco-ECONomic DIMENSION 33, 62 n.14 (Leo Sutyadinata ed., 1995).
146. See, e.g., Leo Suryadinara, Indonesian Policies Toward the Chinese Minority Under the New Or-
der, 16 ASIAN SuRv. 770, 770 (1976); A Taxing Dilemma, ASIAWEEK, Oct. 20, 1993, at 57, 58
(reporting that, according to the Sakura Bank-Nomura Research Institute, in 1991 Indonesian
Chinese comprised 3.5% of the population but commanded a 73% share of the country's listed
equity); see also Linda YC. Lim & L.A. Peter Gosling, Strengths and Weaknesses of Minority Status for
Southeast Asian Chinese at a Time of Economic Growth and Liberalization, in ESSENTIAL OUTSIDERS:
CHINESE AND JEWS IN THE MODERN TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND CENTRAL
EUROPE 285, 312 n.2 (Daniel Chirot & Anthony Reid eds., 1997) (offering similar estimates);
infra text accompanying notes 164-196.
147. See Chua, supra note 1, at 65. A 1994 study showed that black South Africans, repre-
senting over 80% of the country's population, held only 3% of total jobs in management. See C.
Richard Scott et al., Affirmative Action as Seen by Business Majors in the U.S. and South Africa, 63
SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J. 28 (1998).
148. See Jacobo Finkelman, Towards Equity in Guatemala, 47 WORLD HEALTH 12 (1994).
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economic dominance.' In reality, however, in part because of histori-
cal or "path dependent" reasons, most economically dominant minori-
ties will also tend to be market-dominant-meaning that their eco-
nomic dominance will not dissipate but rather persist or even increase
with privatization and other market-oriented reforms, at least in the
near to midterm future. There are a number of reasons for this.
To begin with, "economic liberalization naturally favors private
business while reducing the role and influence of bureaucrats and the
state."150 Thus in the many developing societies in which the private
sector is overwhelmingly dominated by a particular ethnic minority,
economic liberalization will likely disproportionately benefit that mi-
nority, at least in the earlier years (or decades) of marketization. 151 This
will particularly be true where the economic regulations being swept
away, and the state-owned enterprises being dismantled, were origi-
nally established to curtail the economic dominance of the ethnic mi-
nority in question. 152
Relatedly, because economically dominant minorities frequently
control (or at least are disproportionately represented in) those sectors
of the economy that are most attractive to foreign investors-for ex-
ample, finance, technology, industry, transport, and mining and other
natural resources153-they often are better positioned to benefit from
foreign investment liberalization (for example, in the form of lucrative
joint ventures). 154 Some of this market dominance may reflect "supe-
rior entrepreneurialism," which itself can result from a number of fac-
tors, from culture to a history of political favoritism by colonial
149. An example might arguably be the Russian minorities in Central Asian countries such as
Kazakhstan, whose historical economic dominance clearly reflects at least in part pro-Russian
Soviet-em discrimination. See Chua, supra note 1, at 86-88. Competition law might also in some
cases dissipate the economic dominance of certain groups. See Eleanor Fox, Equality, Ditcrimina.
tion, and Competition Law: Lessons from and for South Africa and Indonesia, 41 HARv. INTL. L. J. 579,
at pt. IV (examining Indonesian competition law).
150. Lim & Gosling, supra note 146, at 295.
151. This is often the case with "entrepreneurial" ethnic groups in Africa-for example, the
Bamileke in Cameroon, Chagga in Tanzania, and Kikuyu in Kenya. See, e.g., Brooke, stpra note
141, at D8; Everett, supra note 141, at A48. In Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, tile
"liberal, market-oriented economic reform programs" of the 1980s appear to have "greatly in-
creased the wealth and relative power" of those countries' Chinese-dominated private business
communities. Lim & Gosling, supra note 146, at 295, 298, 301. Indeed, as one source has put it
(perhaps a little too vividly), the "rapid regionwide economic growth" since the 1980s "has
turned Southeast Asia into a 'South China Sea' of ethnic Chinese capital and labor movements,
greatly increasing the visibility and the actual presence of both foreign and local Chinese in re-
gional economies." Id. at 289. More recently, economic liberalization in Vietnam and Burma has
led to a resurgence of Chinese commercial dominance in the country's urban areas. See Chua, supra
note 1, at 22-23.
152. See Chua, supra note 1, at 48-50.
153. See, e.g., id. at 20-24, 26; Everett, supra note 141, at A48; Raphael Pura, Tchnology Guru
Stands Out in Indonesia, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1994, at B6D.
154. See, eg., JosE EDGARDO CAMPOs & HILTON L. ROOT, THE KEY TO TH1E ASIAN MIRACLE
131 (1996); Chua, supra note 1, at 100-01.
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authorities. 155 At the same time, more invidiously, some economically
dominant minorities may be market-dominant because, like whites in
apartheid South Africa, they have oppressed the indigenous majorities
around them for so long that it will be decades before education levels
and entrepreneurial experience come close to being equalized. 156
The phenomenon of market-dominant minorities has sobering im-
plications for free market democracy in the developing world. To
summarize my previous work very briefly, in developing countries with
a market-dominant minority, markets and democracy will tend to fa-
vor not just different people, or different classes, but different ethnic
groups. Markets will tend to benefit the market-dominant minority,
while democracy will increase the power of the relatively impoverished
majority. In these circumstances, the combined pursuit of markets and
democracy will tend to produce an ethnically charged and highly un-
stable situation. More specifically, as I have modeled elsewhere, 1" 7 in
countries satisfying certain specified conditions, including economic
underdevelopment and the presence of a market-dominant minority,
marketization and democratization will tend to produce highly deter-
minate and potentially highly destructive ethnoeconomic and ethno-
political consequences, along the following lines.
First, by causing, maintaining, or exacerbating the disproportionate
wealth of the market-dominant minority, marketization will cause,
maintain, or exacerbate intense ethnic resentment among the impov-
erished, indigenous majority.158 Next, with democratization, this eth-
noeconomic resentment will tend to be transformed into a potent eth-
nonationalist movement, in part because politicians will have powerful
incentives to scapegoat the resented economically dominant minority
and foment ethnic hatred to their advantage. 159 The result of this proc-
ess will often be the ethnicization of the paradox of free market democ-
racy: the emergence of an aroused ethnonationalist majority who, per-
ceiving markets as solely or principally benefitting a resented ethnic
minority, demands policies that will end that minority's economic
dominance, so that the nation's wealth and identity can be reclaimed
by its "true owners.' 160 In these circumstances, one of three non-
mutually exclusive outcomes becomes highly probable: (1) an anti-
155. 1 have elsewhere explored in detail the causes of market dominance. See Chua, supra note
1, at 29-33.
156. Seeid. at29.
157. I have developed a model exploring the likely consequences of pursuing markets and
democracy under the following conditions prevalent in the developing world: (1) economic un-
derdevelopment; (2) severe ethnic divisions; (3) the presence of a market-dominant minority; and
(4) the presence of an impoverished majority with claims to being the "true owners of the nation"
(often by virtue of their supposed "indigenousness"). See Chua, supra note 1, at 33-63.
158. See id. at 37-41.
159. Seeid. at 42-47.
160. Seeid. at 47-48.
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market backlash targeting the market-dominant minority (for example
through ethnically targeted nationalizations or economic restrictions);
(2) actions aimed at eliminating the market-dominant minority (for
example, through expulsion or atrocity); and (3) a pro-market retreat
from democracy. As I have documented in detail, each of these out-
comes has occurred repeatedly throughout the developing world. 16 1
Thus, the paradox of free market democracy often assumes a very
different face in the developing world. As noted above, the ethnic and
racialist structures of the developed world typically help neutralize the
conflict between markets and democracy, essentially by fracturing the
poor majority.162 In the United States, for example, racism (together
with a thriving ideology of upward mobility) arguably makes poor and
lower middle class whites feel more "kinship" with wealthy whites
than with African Americans or Hispanic Americans of comparable
economic status. Indeed, as many have observed, large numbers of
working-class whites in the United States oppose welfare and increased
government spending on social services, often voting against what
might be expected to be their rational economic self-interest, and it is
often speculated that racism plays a role in this pattern. 163 In this
sense, ethnic consciousness pulls against class consciousness in the de-
veloped world, such that the core ethnoeconomic dynamic in countries
like the United States or Japan pits an economically and politically
dominant racial or ethnic majority against economically and politically
weaker racial or ethnic minorities. As a result, developed-world racism
creates no particular threat to a market economy; on the contrary, to
the extent that racism helps reconcile a great number of poor persons
to the economic hierarchy (because there is a group still lower than
they) and impedes political coalitions among the poor, racism in the
developed world helps to defuse the paradox of free market democracy.
By contrast, the distinctive overlapping of class and ethnicity char-
acteristic of many developing countries-in which the "very rich" are
(or are perceived as) ethnically distinct-tends to catalyze the paradox
of free market democracy, with democracy dangerously pitting a po-
litically powerful but impoverished "indigenous" majority against a
resented economically dominant "outsider" minority. This dynamic,
161. See id. at 47-56. To be clear, the model does not depend on any particular theory about
why ethnic conflict occurs. Indeed, the model presupposes the presence of severe ethnic divisions.
Moreover, the suggestion is not that democracy is necessary (or more likely than authoritarian-
ism) to trigger an ethnonationalist reaction. Rather, the point of the model is that in developing
countries where a market-dominant ethnic minority is present, democracy can proceed only in
deep tension with markets. Seeid at 35.
162. Seesupra text accompanying notes 86-89.
163. See KENNEDY, supra note 69, at 16-17; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 88, at 4, 91, 93;
QUADAGNO, supra note 86, at 191-93.
2000 / The Paradox of Free Market Democracy
together with all three of its characteristic outcomes described above,
is vividly illustrated by contemporary Indonesia.
2. Indonesia
As in all the Southeast Asian countries, the ethnic Chinese in Indo-
nesia have long represented an economically dominant minority vis-a-
vis the indigenous majority164 around them-in this case, the pribumi
("of the earth").1 6' Since at least the early 1910s, the Indonesian Chi-
nese have been the frequent targets of "[vjiolent, popular anti-
Sinicism. ' '166 As many scholars have noted, the emergence of Indone-
sian nationalism at the turn of the century was inextricably bound up
with "the sudden increased impingement of aggressively competitive
Chinese entrepreneurs upon the interests of the vestigial Javanese mer-
chant class." 167 After independence, President Sukarno's sweeping na-
164. This is by no means to suggest that indigenous Indonesians are homogeneous-nothing
could be further from the truth. Indonesia's "nearly 200 million people are divided into hundreds
of distinct cultural groups living for the most part in regional homelands ... from Aceh on the
northern tip of Sumatra to Irian Jaya .... R. William Liddle, Coercion, Co-optation, and the Man-
agement of Ethnic Relations in Indonesia, in GOVERNMENT PoucIEs AND ETHNIC RELATIONS, supra
note 55, at 273, 274. "Typically, the members of each group speak their own language or dialect
and have a strong sense of their distinctiveness .... Id. Among cultural and regional groups,
"the main axis of conflict has been the relationship between the Javanese, who almost constitute a
majority, and all the others, who have feared domination by the Javenese." Id. at 279. Indonesians
are divided along religious lines as well. Roughly 87% of the country is Muslim. See id. at 275
tbl.7.2. "Most Hindus are Balinese, while Protestant and Catholic adherents are heavily concen-
trated among specific regional ethnic groups . i.." "d  at 274.
165. In pre-colonial Indonesia,
all foreign trade in the [Tabanan] kingdom-the main export was coffee, the main import
opium-was conducted by a single wealthy Chinese called a subandar, who held a royal mo-
nopoly in exchange for a suitable tribute, the remainder of the small resident Chinese popu-
lation acting as his agents. Domestic trade was trifling ....
CLIFFORD GEERTz, PEDDLERS AND PRINCES: SOCIAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION
IN Ta o INDONESIAN TowNs 25 (1963) (3d impression 1970). The Chinese began arriving "in
large numbers only in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the Dutch colonial
government offered them both economic opportunity and a measure of personal security ...."
Liddle, supra note 164, at 278. During the colonial era, wealthy Chinese merchants, along with
"Javanese aristocrats turned bureaucrats (priyayi)," served as "local elite intermediaries" for the
Dutch. Takashi Shiraishi, Anti-Sinicism in Java's New Order, in ESSENTIAL OUTSIDERS, supra note
146, at 187, 195. The main role of the Chinese was to operate for the Dutch highly profitable
"revenue farms and monopoly concessions for running local markets, collecting fees, selling salt
and opium, running pawnshops, and so on. The most important of these from the 1850s to the
1880s were the opium farms." Id. At the same time, Chinese moneylenders dominated colonial
Java's rural credit sector. See id. at 199. The result of this "plural" colonial economic structure was
the concentration of economic power largely in Chinese and European hands and the distinctly
"inferior economic position of the Indonesians." FRANK H. GoLAY ET AL., UNDERDEVELOPMENT
AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 115 (1969); see also id. at 113-18.
166. Shiraishi, supra note 165, at 187.
167. GEORGE McTURNAN KAHIN, NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN INDONESIA 67
(1952); see also GoLAY ET AL., supra note 165, at 118-19. The Dutch revenue farms were disman-
tled in the 1890s, which caused the Chinese to seek "new investment opportunities in kretek
(clove) cigarettes, batik, and other industries hitherto dominated by the native bourgeoisie. Thus
they came into direct conflict with a native class for the first time in their history on the Indies."
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tionalizations in the 1950s and 196 0s targeted not just the Dutch but
also, very explicitly, the ethnic Chinese16 8-an instantiation of the first
outcome noted above (ethnically targeted anti-market backlash). In-
deed, through nationalization and other measures of economic nation-
alism, Sukarno "indigenized" much of Indonesia's financial, mining,
import-export, rice, batik, and modern industrial sectors-all formerly
dominated by Chinese and Europeans. 169
By contrast, the thirty-year "capitalist-style" autocracy of General
Suharto is a paradigmatic example of the third outcome noted above
(pro-market retreat from democracy). After seizing power militarily in
1965, "Suharto proceeded to quash rival political parties and to extin-
guish opposition of all types."'170 In return for the support of the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Suharto adopted
aggressive privatization and economic liberalization policies to encour-
age foreign investment and rapid economic growth.' 7' To that end,
Suharto reached out to the Chinese business community. Throughout
his rule, Suharto not only protected the Chinese politically, 7 2 but
affirmatively directed lucrative business opportunities to them.7 3 In
exchange, the Indonesian Chinese, with their "business expertise, in-
ternational connections, and preexisting business links with the armed
forces,"'174 returned these favors, both by fueling the country's economy
and by adding enormously to the personal wealth of the Suharto fam-
ily. 7 5
Shiraishi, supra note 165, at 189. The Sarekat Islam, Indonesia's "first popular native nationalist
movement" (born in late 1911 in Central Java), was marked by "violent anti-Sinicism." Id. at
187. For a discussion of the complex array of forces surrounding this anti-Sinicism, see id. passim.
168. See GOLAY Er AL., supra note 165, at 137, 158, 166, 194.
169. See Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets and
Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 269 (1995) (citations omitted). Despite
his "indigenization" campaign, Sukarno was criticized by ethnic Indonesians for "his protective
attitude to the Chinese minority, perhaps reflecting the gradual rapprochement under Sukarno
between Indonesia and the People's Republic of China." Id. at 269 n,370 (citation omitted).
170. Chua, supra note 1, at 55 (citations omitted).
171. See id. See also MICHAEL R.J. VATIKIOTIS, INDONESIAN POLITICS UNDER SUHARTO: OR-
DER, DEVELOPMENT AND PRESSURE FOR CHANGE 39-41 (1993); Liddle, supra note 164, at 300-
01.
172. In 1971 an article appeared in the Bangkok Post reporting that Indonesia's Cukongs, con-
sisting of about twenty ethnic Chinese, had "wide holdings ranging from airlines and banks to
flour mills, import-export companies, tourist corporations, restaurants, shipping companies, tin
exporting concessions, rice milling plants, [and] timber concessions." Suryadinata, supra note
146, at 773-74. The article also stated that the Cukongs had a steady inside track to government
contracts and investment credits and that 90% of project aid money ended up in the hands of
Cukongs. The article was translated and published in Nusantara, a leading Jakarta daily,
prompting inquiries by members of Parliament. The government denied the charges, and the
editor of Nusantara was prosecuted and sentenced to two years imprisonment. See id. at 774.
173. See Chua, supra note 1, at 55 (citations omitted).
174. William Ascher, From Oil to Timber: The Political Economy of Off-Budget Development Fi-
nancing in Indonesia, 65 INDON. 37, 55 (1998).
175. See Chua, supra note 1, at 55 (citations omitted).
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As already mentioned, by the end of the Suharto regime, Sino-
Indonesians occupied a position of economic dominance wildly dispro-
portionate to their numbers (roughly three percent of the popula-
tion). 176 All of Indonesia's billionaires reportedly have been ethnically
Chinese, 177 and, until very recently, almost all of the country's largest
conglomerates were owned by Sino-Indonesian families. 178 The major
exceptions to this rule were companies owned by the children of Presi-
dent Suharto, which themselves "depended for their success on state
favors and links with Sino-Indonesians."' 179 On a smaller scale, al-
though of course not all Sino-Indonesians were well-off, 80 ethnic Chi-
nese dominated petty trading occupations in rural areas and retail and
wholesale trade in urban areas, 181 as well as the country's informal
credit sector. 182 Indeed, "[plractically every tiny town [had] an ethnic
Chinese-run general store that [was] the center of local economic
life."18 3
As recent events have made clear, this state of affairs provoked mas-
sive, widespread hostility among the pribumi majority. Suharto's res-
ignation in May 1998 was accompanied by discriminatory ethnically
targeted market interventions 184 and an eruption of vicious anti-
Chinese violence, in which nearly five thousand shops and homes of
ethnic Chinese were burned and looted, 185 over two thousand people
176. See supra text accompanying note 146 (noting that Chinese Indonesians in the New Or-
der controlled roughly 70% of the private economy).
177. See JOEL KoTKIN, TIuBES: How RACE, RELIGION, AND IDENTITY DETERMINE SUCCESS
IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 180 (1993).
178. See Liddle, supra note 164, at 301.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., David Lamb, Terrorized Ethnic Chinese Still on Edge in Indonesia: Southeast Asia,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at A4.
181. See VATIKIOTIS, spra note 171, at 101.
182. Following a tradition reportedly dating to the 17th century, ethnic Chinese ran "thou-
sands of small factories that make everything from shoes to auto parts." These Chinese-owned
"general stores" "double[d] as credit agencies for farmers and laborers." Michael Shari & Jonathan
Moore, The Plight of the Ethnic Chinese, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 3, 1998, at 48.
183. Id.
184. See David Jenkins, The Business of Hatred, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 28, 1998, at
8. Indonesia's rice industry provides one illustration. Until May 1998, Indonesia's rice distribu-
tion network was dominated by ethnic Chinese traders, who operated a fairly efficient system,
"despite some profiteering on their part and despite the pay-offs they had to make to an increas-
ingly venal indigenous bureaucracy." ld. After Suharto's resignation, the Habibie government, in
an openly ethnonationalist move supported by majoriarian sentiment, canceled rice distribution
contracts with hundreds of ethnic Chinese businessmen and awarded them instead to indigenous
Indonesians, some of whom had little or no experience in the field. See id. The results were disas-
trous, part of a food crisis in which tens of millions of Indonesians were at one time reportedly
eating only one meal a day. See Indonesia's Anguish, N.Y. Tis s, Oct. 16, 1998, at A26. The new
state-run rice cooperatives were immediately saturated with corruption, inefficiency, and scandal
(one official was accused of trying to export illegally 1900 tons of rice to Malaysia, while his own
constituents were starving). Predictably, indigenous officials and businessmen began secretly to
subcontract work out to Chinese traders again. See Jenkins, supra.
185. See Gregg Jones, Fear Overwhelming Indonesia's Chinese, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 4,
1998, at IA.
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died,18 6 and many ethnic Chinese women were raped. 187 Many Sino-
Indonesian families (including some of the wealthiest) left the coun-
try,188 along with massive amounts of Chinese-controlled capital, esti-
mated at $40-$100 billion, 8 9 making Indonesia during this period an
illustration of the second (eliminationist) outcome noted above.
Recent elections brought to power a new president, Abdurrahman
Wahid, widely admired for his tolerance and commitment to human
rights. President Wahid supports both "democratic reforms" and IMF-
dictated pro-free-market policies. 190 In other words, the combined pur-
suit of markets and democracy is once again the prevailing prescrip-
tion.
Unfortunately, the conflict between these two goals is likely to be
intense and combustible. With poverty pervasive, and "its banks and
largest corporations still mired in delinquent debts," Indonesia re-
mains "in its worst economic crisis in a generation."19' The point of
pro-market reforms is explicitly to procure the return of foreign in-
vestment and Chinese-controlled capital, without which experts agree
the Indonesian economy cannot be restarted. 92 But for these policies
to succeed would require a degree of assurance of Chinese economic
security that may not be compatible with a genuine democratic poli-
tics in a country where, just fifteen months ago, many reportedly felt
that "it would be worthwhile to lose ten years of growth to get rid of
the [Chinese] problem once and for all." 193
Indonesia is not exceptional. Ethnically targeted nationalizations or
confiscations have occurred in postcolonial Burma, Ethiopia, Kenya,
186. See id. Most of those who died were "non-Chinese looters trapped in burning shopping
malls." Id.
187. According to local human rights workers, "'more than 168 women'--most of them eth-
nic Chinese-were gang-raped during the riots." Id. The Habibie government denied these alle-
gations, claiming that they were "exaggerated." Id.
188. See Jay Solomon, Indonesia's Chinese Move to Increase Civil Rights After a Decades-Long Ban on
Political Activities, WAIL ST. J., June 9, 1998, at A14 (reporting that 110,000 Sino-Indonesian
families left the country).
189. See Ravi Velloor, Fix Chinese Issue, Indonesia Told, STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at 2;
Kafil Yamin, Economy-indonesia: Not Too Happy Wth Very Strong Currency, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
July 2, 1999.
190. See David Lamb, Coalition Government Likely in Indonesia, L.A. TImEs, June 9, 1999, at
All.
191. Wayne Arnold, New Indonesian Leadership Stirs Financiers' Skepticism, N.Y. Twigs, Oct. 27,
1999, at C4.
192. See id. at C4; see also Solomon, supra note 188, at A14; Velloor, supra note 189, at 2;
Yamin, supra note 189. According to many observers, it is no coincidence that President Wahid's
first official visit was to China, where one of his primary goals was to secure Beijing's blessing for
the return of "overseas Chinese" capital to Indonesia.
193. Velloor, supra note 189, at 2. There is a widespread belief among the pribumi that New
Order economic liberalization favored the "already strong" Sino-Indonesians at the expense of the
"economically weak" indigenous Indonesians. Liddle, supra note 164, at 300-01. "According to
this logic, the obvious cure is a new set of regulations, the reimposition of governmental regula-
tion." Id. at 316.
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Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uganda, and Vietnam,
and most recently have been championed by indigenous politicians in
South Africa and Zimbabwe. 194 Suharto-style symbiotic relationships
between autocratic governments and entrepreneurial minorities have
been pursued by the Nguyen emperors in Vietnam, many Thai kings,
Marcos in the Philippines, and a host of rulers in Africa. 195 Finally,
economically dominant minorities have been killed en masse in, ex-
pelled from, or pressured to leave Burma, Cambodia, Kenya, the Phil-
ippines, Rwanda, Uganda, and Vietnam, and most recently many of
the Central Asian republics in the former Soviet Union. 196
C. Developing Countries Without Economically Dominant Minorities
Although the phenomenon of economically dominant minorities is
much more pervasive in the developing world than is usually acknowl-
edged, not all developing countries have economically dominant mi-
norities. An important case in point is China. While the market re-
forms of the last decade have starkly benefitted China's coastal prov-
inces (for example, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Fujian) and urban ar-
eas,197 China does not appear to have any economically dominant eth-
nic minorities. On the contrary, the Han Chinese in China, comprising
95% of the population, have represented an economically and politi-
cally dominant majority vis-k-vis ethnic minorities like the Tibetans,
Uighers, and Miao for three millennia. 198 Recent evidence, moreover,
suggests that the Han Chinese are generally market-dominant vis-k-vis
the country's ethnic minorities as well. 199
Nor are economically dominant minorities present today in most
Eastern European countries, although (as discussed further below) such
minorities existed earlier in the history of countries such as Hungary,
Romania, and Yugoslavia.200 While virtually all countries in Africa are
marked by severe ethnic divisions, a few (for example, Botswana or
Sudan) do not appear to have economically dominant minorities.
Latin America presents a more complicated picture. In one com-
mentator's words, "No part of the world has ever witnessed such a gi-
gantic mixing of races as the one that has been taking place in Latin
194. See Chua, supra note 1, at 48-49; Novogrodsky, supra note 141.
195. See Chua, supra note 1, at 54-56.
196. See id. at 51-54.
197. See June Teufel Dreyer, Assimilation and Accommodation in China, in GOVERNMENT POL-
CIES AND ETHNIC RELATIONS, supra note 55, at 351.
198. See Chua, supra note 1, at 28. For purposes of this Article, I assume, along with most Si-
nologists, that in China the "Han" Chinese (however constructed or even mythical this category)
may be viewed appropriately as a single ethnic group. See id. at 28-29 n.136. This is not to deny
important differences within China along provincial, north-south, and rural-urban lines. See id.
199. See Dreyer, supra note 197, at 382.
200. See infra text accompanying notes 207, 219-222, 225.
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America and the Caribbean since 1492. " '0' At the same time, the phe-
nomenon of "pigmentocracy"-a social spectrum in which lightness of
skin correlates with increasing wealth, social status, and political
power-is apparent in many Latin American societies. Moreover,
virtually every country in the region shares the common feature of a
privileged elite class claiming European descent and defining itself
through European (and later United States) cultural habits."' By and
large, however, this wealthy elite is not perceived as ethnically distinct
from the less well-off majority.
This is particularly true in the relatively "Europeanized" countries,
such as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, which today have
small (and in some cases negligible) Indian populations and which saw
enormous waves of immigrants from Europe earlier this century. t On
the other hand, in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and
Peru, where indigenous peoples continue to constitute a large portion
(and in some cases, the majority) of the population, the ethnic distin-
guishability of the elite is much starker.20' Indeed, the revolutionary
movements in many of these countries in the early twentieth century
included a strong element of "indigenism," demanding redress for "the
immense gap between the light-skinned descendants of the victors and
the dark-skinned descendants of the vanquished., 20 Nonetheless, with
some exceptions, social relations in Latin America today tend to be
conceptualized in terms of class, not ethnicity, and in recent decades
majoritarian, nationalist movements have generally not been organized
in racial or ethnic terms. Whether this will continue to be the case in
the future remains to be seen.
In countries without market-dominant minorities, the paradox of
free market democracy is unlikely to be ethnicized. This does not
mean, however, that the conflict between markets and democracy in
such countries will not be deeply problematic. Romania provides a
sobering but not atypical example. In the last several years, market
reforms have stalled, economic growth rates have been negative, and
the coalition government that took office in 1996 has on several occa-
sions "teetered on the brink of collapse. '207 Among other problems,
the government has had to deal with thousands of striking (and fre-
quently violent) coal miners, who "want a pay rise of more than a third
201. Chua, supra note 169, at 271 (citing MAGNUS M6RNER, RACE MIXTURE IN THE HIs-
TORY OF LATIN AMERICA 1 (1967)).
202. See id. at 274.
203. See id. at 272-74.
204. See Chua, supra note 1, at 25 n.1 18.
205. See id.
206. Chua, supra note 169, at 275-76 (quoting MAGNUS M6RNER, THE ANDEAN PAsT 199
(1985)).
207. Romania: Grey New Year, ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 1999, at 4 8.
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and the reopening of two mines closed last year."208 Meanwhile, both
the IMF and the World Bank have conditioned desperately needed
assistance packages on the further shutting down or privatization of
unprofitable state-owned enterprises-actions that will lead to the
unemployment rate shooting up further.20 9 The widespread poverty,
frustration, and desperation of the past several years has led to the
growing political power of Vadim Tudor, leader of the "xenophobic
and protectionist Greater Romania Party," whose supporters include
ex-communists, nationalists, as well as disaffected policemen and sol-
diers.210 Elsewhere in the former Soviet Bloc, including Russia, per-
sisting economic distress has led to a similar resurgence in popular
support for nationalist- and Communist-dominated parties, often
calling for renationalization of major industries.2 11
D. Economically Dominant Minorities in the Developed World
In striking contrast to much of the developing world, economically
dominant ethnic minorities generally do not exist today in the West-
ern nations. In the United States, for example, whatever one occasion-
ally hears about (say) Jews or Koreans, the economy is not dominated
by any ethnic minority.2 12 On the contrary, the core ethnic problem in
the United States is one that pits an economically and politically
dominant white majority against economically and politically weaker
ethnic minorities.213 The same is generally true of Australia, 214 Can-





211. See Thornhill, supra note 104, at 3. In Russia today, supporters of the Communist Party
(who are disproportionately older people) talk "of redistributing Russia's vast natural wealth by
renationalising the oil, gas, and electricity industries" and of giving "everyone ... access to free
hospitals, sanatoria, and schools once again." Id.
212. See Chua, supra note 1, at 27.
213. See id.
214. See Christine Fletcher, Federalism and Indigenous Peoples in Australia, in GOVERNMENT
POLICIS AND ETHNIC RELATIONS, supra note 55, at 395,401.
215. See Chua, supra note 1, at 27 n.133. Economically dominant minorities do not exist in
Canada either at the national level or at the provincial level-with the important exception of
Quebec, where Anglophones have historically represented an economically dominant minority
vis-a-vis the Francophone majority. Quebec is discussed in detail below. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 366-374.
216. See Andrew Sharp, Civil Rights, Amelioration, and Reparation in New Zealand, in GOVERN-
MENT POLICIES AND ETHNIC RELATIONS, supra note 55, at 421,441-47.
217. See Chua, supra note 1, at 27 n.133. Economically dominant minorities also do not exist
in the more ethnically complex countries of Belgium and Switzerland. In Switzerland, for exam-
ple, while there are tremendous disparities in the distribution of wealth, both by region and by
social class, these disparities
cross-cut ethnic differences. There is a roughly proportional distribution of rich and poor
cantons in the Francophone and Germanophone areas. Of the ten richest cantons, three are
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Likewise, and in stark contrast to Southeast Asia, economically
dominant ethnic minorities do not exist in the more economically ad-
vanced countries of East Asia. In all of the "Asian Tigers," the ethnic
majority-the Japanese in Japan, the Koreans in South Korea, and the
Chinese in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan-is economically and
politically dominant.218
To be dear, the claim is not that today's developed countries never
had economically dominant minorities. On the contrary, European
history includes numerous examples of such minorities. In late nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century Transylvania, for example, Hun-
garians represented an economically dominant minority vis-4-vis the
largely peasant Romanian majority, many of whom "worked on the
estates of the Hungarian great landowners."2 19 In a rather different dy-
namic, during the interwar era Jews occupied "a commanding posi-
tion" in major sectors of the economy in countries such as Romania22
and Hungary.2' A more complicated example is the former Yugoslavia,
where, among many other dynamics, the Croatians and Slovenes were
for many years disproportionately prosperous vis-ta-vis the more popu-
lous Serbs. In the United States, whites in a number of Southern
states (for example, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina) repre-
sented after the Civil War a starkly economically dominant minority
French and seven German. Of the ten poorest cantons, two are French, seven German and
one Italian .... Religiously, there is a distinct tendency for Catholic areas to be poorer than
Protestant areas .... However, as each canton has its class inequalities that cross-cut both
religious and ethnic lines, the issue of religious disparities in wealth rarely became politi-
cized ....
PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, THE ETHNIC PHENOMENON 195-96 (1987).
218. See Chua, supra note 1, at 28.
219. BARARA JELAvicH, 2 HIsToRy OF THE BALKANs: TWENTIETH CENTURY 73 (1983).
From 1867 to 1920, Transylvania was part of Hungary. See id. at 6, 72, 122. Transylvania became
part of Romania pursuant to the Treaty of Trianon ofJune 1920. See id. at 122. In 1910 the Tran-
sylvanian population was 53.8% Romanian, 28.6% Hungarian, and 10.8% German. See id at 73.
220. Id. at 160. According to one commentator,
[b]y the middle of the interwar era, Jews controlled the bulk of the private capital in the ex-
port, transportation, insurance, textile, leather, electrotechnical, chemical, housing, print-
ing, and publishing industries. Though their access to the universities was restricted by
statutory limitations and extralegal violence, they were also strongly represented in the le-
gal, medical, dental, journalistic, and banking professions. Though only 4.2 percent of the
total population, they constituted ... 14.3 percent of the entire country's urban population,
In such cities as Chiiinlu (Kishinev) and Cernlu;i, . .. where the Jews accounted for 52.6
and 44.9 percent of the population, most store signs were in Hebrew letters.
Id. (citation omitted).
221. In 1910, Jews represented nearly one-quarter of the population of Budapest (earning the
capital the epithet "Judapest"). PETER G.J. PULZER, THE RISE OF POLITICAL ANTI-SEmITISm IN
GEm.eaNY AND AUsmIA 10-11 (1964). In 1920, while only 0.1% of the agricultural laborers In
Hungary were Jewish, Jews "constituted 23% of the actors and musicians, 34% of the authors,
51% of the lawyers, 60% of the doctors in private practice, and the overwhelming majority of the
self-employed in commerce and finance (but not manufacturing industry)." Id. at 13.
222. See MARCUS TANNER, CROATIA: A NATION FORGED IN WAR 187, 192, 195-97 (1997).
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vis-A-vis the newly emancipated black majorities around them.223 More
generally, there have been periods in the history of Europe and the
United States when the affluent upper classes may have been perceived
(either by themselves or by others) as ethnically or racially distinct
from the lower classes around them. This may have been true, for ex-
ample, of the French-speaking ruling class in nineteenth-century Bel-
gium, which used its supposed racial superiority to justify its class
224privileges.
But in all these cases, the countries at issue were at the time either
nondemocratic or, if democratic, did not have anything close to univer-
sal suffrage. In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Hungary,
for example, although Romanians were a "clear majority" in Transyl-
vania, "most of them could not vote" under the highly restrictive fran-
chise then in effect.2 2 ' Similarly, in nineteenth-century Belgium, the
class domination of the French-speaking bourgeoisie "was buttressed
by a franchise that until 1893 limited voting to the propertied classes.
Even then, universal manhood suffrage was diluted by plural voting
for the bourgeoisie; equal manhood suffrage only came in 1919.
Likewise, during the Jim Crow era in the American South, blacks were
223. See also MEIER & RUDWiCK, supra note 53, at 50, 152-54 (noting that blacks represented
a majority in Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina after the Civil War); OAKaS supra note 52,
at 234.
224. VAN DEN BERGHE, supra note 217, at 202. Another example might be 19th- and early
20th-centuty Boston, where the "Boston Brahmins" could arguably have been viewed as an ethni-
cally distinct, economically dominant minority vis-k-vis the large numbers of less prosperous
immigrant groups around them-including, perhaps most saliently, the Irish and Italians. See
STEPHAN THERNSTROm, THE OTHER BOSTONIANS: POVERTY AND PROGRESS IN THE AMERICAN
METROPOIS 1880-1970, at 112 (1973). This, however, is a very imperfect analogy to economi-
cally dominant minorities in the developing world. Even apart from the fact that this is a claim of
municipal (as opposed to state or national) economic dominance,
the Brahmins were at best a tiny element of the social structure of the city as a whole, and it
is surely unwise to assume that the existence of a castelike group of a few hundred families
puts the stamp of village India upon the social life of an American metropolis with a popu-
lation numbered ... in the hundreds of thousands.
Id. at 5. Moreover, in contrast to most of today's developing-world populations, the immigrant
populations in 19th- and 20th-century Boston generally experienced "impressive opportunities
for self-advancement" as well as "uniquely high levels of real wages generated by economic
growth." Id. at 258-59. While some immigrant groups (e.g., British, Germans, Scandinavians,
Jews) clearly outperformed others (e.g., Italians, Irish), see id. at 131-42, studies indicate that all
of Boston's "major immigrant groups, however dismal their plight when they first arrived, expe-
rienced substantial upward mobility in subsequent years." Id. at 258.
225. JELAVICH, supra note 219, at 73. "Franz Joseph's threat to introduce universal manhood
suffrage in 1905" would have given political control to the non-Hungarians and the peasantry;
the official parties, protected since 1874 by stringent voting qualifications, "would have been
swamped." Id.
226. VAN DEN BERGHE, supra note 217, at 202. The Flemish nationalist movement of the
19th and early 20th centuries "was led mostly by the upwardly mobile, educated, petty bourgeoi-
sie of students, teachers, lower clerics and professionals, who often came from peasant working
class origins and bitterly resented the status of French as an elite language and the second-class
ethnicity in their own territory." Id. at 202-03.
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effectively disenfranchised through violence, intimidation and dis-
criminatory voting procedures.227
In other words, unlike today's developing countries, the developed
nations rarely have had to deal with the problem of rapid democratiza-
tion pursued in the face of widespread poverty and a deeply resented,
economically dominant outsider ethnic minority. The few arguable
exceptions that exist, moreover, strongly corroborate the model dy-
namics summarized above. Quebec and South Africa will be discussed
in Part III. Post-World War I Germany is discussed below.
E. Jews in Weimar Germany (1918-1932)
This Section will discuss Weimar Germany, a rare example of a
Western nation that pursued-with catastrophic ethnonationalist con-
sequences-free market democracy under conditions in many respects
analogous to those characteristic of many developing countries today.
Considerable caution is required here. The Holocaust is in some ways
so singularly evil and catastrophic that no straightforward comparison
can be made between Nazi Germany and any other country, at any
other time.
To avoid any possible misunderstanding, I begin with three pre-
liminary clarifications. First, the Jews in Weimar Germany were not an
economically dominant minority in the sense that, say, the Chinese are
economically dominant in many Southeast Asian countries. Claims
that "Jews ran the German economy" were patently false.225 Second, I
am distinctly not suggesting that the roots of anti-Semitism in Wei-
mar Germany, or for that matter anywhere, were economic in nature.229
Third, Weimar Germany obviously differed in profound respects from
most of today's developing countries. For example, Germany was a
former imperial power, with colonies and protectorates all over Africa
and a formidable naval fleet and army.230 Weimar Germans, including
women, were far more educated than the average inhabitant of the de-
veloping world today.23' Commentators have described Weimar Ger-
227. See supra text accompanying note 53.
228. DONALD L. NIEwYK, THE JEws IN WEIMAR GERMANY 43 (1980); see infra text accom-
panying notes 250-256.
229. See infra text accompanying notes 257-260. Anti-Semitism in Germany, as elsewhere in
the world, existed long before Jews were particularly successful economically. See MICHAEL
GRANT, THE JEws IN THE ROMAN WORLD 31 (1973). In addition, economic grievances cannot
have been the basis of the vicious pogroms directed at poor shtetls in Russia and Eastern Europe
in the second half of the 19th century. See Vladimir M. Oks, The World of the Jewish Shiel, in RITA
OSrROVSKAYA, JEWS IN THE UKRAINE: 1989-1994, at 162, 164-65, 167 (1996). More gener-
ally, theories of economic determinism that ascribe all or most ethnic conflict to economic causes
have been widely discredited (although there is often an economic dimension to many ethnic
conflicts). See MILTONJ. EsmAN, ETHNIC POLITICS 231, 234 (1994).
230. See GORDON A. CRAIG, GERMANY 1866-1945, at 119-24, 312 (1978).
231. Seeid. at 478.
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many as "the cradle of modernity."23 2 Moreover, Weimar Germany had
a powerful industrial base, an impressive network of railways and in-
frastructure, and a highly sophisticated banking system.2"
Nevertheless, conditions in post-World War I Germany were more
analogous to those in the developing world today than one might
think. To begin with, like most of contemporary Africa and Southeast
Asia, Germany in 1918 had been a unified nation-state for less than
fifty years.23 More crucially, Weimar Germany was characterized by
widespread economic deprivation and suffering, in large part because
of inflation that reached catastrophic proportions in 1923.25 With the
plunging mark "the simplest of objects were invested ... with mon-
strous value-the humble kohlrabi shamefacedly wearing a price-tag
of 50 millions, the penny postage stamp costing as much as a Dahlem
villa in 1890.,,236 While a few (principally industrialists and specula--- 237 o
tors) profited from the inflation, millions of working- and middle-
232. Id. at 470. Although "Expressionism in art and literature, Bauhaus architecture, the
physics of relativity, psycho-analysis, and depth psychology" all had their origins before the war,
these movements in the 1920s "entered into popular consciousness" and became the subject of
conversation and debate among ordinary Germans. Id.
233. See id. at 80-86; see also HAJO HOLBORN, A HISTORY OF MODERN GERMANY 1840-
1945, at 374-83 (1969).
234. Germany was unified in 1871. See CRAIG, supra note 230, at 33. The resulting Empire
was a union of eighteen German states and one administrative territory (the "Reichsland") com-
prising the newly conquered provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. See id. at 39.
235. By most accounts, the principal cause of the inflation was not reparations to the Allies,
but rather the excessive national debt that Imperial Germany had incurred in financing the war.
See CRAIG, supra note 230, at 435; HANS MommsEN, THE RISE AND FALL OF WEIMAR Damoc-
RAcY 117 (Elborg Forester & Larry Eugene Jones trans., Univ. of N.C. Press, 1996) (1989). After
the war, the expense of supporting war victims and "the demobilization of labor-particularly the
need to stimulate the economy so as to provide employment for the millions of returning soldiers
and former employees of war industries-contributed greatly to the German post-war inflation."
RIcHARD BESSEL, GEmANY AFTER THE FIrsT WORLD WAR 165 (1993); see also MoaMrsEN,
supra, at 117. Meanwhile, the government's tax policy-which fell disproportionately on wage
and salary workers and "granted tax breaks to businesses and holders of capital"-did not produce
nearly enough revenue to meet its obligations. CRAIG, supra note 230, at 450; see also MOMMSEN,
supra, at 116. The increasingly large government deficits (11,732 million R.M. in 1923) were
covered by printing new money: "By the end of 1923, 133 printing-presses had 1,783 presses
running day and night to print Reichsbank notes, which had to be transported to banks of issue
in large straw crates carried by armies of porters." CRAIG, supra note 230, at 450.
236. CRAIG, supra note 230, at 450-51.
237. For those Germans, primarily industrialists, who possessed tangible as opposed to paper-
mark assets, "inflation made it possible for companies and plants to pay off their debts with cur-
rency that was no longer worth as much as the currency in which those debts had been con-
tracted." MOMMSEN, supra note 235, at 117-18. Those with tangible property could also "secure
credit from banks for plant expansion or investment in other properties. The investment brought
profit without risk, and the loan was paid off in depreciated currency. Huge fortunes were accu-
mulated this way." CRAIG, supra note 230, at 451. At the same time, money was made
by the manipulators of high finance and by the thousands of small speculators, the Raffke
and Schieber, who knew how to profit from the distress of others, who bought the treasured
possessions of the desperate for a pittance and sold them across the border in Holland or
Belgium, who operated skilfully on the black market, who cornered foodstuffs in short sup-
ply and sold them in adulterated form.
Id. at 452.
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class Germans were left impoverished; those on fixed incomes or pen-
sions were hit hardest. 38 At one point, in late 1923, only 29.3% of the
total German labor force was fully employed.2 39 Housing, moreover,
"was an area where the impoverishment brought about by the War was
most disturbingly apparent"-in 1919-20, the national "housing
shortage was estimated to be as high as 1.5 million dwellings."'24 As in
the developing world, malnutrition and disease in the Weimar Re-
public were pervasive, particularly among children and the old; deaths
from hunger were common.24
Against this background, Jews in the Weimar Republic were widely
perceived as an "outsider" ethnic minority wielding outrageously dis-
proportionate economic power vis-a-vis the "indigenous" majority. The
reality of the Jews' economic situation in the Weimar Republic was as
follows. Relative to their numbers-Jews formed just under 1% of the
total population of Germany-they were disproportionately repre-
sented in certain professions and occupations.242 Between 1918 and
1933, nearly three-quarters of German Jews earned "their living from
trade, commerce, banking, and the professions, especially medicine
and law.,243 By contrast, only about one-quarter of the non-Jewish
population of Germany was similarly employed.244 Thus in 1933, Jews
made up around 11% of Germany's doctors and more than 16% of its
lawyers and notaries public.24' Commerce and finance, however, were
246the major pursuit of most German Jews. In 1930, Jews owned 40%
of Germany's wholesale textile firms and nearly 60% of the country's
247wholesale and retail clothing businesses. In 1932, "department stores
owned by Jews accounted for 79 percent of all business done by such
enterprises.,,141 Jews were also "prominent as bankers in Weimar Ger-
many. Almost half of all private banks, the number and importance of
which declined after 1920, were owned by such famous Jewish bank-
ing families as the Mendelssohns, Bleichroders, and Schlesingers. '
238. See CRAIG, supra note 230, at 452-54; see also MOMMSN, supra note 235, at 118.
239. See CRAIG, supra note 230, at 454.
240. BESSEL, supra note 235, at 166, 187.
241. See CRAIG, supra note 230, at 454-55.
242. See RICHARD GRUNBERGER, THE 12-YEt REICH: A SocIAL HISTORY OF NAZ GER-
mANY, 1933-1945, at 456 (Da Capo Press 1995) (1971); NiEwYK, supra note 228, at 13.
243. NIEWYK, supra note 228, at 13.
244. See id.
245. See GRUNBERGER, supra note 242, at 456; see also NIEWYK, supra note 228, at 15.
"Among university lecturers, writers, journalists and theatrical producers the Jewish proportion
was about 5 per cent." GRUNBERGER, supra note 242, at 456.
246. See HOLBORN, supra note 233, at 279. "More than 61 percent of all gainfully employed
Jews in Weimar Germany were engaged in some form of trade or commerce." NIEWYK, supra
note 228, at 13.
247. See NIEwYK, supra note 228, at 13; see also GRUNBERGER, supra note 242, at 456.
248. NIEWYI, supra note 228, at 13.
249. Id. at 14. The Jewish proportion in banking was roughly 17% in 1925 (a marked decline
from the corresponding figure of 37% in 1895). See GRUNBERGER, supra note 242, at 456.
2000 / The Paradox of Free Market Democracy
On the other hand, Jews controlled less than 1% "of Germany's more
numerous and increasingly important credit banks, ''250 and "the mod-
ern big banks which financed the German industrialization were not
decisively directed by Jewish interests. 2 11 Although the number of
German Jews "who became members of the upper bourgeoisie and ac-
quired considerable fortunes was not small," "[the great majority of
the Jews belonged to the middle classes," and many Weimar Jews were
252poor.
The economic picture of the Weimar Jews was thus a mixed one.
Jews plainly did not control the Weimar economy. To the contrary, the
wealthiest Germans in the Weimar Republic by and large were non-
253Jews: members of the nobility or landowning aristocracy, as well as
powerful industrialists such as Robert Bosch, Carl Friedrich vonSiemens, and Hugo Stinnes. 25 4 On the other hand, almost no Jews were
peasants, farmers, or members of the urban proletariat, and "the av-
erage income of Jews in Weimar Germany was 3.2 times that of the
.. ,256
total population.
It is crucial to reiterate that the "Jewish Problem" in Germany was
far more than an economic problem. As many have pointed out, anti-
Semitic economic hostility "is necessarily predicated upon the an-
tisemites' marking of the Jews as being different, identifying them not
by the many other (more relevant) features of these people's identities,
but as Jews, and then using this label as the defining feature of these
people. 2 15 7 The imagery and rhetoric used against German Jews was
contradictory and confused. Thus "the arrogant Jew" included "the
flea-market and marts-of-trade and stock-market Jew, the Press and
literature Jew, the parliamentary Jew, the theatre and music Jew, the
250. NIEWYK, supra note 228, at 14. However, those credit banks "with Jewish managers in-
cluded some of the largest and most successful of these financial institutions." Id.
251. HOLBORN, supra note 233, at 279.
252. Id. "[I1n 1933 one in three Jewish taxpayers had an annual income of less than 2,400
marks and one in four Berlin Jews (31,000 out of 170,000) was receiving charity." GRuNBERGER,
supra note 242, at 456 (citation omitted).
253. SeeJAMES POOL, WHO FINANCED HITLER 301-05 (1997).
254. See id. at 63; CRAIG, supra note 230, at 451-52; MOMMSEN, Supra note 235, at 474.
255. See HOLBOPN, supra note 233, at 278-79. Jewish economic patterns in Germany
reflected longstanding exclusions ofJews from many economic roles. According to one scholar,
(for many centuries [German Jews] had been deprived of the right of holding land; conse-
quently there were no Jewish peasants and farmers. Their exclusion from the craft guilds ex-
plains the absence of Jewish artisans except in a few specialized vocations, such as diamond
cutting, which they had been allowed to enter by the princes. The lack of a tradition in the
crafts may also have been a cause for the relatively weak representation of Jews in the mod-
ern industries. Only in industries where they had played a role as financiers in earlier days,
such as the various branches of the textile industry, did they become in larger numbers
builders of modern industrial firms.
Id.
256. NEWYK, supra note 228, at 16.
257. DANIELJONAH GOLDHAG N, HITLmt'S WILLING EXECUTIONaRs 40 (1996).
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culture and humanity Jew."2" Although "materialist," Jews did not
"work" but only exploited.259 Jews were both greedy "capitalists" and
the "secret force" behind Communism.2 °
Nevertheless, regardless of the falsity of the charges of Jewish eco-
nomic dominance, there was undeniably an economic dimension to the
mobilization of German anti-Semitism. The stereotype of the Jew as
rich and rapacious had long existed in Germany (as in many otherS\261
European countries). Four hundred years before Hitler capitalized on
this theme, Martin Luther wrote: "They hold us Christians captive in
our country. They let us work in the sweat of our noses, to earn money
and property for them, while they... mock us and spit on us, because
we work and permit them to be lazy squires who own us and our
realm., 26 2 Similar rhetoric accompanied the vicious wave of anti-
Semitism following the financial crash of 1873.263 Fifty years later,
Jews in Weimar were widely accused, by Germans high and low, of
being "uniformly prosperous,"26 "rulting] Germany financially, eco-
nomically, 2 6 ' and causing the nation's economic privations.2 In other
words, the Jews were said to be a grossly economically dominant out-
sider minority, even though their actual level of economic success did
not warrant this perception. As in many developing countries today,
these charges of economic dominance provided a convenient spur to,
and rationalization of, ethnic mobilization.
Weimar Germany shared another feature in common with most of
today's developing countries: Germany after the First World War em-
barked on a period of intense marketization and democratization.
Whereas normal market transactions had ground virtually to a halt
during the war,267 Germany after 1918 saw burgeoning investment and
the influx of speculative capital from abroad, 2 8 new international
258. CRAIG, supra note 230, at 153.
259. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 257, at 284-85.
260. POOL, supra note 253, at xxxi, 79. Both Henry Ford and Hitler "believed that Jewish
capitalists and Jewish Communists were partners aiming to gain control over the nations of the
world." Id. at 79.
261. See id. at 84. "[T]he worst pogroms in pre-modern Europe-apart from the ones in the
Ukraine during the seventeenth century-occurred in the Rhineland at the time of the Crusades.
The German Reformation and the Peasants' Wars were also attended by anti-Jewish outrages."
GRUNBERGER, supra note 242, at 454.
262. RAUL HILBaRG, THE DESTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN JEWS 16 (rev. ed. 1985) (quoting
Martin Luther).
263. See PULZER, supra note 221, at 145.
264. GRUNBERGER, supra note 242, at 456.
265. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 257, at 113.
266. See id. at 82.
267. See CRAIG, supra note 230, at 435.
268. MOMMSEN, supra note 235, at 125; see CRAIG, supra note 230, at 451. The post-war
influx of foreign capital (which by early 1922 had made it possible for the government to balance
the budget) came to an abrupt end in the fall of 1922. Momb.sEN, supra note 235, at 125.
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•• 269 . . . 270trade opportunities, a burst in industrialization, an "orgy of ex-
ports, 27' and the accumulation of huge fortunes by big business and
financiers. 272 Like today's "emerging economies," the Weimar govern-
ment undertook substantial economic liberalization, for example by
eliminating import-export quotas; offering tax breaks to businesses
and holders of capital (at the expense of the working class); and, after
1923, repealing significant labor-law protections, including, perhaps
most strikingly, the eight-hour work day.2"
At the same time, Weimar Germany pursued intense democratiza-
tion. In 1918 and 1919, over a period of barely ten months, theII 274
Wilhelmine Empire collapsed, the German people elected a National
Assembly, and the National Assembly promulgated a new constitution
providing for universal suffrage, proportional representation in elec-
tions to Parliament, direct popular election of the Reich president, and
"the wholly untried practice of popular initiative and referendum. 275
The new constitution also enumerated, and guaranteed "as far as words
were capable," a lengthy list of findamental human rights (Grun-
drechte).27
6
In other words, to a surprising extent, Weimar Germany recapitu-
lated both the basic background conditions prevalent in many devel-
oping countries today and the basic policy paradigm advocated for
these countries. In conditions of widespread economic distress with a
(perceived) economically dominant minority, Weimar Germany pur-
sued intensive market liberalization, rapid democratization, and con-
stitutionalism. Indeed, in important respects, conditions in Weimar
Germany were more propitious for the success of these policies than
they are in the developing world today. For example, Weimar Get-• 277
many had a much higher general level of education, an impressive
269. See MOMMSEN, supra note 235, at 118, 121.
270. See CRAIG, supra note 230, at 451-52; seealso MOMMSEN, supra note 235, at 117-18.
271. BESSEL, supra note 235, at 116. During the second half of 1919, there was an "upsurge
in foreign demand for relatively cheap German products." Id.
272. See CRAIG, supra note 230, at 451-52; see also MOrMSEN, supra note 235, at 118.
273. See MOMMSEN, supra note 235, at 116, 118, 134. The eight-hour work day and other re-
strictions on employers were implemented as temporary emergency measures to facilitate eco-
nomic demobilization immediately after the War. See BESSEL, supra note 235, at 143, 164-65.
274. In October 1918, a series of laws was enacted that "not only provided for ministerial re-
sponsibility to Parliament but virtually eliminated the royal power of command over the armed
forces." CRAIG, supra note 230, at 397. The abdication of Wilhelm II was announced by the new
chancellor, Prince Max von Baden on November 9, 1918. See MommSEN, supra note 235, at 20.
275. CRAIG, supra note 230, at 416.
276. Id.; see also YOuNG-SuN HONG, WELFARE, MODERNITY, AND THE WEIMAR STATE,
1919-1933, at 13 (1998).
277. As early as the 18th century, the German states had established elementary schools and
passed compulsory attendance legislation. See CRAIG, supra note 230, at 186-87. In terms of
reducing illiteracy, "Germany's record was the best in Europe," and "by 1830, almost all Germans
could read and write." Id.
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array of "social safety nets,"278 and a much stronger legal system, whose
judges, even if they "lacked a strong tradition of constitutional re-
,,279 280
view, were notoriously independent (and anti-Semitic).
The fate, however, of Weimar free market democracy is well-known.
In 1932 and 1933, the National Socialist German Workers' Party, as
the Nazi Party was formally named, gained control of the German
government through electoral means.2 1' Although historians over the
last fifty years have repeatedly described the Nazi movement as self-
contradictory and ideologically inconsistent-"a confused mixture of
nationalistic, anti-Semitic, and pseudo-socialist demands"21 2 -the Nazi
movement led by Adolph Hider was in fact unwaveringly and quintes-
sentially ethnonationalist, and in this diseased sense, perfectly coher-
ent. Point Four of the twenty-five-point party program (coauthored by
Hitler and promulgated in 1920) declared: "Only members of the na-
tion may be citizens of the State. Only those of German blood, what-
ever their creed, may be members of the nation. Accordingly no Jew
,,2111
may be a member of the nation.
Like the ethnonationalist movements of the developing world, Na-
tional Socialism was never truly socialist.] Indeed, Nazism was more
278. See BESSEL, supra note 235, at 127-65.
279. ACKERmAN, supra note 60, at 102.
280. "When the German Empire came to an end and a republic was declared by a Social
Democrat, it was a terrible blow to the members of the judiciary who had been loyal monar-
chists." INGO MOULLR, HITLER'S JusTimC: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REicH 10 (Deborah
Lucas Schneider trans., Harv. Univ. Press 1991). Nevertheless, "the judiciary received guarantees
of continuing independence," and "those judges whose conscience would not permit them to
serve the republic instead of the kaiser were offered early retirement by the government, with full
consideration of their material needs." Id. Virtually no judges took advantage of this opportunity.
Instead, the majority of them allied themselves with the Deutschnationale Volkspartei "at the
right-wing end of the political spectrum" and "kept their distance from the republic." Id,
In June 1923, after several lower courts had found that the radical right-wing slogan "Jew re-
public! Shame! Jew republic!" violated the Law for the Protection of the Republic of July 21,
1922, the Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion reflecting both anti-Semitic and anti-republic
attitudes:
The expression "Jew republic" can be used in different senses. It can designate the particular
form of democratic republic 'which was "constitutionally established" by the Weimar Na-
tional Assembly; it can also include the entire form of government which has existed in
Germany since the violent upheaval of November 1918. It can denote the new legal and so-
cial order in Germany which was brought about in significant measure by German and for-
eign Jews. It can also denote the disproportionate power and disproportionate influence
which, in the opinion of many citizens, a small number of Jews, relative to the total popula-
tion, actually wields. The sense in which the accused used the expression "Jew republic" is
not precisely established. It has not even been specifically determined that the accused
vilified the constitutionally established form of government of the Reich, but only that they
vilified the presently existing form of government.
Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
281. See CRAIG, supra note 230, at 543; MOzeisEN, supra note 235, at 158.
282. CRAIG, supra note 230, at 550.
283. GOLDHAGnN, supra note 257, at 85.
284. The Nazis never undertook to abolish the institution of private property nor to eradicate
all economic classes. Indeed, Hitler repeatedly made overtures to big business, see MONIMSHN,
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anti-Communist than it was anti-capitalist-in either case with the
same anti-Semitic thrust.2 5 Precisely because its principal commit-
ment was to ethnonationalism, there was little need for an economic
policy. (Once heard at a Nazi gathering: "We don't want higher bread
prices! We don't want lower bread prices! We don't want unchanged
bread prices! We want National Socialist bread prices!"2 6) Far more
than any of its rivals, the Nazi Party was successful in "overcoming
social cleavages and... transcendlingl class divisions"28 --from indus-
trial magnates to farmers, but above all the middle class 2 -in its call
for a once-again powerful Germany for "true Germans" and the de-
struction of Germany's "enemies" at home and abroad.
Once Hitler was in power, "the destruction of the Jewish race in
Europe" became a guiding principle of official state policy. 289 More
specifically, there unfolded between 1933 and 1945 increasingly ex-
treme expressions of the ethnonationalist outcomes noted above: ethni-
cally targeted confiscations, employment discriminations, and of course
ethnic eliminationism. Hitler began with a series of laws depriving
Jews (through stringent racial qualifications) of their positions in the
state bureaucracy, the judiciary, universities, and the professions, 2'* and
later dictated the wholesale expropriation of Jewish property and busi-
nesses.29' Nazi eliminationism began by stripping Jews of their citizen-
supra note 235, at 345-46, and the Nazi movement was supported by many wealthy Germans,
including industrial magnates and aristocrats, see POOL, supra note 253, at 107-14, 152, 301-05.
285. See MOMalSEN, supra note 235, at 346-47. According to Mommsen, "[oirganized labor
was not taken in by the [Nazi's] anticapitalist rhetoric," "which carried a distinctly anti-Semitic
flavor with its polemics against big capital and stock market speculation." Id.
286. CRAIG, supra note 230, at 550 (citation omitted).
287. MOMMISEN, supra note 235, at 354-55.
288. See CRAIG, .rupra note 230, at 551, 585; PULZER, supra note 221, at 281.
289. CRAIG, supra note 230, at 637.
290. See id. at 633-34.
291. See id. at 635-36. Following the enactment of a fundamental Decree regarding the Re-
porting of Jewish Property (April 1938),
Aryanization of Jewish businesses began in earnest in June; a month later Jewish physicians
were notified that they must liquidate their practices within three months; in September
Jewish lawyers were given until 30 November to do the same; and in October Goering an-
nounced that it was necessary for the Jews to be completely 'removed from the economy.'
[Following Krystallnachr,] Jews were ordered to pay a collective fine of one billion R.M., in
addition to the cost of the damages to their own property (which the state collected by
confiscating their insurance payments). On the same day that Goering levied this exaction,
he issued a Decree on Eliminating the Jews from German Economic Life, which excluded
Jews from retail stores, mail-order firms, independent crafts, sales, service, and management
... [Goering] insisted that Jewish property belonged to the Reich. In reality, however,
... the chief beneficiaries had, from the beginning, been the giant enterprises that rounded
out and extended their holdings by buying out Jewish firms that were under pressure ....
Between 1932 and 1939 the number of German banks decreased from 1,350 to 520, and
most of those that were swallowed up were Jewish houses ....
Id. (citations omitted).
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ship and political rights 92 and ended with the "final solution": the ex-
termination between 1941 and 1945 of an estimated six million peo-
ple, most of them Jews.293
Once again, I am making no claims here about the immediate or ul-
timate causes of the Holocaust. The point is simply that Weimar
Germany stands as a somber warning against excessive confidence in
applying the reigning law-and-development policy paradigm to ethni-
cally divided societies. Obviously, the parallels between Weimar Ger-
many and the developing world should not be overdrawn. Neverthe-
less, Weimar Germany marketized and democratized with a steadiness
that would make most of today's international policy makers proud.
Yet in Germany after World War I, this combination of free market
democracy with the familiar social-welfare and rule-of-law institutions
of a liberal activist state did not prevent-and indeed may have con-
tributed to--an ethnonationalist conflagration of precisely the kind
that today threatens much of the developing world.
III. FROM PARADOX TO POLICY
The paradox of free market democracy, once fully recognized, de-
mands serious rethinking of current development policy. It suggests a
number of broadly applicable policy observations, and it opens up a
number of major avenues for future policy research. Consider the fol-
lowing:
(i) All developing and transitional countries pursuing markets and
democracy will have to find ways to mediate the basic conflict be-
tween market-generated wealth disparities and majoritarian poli-
tics. Needless to say, there can be no "one-size-fits-all" solution.
Some countries are much farther along than others in the marketi-
zation or democratization process; each will have to find a balance
of mediating institutions appropriate to its history and political
economy.
(ii) The design of all the latest reform initiatives in the developing
world (including promotion of the rule of law, state-building, free
and fair elections, independent judiciary, and civil society) must
be reexamined in this light. All these measures are of great impor-
tantance for the developing world. Moreover, if properly designed,
they could ultimately play a valuable role in mediating the para-
dox of free market democracy.2  But if care is not taken, these
292. Id at 633-34.
293. See id. at 750. Thousands of non-Jews died in the camps as well, including almost all of
the gypsies in Europe. See id
294. Ideally, for example, rule-of-law initiatives can strengthen the rights and position of the
less well-off- anti-corruption measures can help dislodge oligarchic, plutocratic control. Both can
help legitimize the state. "The public perception that law is legitimate constitutes a social re-
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measures may inadvertently heighten the conflict between mar-
kets and democracy. For example, the main thrust of today's rule-
of-law initiatives in the developing world is to facilitate market
activity (by strengthening legislative and judicial protections of
property and contract). To the extent that such initiatives succeed,
they will accomplish very significant achievements, but in the
process they may intensify the contest between unequal wealth
and majoritarian politics.
(iii) There are many different forms that a market economy can
take. Ironically, the version of capitalism being exported today to
many developing countries more closely resembles the relatively
laissez-faire regimes characteristic of the developed world during
an earlier period when property qualificationi and other stringent
suffrage limitations were in place. This anachronism is especially
questionable given the much more pervasive poverty and political
instability of the developing world.
(iv) Similarly, there are many different forms of democracy. Taking
universal suffrage as a given, democratization can vary along a
large number of axes relevant to the paradox of free market de-
mocracy: to name a few, presidentialism versus parliamentarism;
"first-past-the-post" versus proportional representation; and starting
locally versus starting nationally. Much more consideration needs
to be given to the question of what kind of democracy is suitable
to particular developing nations in light of the tensions that will
inevitably arise between markets and majoritarian politics.
(v) As to ideology, are the poor of the developing world really to
be expected to support a market economy, with its phenomenal
wealth disparities, out of a belief in rags-to-riches upward mobil-
ity? If not, are they expected to support it because they are ra-
tional maximizers of society's long-term gross national product? It
should not be assumed that any of the developed world's market-
compatible ideologies will spontaneously come into being with
market reforms in the developing world. The question, then, is
how the poor in the developing world can be given a genuine,
sufficient stake-material, political, and psychological-in a
market economy.
As a small, tentative start toward working through some of these
extremely broad questions and observations, I will in the remainder of
this Article narrow my lens and focus on the specific problems of mar-
ket-dominant minorities and the particularly destructive, ethnonation-
alist version of the paradox of free market democracy.
source of incalculable value .... Fflt invites people to broaden their conception of what their
interests are and perhaps to identify them with the interests of others." PETER H. SCHUCK, THE
LIMITs OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEOMOcRATic GOVERNANCE 442 (2000).
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There are a number of policy "solutions" to this problem that will
not be considered in this Article. For example, autocracy would in
principle eliminate the paradox of free market democracy altogether
(by eliminating democracy). Similarly, communism would also in
principle eliminate the paradox (by eliminating markets-or perhaps
by eliminating both markets and democracy). At the same time, coun-
tries with an economically dominant minority could eliminate the spe-
cial problems they face by expelling or exterminating that minority.
All of these "solutions" will be assumed off the table in what follows.
In other words, the normative premises underlying this policy section
are: that some form of market-generated growth offers the best hope
for developing countries; that some form of democracy with constitu-
tional constraints offers the best political hope; and that avoiding eth-
nic oppression and bloodshed should be a constant priority.
Even within these normative premises, however, I will also assume
the infeasibility or unacceptability of a number of the devices that, as
described above, have helped defuse the conflict between markets and
democracy in the developed world. For example, most developing
countries simply will not be able to establish broadly redistributive
Western-style welfare states in the foreseeable future. Similarly, a ro-
bust ideology of upward mobility cannot simply be transplanted into
developing countries-or expected to blossom spontaneously with
market reforms. Finally, although racism arguably has helped mediate
the conflict between markets and democracy in some developed coun-
tries, I will assume that responsible developing-world policy makers
will not consciously pursue such a strategy.
Section A explores the possibility of redressing ethnoeconomic im-
balances by identifying and correcting the underlying causes of eco-
nomic dominance in particular cases, for example by expanding educa-
tion and promoting opportunities for disadvantaged groups or by
strengthening "social capital." This strategy turns out to have a num-
ber of serious limitations that will be discussed. Section B proposes
policies to address more directly the fundamental and potentially ex-
plosive conflict between markets and democracy in developing coun-
tries with market-dominant minorities. These policies will roughly
track the three categories used above: material redistribution, political
exclusions and restraints, and the formation of market-compatible or
market-subversive ideologies. 295
295. While the paradox of free market democracy will not be echnicized everywhere in the de-
veloping world, the policies discussed in this Part may, with some adjustment, have bearing for
all developing and post-communist countries. This is because foreign investors-who tend to
prosper disproportionately under economic liberalization, characteristically provoking nationalist,
anti-market sentiment-often occupy a role analogous to that of economically dominant minori-
ties.
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A. Addressing the Causes of Economic Dominance:
On Human and Social Capital
To address the distributional and ethnodistributional problems of
the developing world, it would be logical to begin by isolating and,
where appropriate, changing the conditions that cause the economic
dominance of certain groups. For example, if superior education ac-
counted for the disproportionate economic power of a certain minority,
then corrective education policies for the disadvantaged majority
would be the obvious policy response. Similarly, if a particular minor-
ity owed its economic dominance solely or principally to political fa-
voritism, then policies designed to "level the playing field" (anti-
discrimination and anti-corruption measures) would be the solution.
The problem, however, is that in reality the underlying causes of
economic dominance are rarely clear, and even if they are, they will
rarely prove tractable. Research suggests, for example, that merely
equalizing student-teacher ratios, teacher experience, dollars spent per
student, and even total years of education would eliminate a much
smaller percentage of ethnoeconomic disparities than might be ex-
pected. 296 Likewise, while political favoritism has clearly contributed
to the enormous wealth of some economically dominant minorities
(historically in the form of colonial divide-and-conquer policies or
more recently in the form of cukong or patronage relationships),
treating such favoritism as the explanation of economic dominance
begs the question of why those in power have chosen repeatedly to
collaborate with certain ethnic groups. The decision of so many in-
digenous power-holders in Southeast Asia and Africa to enter into lu-
crative, symbiotic commercial arrangements with immigrant groups
such as the Chinese or Indians is not fortuitous, but rather reflects, at
least in important part, the longstanding success of these groups as
wealth-generating "middleman" minorities.
297
Sociologists and anthropologists have been trying for years to under-
stand the economic success of certain groups. 298 Many have argued that
296. See, e.g., ROBERT KLITGAARD, ADJUSTING TO REALITY 214-15 (1991); Harry Anthony
Parrinos, Differences in Education and Earnings Across Ethnic Groups in Guatemala, 37 Q. REV. ECON.
& FIN. 809 (1997); infra text accompanying note 318; see also JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE,
POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 87-88, 101, 105-06 tbl. 4-2, 143-44 (1990)
(concluding on the basis of an empirical study of American schools that relatively immutable
factors such as student ability and family resources exert the largest impact on educational per-
formance); James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YAL L.. 259, 266, 293-95 (1991) (noting
the central importance of interrelated factors such as parental socioeconomic status, classmates'
socioeconomic status, and student, family, and peer "tastes" for education in determining aca-
demic achievement).
297. See Chua, supra note 1, at 31-32, 101-02.
298. See Anthony Reid, Entrepreneurial Minorities, Nationalism and the State, in ESSENTIAL OUT-
SIDERS, supra note 146, at 33, 58. Although scholars had noticed the phenomenon of entrepre-
neurial minorities long befbre the modem era,
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cultural factors-for example, group differences in work habits, sav-
ings propensities, or attitudes toward education, commerce, and
wealth-explain differentials in group economic performance.2 99 Ac-
cording to some, religion is crucial in explaining the economic success
of certain groups.300 Thus, Weber famously argued that Protestantism
was more conducive to capital accumulation than Catholicism,301
whereas Werner Sombart saw the Jewish Torah as embodying a more
positive attitude toward wealth than the Christian New Testament.30 2
Confucianism, meanwhile, has appeared on both sides of the ledger:
Viewed by Weber as inhibiting "the acquisitive drive," 30 3 Confucian-
ism has lately been touted as wealth-promoting-at least until the
recent Asian financial crisis. 304 It is probably safe to say that the rela-
tionship between religion and economic success is inconclusive. More
recently, a growing literature (adumbrated by de Tocqueville and
popularized by Robert Putnam30 5) focuses on the importance of "fea-
tures of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks"-of-
ten described as "social capital"306 -in explaining the economic success
of certain groups.
comparative theories began to be developed by European (chiefly German) social scientists
during the late nineteenth century. The Jews of Europe were, naturally, the central example
for these writers, but even as early as Roscher (1875), analogies were made to the Chinese in
Southeast Asia. Most influential were the theories of Werner Sombart and Max Weber ....
[Sombart's] views have been less quoted than Weber's, probably ... because of his later
sympathy for Nazism ....
Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
299. See generally LAWRENCE E. HARRISON, WHO PROSPERS? How CULTURAL VALUES SHAPE
ECONOMIC AND POuTICAL SUCCESS (1992); KOTKIN, supra note 177; THOMAS SowELL, MIGRA-
TIONS AND CULTURES (1996); MAx WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPI-
TALISM 35-46 (Talcot Parsons trans., Routledge 1992) (1930).
300. See, e.g., DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS (1998); WEER,
supra note 299 at 35-46.
301. See WEBER, supra note 299, at 35-39, 155-83.
302. See WERNER SOMBART, THE JEwS AND MODERN CAPITALISM (M. Epstein trans., The
Free Press 1951) (1911).
303. Anthony Giddens, Introduction to WEBER, supra note 299, at xv-xvi. Indeed, "as recently
as the 1970s, Western culturalists, among others, were blaming Confucianism for the economic
backwardness of the Chinese." K.S. Jomo, A Specific Idiom of Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia:
Sino-Malaysian Capital Accumulation in the Face of State Hostility, in ESSENTIAL OUTSIDERS, supra
note'146, at 237, 237.
304. See LAL, supra note 33, at 2; What Would Confucius Say Now? ECONOMIST, July 25, 1998,
at 23.
305. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIc TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY 167 (1993); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513-24 (J.P. Mayer ed. &
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1835).
306. PUTNAM, supra note 305, at 167. As usually conceived,
[lhike other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of
certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence ....
... For example, a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive
trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking
that trustworthiness and trust.
JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 302, 304 (1990).
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To the extent that cultural factors play a significant role in produc-
ing the economic dominance of certain groups, the appropriate policy
implications are by no means clear. Even if there were a demonstrable
relationship between certain religions and economic success, an effort
to instill "the impulse to acquisition"30 7 through, say, group conver-
sions to Protestantism (or Judaism or Confucianism, depending on the
theory) would seem unpromising. Further, while developing-country
elites frequently have urged their peoples to "emulate the more suc-
cessfil minorities in their midst"30 8 and to become more "diligent"
and "acquisitive,"30 9 governmental "cultural revolutions"-attempting
to change culture and social norms by "top-down"310 legal mandates-
have not been famously successful. 311
Somewhat more hopeful are the growing efforts at the local level to
promote voluntary formation of social capital among impoverished
groups. For example, a number of nongovernmental, nonprofit micro-
credit organizations, such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which
engage in group lending to poor villagers (backed by peer pressure and
collective incentives), have succeeded impressively in promoting small-
scale entrepreneurship in developing-country villages.312
It remains to be seen whether micro-level, voluntary initiatives of
this kind can be implemented on anything like a comprehensive scale.
In some localized contexts-for example, inner cities in the United
States-innovative approaches to build social capital may be extremely
useful.3 3 At the same time, their prospects for equalizing ethno-
307. WEBER, supra note 299, at 171.
308. THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 45
(1990). For example, Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir has often urged his Malay constituents
to model themselves on their more "hardworking" and commercially "astute" Chinese counter-
parts. KLITGAARD, supra note 296, at 188; see HOROWITZ, supra note 139, at 173.
309. In the 1970s, for example, influential Malay intellectuals authored a well-known book
called Revolusi Mental, criticizing "'Malay economic ethics in contrast to those of the Chinese."'
KLITGAARD, supra note 296, at 190. While Malays were "easily contented" and lacking in "persis-
tent effort in work," the Chinese were self-reliant, diligent, and marked by "acquisitive drive." Id.
"Thus progress could only be achieved through a revolution in mental attitudes." Id. Such calls
for cultural change must be understood in light of the condescension of the British colonial gov-
ernment, which held that native Malays were inherently "lazy," "dirty," and unsuited for hard
work. JAMES V. JESUDASON, ETHNICrY AND THE ECONOMY: THE STATE, CHINESE BUSINESS,
AND MULTINATIONALS IN MALAYSIA 38-39 (1989) (quoting colonial officer Frank Swetrenham);
see also Ganguly, supra note 55, at 239 (describing colonial education as aimed at making the
Malay better farmers and fishermen).
310. SCHUCK, supra note 294, at 422.
311. See THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEw 7 (1994); Ganguly, supra
note 55, at 262.
312. The Grameen Bank, founded in 1976, today assists more than two million borrowers,
mostly women, and serves over 37,000 villages. See AMiNuR RAHMAN, WOMEN AND MICRO-
CREDIT IN RURAL BANGLADESH: ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE RHETORIC AND REALITIES
oF GRAMEEN BANK LENDING 1 (1999). Micro-loan programs modeled on the Grameen now
operate in 60 countries, including, most recently, in South Africa. See Andrew Maykuth, Micro-
credit, Macroraeults, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 25, 1998, at 1E.
313. See Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE LJ. 75, 83-84
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economic inequalities should not be overstated. With respect to re-
dressing the economic dominance of "entrepreneurial" minorities, it is,
at a minimum, ironic for governments to try to establish through legal
means the informal social relationships and networks that are said to
constitute the social capital of some groups but not others.3 14 After all,
as usually conceived by social capital theorists, the economic value of
informal, trust-based exchange relations lies precisely in the extent to
which they substitute for the costly mechanisms of legal monitoring
and enforcement. 315
Apart from the issue of feasibility, there is also the question of the
proper objective of development. Cultures obviously change over time,
and cultural generalizations are always suspect.316 Still, in any effort to
engineer social change "from above," there is "a certain danger of
treating culture purely as an obstacle." 317 Even assuming that it is pos-
sible to transform every developing-world villager into a consumer
entrepreneur, it is hardly obvious that this ought to be the goal of de-
velopment.
At least one point remains clear. The arguments against "cultural
engineering," substantial as they may be, should not be allowed to
excuse the enormous inequalities of opportunity that prevail through-
out the developing world and that contribute, at least to some degree,
to the economic dominance of certain minority groups. Anti-
corruption initiatives, anti-discrimination policies, and liberalized
credit reforms are needed throughout the developing world. Moreover,
education is also crucial. In South Africa, for example, expanding edu-
cational opportunities for blacks-relegated for decades to inferior
Bantu schooling and generally inhumane conditions-is an appropri-
ate national priority and should be vigorously supported by the inter-
national community. At the same time, it should be recognized how
difficult it will be to eliminate disparities in educational opportunity.
Given the powerful correlation between educational performance and
socioeconomic status (both of one's own family and of one's classmates)
genuinely equalizing educational opportunities may well require not
(1998) (discussing the advantages of "block-level organization").
314. See Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Inslitu-
tionalAlternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981).
315. See id. at 349.
316. Many have wryly recounted the 1903 "expert" assessment of the Japanese by an Austra-
lian guest of the Japanese imperial government:
My impression as to your cheap labour was soon disillusioned when I saw your people at
work. No doubt they are lowly paid, but the return is equally so; to see your men at work
made me feel that you are a very satisfied easy-going race who reckon time is no object. When
I spoke to some managers they informed me that it was impossible to change the hakits of
national heritage.
T.N. Srinivasan, Democracy, markets, governance, and development, 3 REv. DEV. & CHANGE 177, 197
(1998) (citing Jagdish Bhagwati).
317. Friedman, supra note 117, at 41.
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merely expenditures on schooling, but deep-seated socioeconomic re-
forms. 3 18
More critically, attempting to redress ethnoeconomic disparities
through education assumes a horizon of social stability that many de-
veloping countries may not have. Policies to expand education and
promote equal opportunity, while comforting and uncontroversial, do
not directly address the pressing, potentially explosive problems of
ethnodistributional imbalance, ethnoeconomic resentment, and eth-
nonationalist hatred that threaten so many developing societies. In-
deed, the relationship between education and ethnonationalism is by
no means straightforward. 319 To address these problems, it is essential
in the developing world-as it was in the developed world-to try to
devise measures and create institutions negotiating the conflict inher-
ent in free market democracy. To such measures and institutions we
now turn.
B. Negotiating the Paradox of Free Market Democracy in the
Developing World
This Section will propose policies to negotiate the paradox of free
market democracy in its ethnonationalist form. As Part I suggested,
the conflict between market-generated wealth disparities and majori-
tarian politics has been substantially alleviated in the developed world
by three categories of mediating devices: material, political, and ideo-
logical. In what follows, I will use the same organizational framework.
1. Material Redistribution
In all countries that pursue both markets and democracy, and par-
ticularly where the wealthy consist largely of an "outsider" group,
some form of material compensation to the less well-off majority will
be essential. Ideally, such compensation should be directed as broadly
and visibly as possible.
What form should such compensation take? I will consider two ba-
sic, nonexclusive approaches. The first-trickle-down supplemented
by tax-and-transfer-is rooted squarely within today's dominant policy
paradigm. The second-what I will call interethnic stakeholding-is
not, and I will treat this range of possibilities at greater length.
a. Trickle-Down Plus Tax-and-Transfer
The dominant school of development thinking today holds that the
best hope for the impoverished majorities of the developing world is to
318. See Liebman, supra note 296, at 293.
319. See ANDEaSON supra note 138, at 119-33.
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generate as much total wealth as possible, to let such wealth "trickle
down" to the less well-off, and to supplement this trickle-down ap-
proach with "social safety nets" and other tax-and-transfer programs.
The basic policy package implied by this approach is relatively
straightforward. Economic growth is the primary objective, and to
that end developing countries should strive to maximize their appeal
to domestic and especially foreign investors by establishing well-
functioning, efficient market institutions. Important policies would
thus include all the familiar marketization measures: privatization,
liberalization of capital and regulatory restrictions, rationalization of
property law regimes, simplification of commercial codes, and the
strengthening of commercial courts or other institutions assuring the
enforceability of contract rights.320 To these reforms would be added
tax-and-transfer measures benefitting the least well-off.
Within this basic paradigm, considerable variations are possible.
Some scholars and policy makers favor marketization as quickly as pos-
sible, 321 while others resist this "shock therapy" approach, preferring
"gradualism. '" 322 Some advocate as little governmental redistribution as
possible and hence support only minimal "social safety nets" for the
"truly needy,"323 while others favor more aggressive measures, often
based on Western-style social security programs. 324
Unfortunately, the realistic redistributive potential of trickle-down
plus tax-and-transfer policies in most developing countries is ex-
tremely limited, at least in the near to midterm future. To put it
bluntly, the basic problem is that there is not nearly enough to tax,
and nearly no one who can be trusted to transfer.325
320. See Douglas Webb, Legal System Reform and Private Sector Development in Developing Coun-
tries, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LAw 45, 46 (R. Pritchard
ed., 1996); see also Mariano Tommasi & Andris Velasco, Where Are We in the Political Economy of
Reform?, 1 Por'Y REFORM 187, 192 (1996) (describing the "Washington Consensus"). There are
hundreds of recent legal articles advocating market-oriented policies along the lines mentioned in
the text. For a recent general survey of the literature on marketizarion, see Chua, supra note 1, at
14-16.
321. See, e.g., JEFFREY SACHS, POLAND'S JUMP TO THE MARKET ECONOMY (1993); M. Mussa,
Government Policy and the Adjustment Process, in IMPORT COMPETITION AND RESPONSE 73 (J.
Bhagwati ed., 1982).
322. Tommasi & Velasco, supra note 320, at 204; see also, e.g., A. Caplin & J. Leahy, Business as
Usual, Market Crashes, and Wisdom After the Fact, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 548 (1994).
323. DEEPAK LAL & H. MTIINT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POVERTY, EQUITY, AND
GROwTH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 394 (1996); seealso id. at ch. 9; LAL, supra note 33, at 159.
324. See, ag., SOCIAL SECuRITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (E. Ahmad et al. eds., 1991);
A.B. Atkinson, Income Maintenance andSocial Insurance, in HANDBOOK OF PUB3LIC ECONOMICS 779
(A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 1987).
325. Gunnar Myrdal made this point 15 years ago:
In underdeveloped countries... redistribution of income cannot, however, be carried out by
taxing the rich and transferring money to the poor via social security schemes and other such
measures to raise their levels of living. The poor are so overwhelmingly many, and the
wealthy so relatively few-and tax evasion among them so common.
Gunnar Myrdal, International Inequality and Foreign Aid in Retrospect, in PIONEERS IN DEVELOP-
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While Westerners take sophisticated tax systems for granted, estab-
lishing the institutions and practices necessary to effectuate tax-and-
transfer programs is immensely difficult in countries where the state is
weak and corruption is pervasive.326 More fundamentally, a trickle-
down plus tax-and-transfer strategy does not respond to the ethnodis-
tributional and ethnonationalist problems of developing countries
with market-dominant minorities-not surprisingly, given that this
strategy emerged in the West, where such problems generally have not
existed.
The ethnic "neutrality" of trickle-down and tax-and-transfer policies
may seem a virtue to many Western observers. But as I have shown
above, the Western perspective on ethnic conflict is not so easily
transferable to the developing world. 327 In many developing countries,
a trickle-down plus tax-and-transfer strategy will not be sufficient to
give significant numbers of the majority a stake in an interethnic mar-
ket economy. On the contrary, if history is any guide, such a strategy
may well result in vastly disproportionate wealth, together with the
economic symbols of national identity-major conglomerates, banks,
utilities, national forests, oil fields, copper, silver, and gold mines, and
technology-being held almost exclusively in the hands of foreign
investors and "outsider" minorities.328 This state of affairs has repeat-
edly triggered potent nationalist and ethnonationalist reactions among
"indigenous" developing-world majorities. 329 The reality is that a re-
distribution strategy of trickle-down plus tax-and-transfer will leave
markets and democracy in open, ethnonationalist conflict in much of
the developing world.
b. Interethnic Stakeholding
The real task, therefore, in countries with a market-dominant mi-
nority, is to confront the ethnodistributional and ethnonationalist di-
mensions of free market democracy and to formulate policies capable of
grappling decisively with these problems. The starting point of this
MENT 151, 154 (Gerald Meier & Dudley Seers eds., 1984); see also Laurie Goering, A Different
Facefor Democracy, CHI. TIun., Nov. 26, 1996, at N1 (reporting that "in South America few peo-
ple, especially the rich, pay taxes"); cf. LAL & MYINT, supra note 323, at 394 (arguing that at-
tempts to replicate Western-style welfare states in developing countries repeatedly have led to
fiscal crises, "often accompanied by a growth collapse").
326. Indeed, today's international "state-building" and anti-corruption initiatives are directed
at precisely these problems. See, e.g., RosE-AcKEM-iAN, supra note 106, at 225-29; ASIAN DE-
VELOPMENT BANK, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 2-5 (1999).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 97-135.
328. See, eg., Chua, supra note 169, at 228-31, 245, 269, 292, 295 n.538; Victor Mallet, South
Africa to Sell Off State Forests, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999, at 3; Allison Wright & Roberto Hernan-
dez, High Voltage, 9 Bus. Maxica 24 (1999); Zambia: Selling the Family Copper, ECONOMIST, Nov.
6, 1999, at 49.
329. See Chua, supra note 1, at 37-38.
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effort has to be a recognition that, in such countries, to the extent that
markets and democracy are successful, leaders will be under great pres-
sure to intervene in the market in an attempt to redress ethnoeconomic
imbalances; to initiate eliminationist policies; or, if they want to ig-
nore majoritarian ethnonationalist sentiment, to suppress democracy
itself.330 Within this realistic option set, the first choice-governmen-
tal intervention into the market-would appear to represent the lesser
of evils.
The difficulty of implementing effective interventions of this sort
should not be underestimated. Government intrusions into the market
always carry risks of inefficiency and corruption. Moreover, there is a
danger of unrealistic goals and excessive expectations. "Law is most
vulnerable when it takes on the ambitious task of social reconstruction,
for here the gap between its promise and its performance is widest.
3 1'
Finally, when such governmental intrusions are ethnically targeted
they carry the additional risk of exacerbating the ethnic conflict that
they are supposedly intended to address.332 Nevertheless, the actual
experience with ethnically based market interventions in the develop-
ing world does not justify rejecting this strategy outright. 333 Rather, it
is crucial to examine the kinds of measures that developing govern-
ments have pursued in the past to deal with their ethnodistributional
problems in order to learn from past mistakes, to profit from past suc-
cesses, and to chart a course toward future innovations. As will be ex-
plained more fully below, the overarching historical lesson here is that
interventions oriented toward monoethnic solutions have failed, while
those promoting interethnic solutions have been considerably more
successful.334
The form of ethnically targeted market intervention most com-
monly pursued in the developing world has probably been nationaliza-
tion, typically targeted at assets or businesses considered central to
national identity and even more typically targeted at assets or busi-
nesses controlled by economically dominant minorities and foreign
investors. 335 Generally speaking, nationalization regimes have been
colossal economic failures, characteristically leading to fiscal crisis and
economic stagnation. 336
330. Seesupra text accompanying notes 160-161.
331. SCHUCK, supra note 294, at 442 (footnotes omitted).
332. I address this concern below. See infra text accompanying notes 407- 409.
333. I discuss below the widely varying experiences of Malaysia, Nigeria, Quebec, South Af-
rica, Sri Lanka, and a number of Indian states, all of which have pursued ethnically based market
interventions. See infra text accompanying notes 365-413, and notes 407, 409.
334. See infra text accompanying notes 365-413.
335. See Chua, supra note 169, at 223-84.
336. See Michael J. Trebilcock, What Makes Poor Countries Poor? The Role of Institutional Capital
in Economic Development, in THE LAw AND ECONOMiCS OF DEVELOPMENT 15, 24-25, 33 (E. Bus-
caglia ed., 1997); Chua, supra note 1, at 51.
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Another form of market intervention all too common in the devel-
oping world has been ethnically targeted exclusions-laws or policies
that ban specific minorities from working in certain occupations 337 or
participating in certain economic sectors. 338 As a general matter, such
exclusionary policies have also backfired. On the one hand, they have
had drastically negative economic effects. "On the other hand, ethni-
cally based economic exclusions have proven notoriously ineffective;
economically dominant minorities have managed to frustrate such re-
strictions consistently through evasion (e.g., bribery or use of indige-
nous frontmen) or sheer indispensability."339
Instead of nationalization or exclusion, recent developments argue in
favor of exploring a very different approach: narrowly tailored pro-
grams to promote interethnic stakeholding. I will discuss three con-
texts in which such programs might be pursued: (i) interethnic corpo-
rate ownership, (ii) promotion of an interethnic middle class, and
(iii) worker participation.
i. Interethnic Corporate Ownership
Monoethnic corporate structures are characteristic of many devel-
oping societies, whether in the form of closely held, nontransparent
private companies (often controlled by single families belonging to an
economically dominant ethnic group)4 °0 or in the form of public com-
panies with shares traded on an- exchange in which extremely few
members of the general poptilation participate (as in South Africa,
where blacks still control only 6.8% of the Johannesburg Stock Ex-
change's total market capitalization)."' If this state of affairs could be
changed-if large numbers of the "indigenous" population had an
owzner-giip stake in the society's capital markets-the benefits might
- be considerable, both politically and economically. 42 In one commen-
337. In many Eastern European countries during the 1930s, for example, occupational li-
censing laws and the rules of various "professional associations excluded Jews from many occupa-
tions." SOWELL, supra note 299, at 267. After World War II there was not a country in Southeast
Asia "where the Chinese could pursue their callings or commercial preferences without disap-
proval or interference. In Thailand, Chinese aliens were excluded from twenty-seven occupations,
in Cambodia from eighteen." LYNN PAN, SONS OF mE YELLOW EMPEROR 217 (1990).
338. In the Philippines, for example, the Retail Nationalization Act passed in 1954 banned
Chinese residents from "'engag[ing] directly or indirectly in the retail business."' GoLAY ET AL.,
supra note 165, at 66-67 (quoting Retail Nationalization Act of 1954).
339. Chua, supra note 1, at 51.
340. See Supang Chantavanich, From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai: Political Conditions and
Identity Shifts among the Chinese in Thailand, in ETHNIC CHINESE AS SoumEAsr AsIANs 232, 255
(Leo Suryadinata ed., 1997); ROBERT G. GREGORY, SOUTH AsIAxNS IN EAST AFRICA: As Eco-
NOMIC AND SOcIL HISTORY, 1890-1980, at 61 (1993).
341. See Nicol Degli Innocenti, Johannesburg "marches backward" from black control: Black
empowerment on theJSE is faltering, says Nicol Degli Innocenti, FIN. TfmEs, Mar. 25, 2000, at 18.
342. Japan's evolution is interesting on this point. "Japanese industrial organization was first
dominated by the family owned and managed zaibatsu groups in the uncertain property rights
349
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tator's words: "Encouraging equity markets to develop and encourag-
ing dispersed ownership may ... imply not only efficiency gains but
also a more open society, one less dominated by banks" and "crony
capitalism" and "more attractive to entrepreneurship." 343
The difficulty, however, is that substantial obstacles impede the
achievement of this goal in the developing world. Given the "uncer-
tain property rights environment" of most developing countries, the
regulatory apparatus necessary to implement and monitor "an Anglo-
American style system of capital-market oriented," "dispersed, non-
family ownership" is typically lacking. 344 At the same time, there is far
too little money in the hands of general developing-world populations
to make equity purchases by these populations a realistic capital-
raising scenario, and forced popular equity distributions would require
highly inefficient alienation restrictions to deal with the problem of
rapid ownership reconcentration.
Nevertheless, this goal is much too important to be dismissed as
hopeless, and recent global developments offer grounds for at least
limited optimism. In the last decade, the creation (or expansion) of
stock markets in emerging economies has been a focus of economists
and policy makers all over the world, and there have been considerable
successes. In Greece, for example, the Athens Stock Exchange has ex-
ploded over the last decade, with a surprising number of privately held
companies "going public," and the number of local citizens holding
shares increasing from just "an elite circle" to roughly 20% of the
population.345 In China, the Shanghai Securities Exchange has given
large numbers of urban Chinese a stake in a market economy and is
widely viewed as a source of upward mobility.34 6 "[Tlo play it," ac-
cording to one participant, "one needn't be hired .... One needn't
cultivate one's official connections .... Indeed, for the moment, one
need not even pay taxes on one's earnings. All one needs to become
rich.., is 'a small bag for a pencil and notebook... and a brain."' 347
Moreover, the extraordinary privatization experiments in the former
Soviet republics and satellites provide an enormous fund of new data
environment of nineteenth-century Japan. The zaibatsu gradually opened up to non-kin investors
and professional managers as property rights institutions became more secure in the early part of
this century." Curtis Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REv. 1145, 1179-80 (1998)
(citation omitted). Post-war efforts to further "dismantle the zaibatsu," however, were only par-
tially successful, in part because of "the legacy of regulatory relations between political and pri-
vate economic agents in Japan." Id. What ultimately emerged was "an intermediate form of
network-based joint production": "the bank-centered keiretsu." Id.
343. Coffee, supra note 35, at 706.
344. Milhaupr, supra note 342, at 1179-80.
345. Brian Murphy, Investors Flocking to Greek Exchange, TIMEs UNION, Mar. 19, 1999, at ES.
346. ELLEN HERTZ, THE TRADING CROWD: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE SHANGHAI STOCK
MARKET 135 (1998).
347. Id.
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and innovative techniques for dealing with problems of broad-based
corporate ownership dispersal. The use of financial intermediaries,
voucher programs, foreign monitors and consultants, and so on, may
with modifications prove instrumental in developing-world contexts as
well. To be sure, there may be as yet few, if any, unequivocal success
stories in the former Communist bloc, but it should be recalled that
the positive transformations that have occurred in those countries
would have been almost unimaginable just a decade ago.
More concretely, there are, in fact, promising developing-world ex-
amples of corporate ownership reforms addressed to problems of ethno-
economic dominance. South Africa, for example, is currently pursuing
redistributive policies designed to redress the extreme dominance of
white ownership in the corporate sphere, but the results at this time
are largely incipient. 348 Malaysia, on the other hand, has pursued for
the last thirty years an ethnically based corporate restructuring agenda,
which has included some considerable successes and may serve as a
valuable model.
Following the 1969 race riots in Kuala Lumpur, which were similar
in many respects to those that recently erupted in Indonesia, the Ma-
laysian government adopted the New Economic Policy (NEP), aggres-
sively seeking to achieve "national unity ... expressed as the im-
provement of economic balances between the races." 349 Malays, at that
time representing roughly 62% of the population, 350 "owned a mere
1.5% of capital assets of limited companies." 351 Moreover, foreigners
and the Chinese community "control[led] large-scale commercial agri-
culture and all forms of non-agricultural enterprises." 352
To redress these extreme imbalances in the corporate sector, the
Malaysian government in the early 1970s initiated large-scale pur-
chases of corporate assets on behalf of the Malay majority353 and
adopted ethnically based quotas on corporate equity ownership. 354 Af-
348. See, eg., Kanya Adam, The Politics of Redress: South Africa Style Affirmative Action, 35 J.
MOD. AFR. STuD. 231 (1997).
349. Chua, supra note 169, at 246 (citation and inner quotations omitted) (quoting the NEP).
Promulgated in 1971, the NEP was replaced in 1990 by the National Development Plan (NDP),
which, despite its strategic shift to privatization, embraces the NEP's fimdamental objectives.
Ganguly, supra note 55, at 257 n.70. Thus, consistent with the original targets of the NEP, the
benefits of privatization are to be directed principally toward Malays, with redistributive goals
receiving even "greater emphasis" under the NDP than under the NEP Id.
350. The ethnic composition of Malaysia is roughly as follows: 62% Malay, 27% Chinese, 8%
Indian, and 3% other. See Ganguly, supra note 55, at 234 (citing 1995 census by the Government
of Malaysia).
351. Id. at 261.
352. Id. at 251.
353. JnsusoN, supra note 309, at 72. "Thefse] assets 'were to be held in trust for the Malays
and other indigenous groups until such time as they [were] in a position to acquire these shares
on their own.'" Id. (citation omitted).
354. See id. at 137.
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ter 1976, under what was effectively compulsory corporate restructur-
ing, many Malaysian Chinese companies were required to set aside
30% of their equity for Malay interests (typically with no choice about
the Malay recipient of such equity).355 At the same time, the govern-
ment "invest[ed] heavily in publicly owned corporations that were
operated and managed by Malays"; it also "created a number of incen-
tive schemes to attract private Malay investment to these enter-
prises."356 More recently, privatized entities, and companies seeking to
list on the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange, are generally "required to
have a Bumiputra shareholding of at least 30%."357
The results of these corporate restructuring measures have been im-
pressive. Along with significant redistributive advances in all other
sectors of the economy (discussed below), in the corporate sector the
Bumiputra ownership share of corporate stock at par values jumped
from 1.5% in 1969, to 15.6% in 1982, to 20.6% in 1995.358 The ef-
fect of this redistribution has been to give Malays a stake not only in
the market as a whole, but also, more specifically, in the success of
Chinese-controlled businesses.359
Early on, the NEP suffered from notorious circumvention problems,
principally in the form of "Ali-Baba" arrangements in which Chinese
businessmen collude with Bumiputra front men who "have no role
beyond collecting a fee for the use of their name."360 In recent years,
however, the Malaysian Government has taken steps to "eliminate the
'Ali-Baba' practice as well as promote expertise and technology-
sharing between Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras," for example by
establishing the Council for the Promotion of Genuine Partnership,
which since 1996 has set up 53 interethnic joint ventures.361 Ali-Baba
arrangements appear to be far less common today than they were in the
early years of the NEP.362 More crucially, even when ethnically targeted
corporate restructuring programs like the NEP are operating imper-
355. See id. at 137, 141; Chua, supra note 169, at 247; Donald L. Horowitz, Cause and Conse-
quence in Public Policy Theory: Ethnic Policy and System Transformation in Malaysia, 22 POL'Y SCI.
249, 266-68 (1989). After heated protest by Chinese business interests, the Malaysian govern-
ment amended its laws so that "firms with fewer than twenty-five workers" and "firms with less
than $500,000 in fixed investments" were not subject to equity quotas. JESUDASON, supra note
309, at 141.
356. Ganguly, supra note 55, at 261.
357. Steve Glain, Malaysia's Grand Social Experiment May be Next Casualty of Asian Crisis,
WALL ST.J., Apr. 23, 1998, at A15; see Chua, supra note 169, at 249 (citations omitted).
358. Jomo, supra note 303, at 244.
359. See id. at 244-45; see also Mah Hui Lim, Affirmative Action, Ethnicity and Integration: The
Case of Malaysia, 8 ETHNIC & RAcIAL SUD. 250, 268 (1985) (citing evidence that the NEP has
increased collaboration among Chinese and Malay businessmen, often through joint ventures).
360. HOROWITZ, supra note 139, at 666.
361. Zuraimi Abdullah, Genuine Partnerships Still a Long Way to Go, NEw STRAITs TIMEs, Dec.
26, 1998, at 17.
362. See HOROWITZ, supra note 139, at 666; Lim, supra note 359, at 259-64.
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fectly, they still may perform important redistributive functions. For
example, an Ali-Baba circumvention of the NEP's ownership restric-
tions still involves a member of the Malay majority being "compen-
sated" by an ethnic Chinese entrepreneur.
The accomplishments of the NEP should not be overstated. It is un-
clear how well the NEP would have fared in the absence of the ex-
traordinarily dynamic growth rates of the 1970s and 1980s? ° " State-
assisted Bumiputra businesses, including many large conglomerates,
"have been especially hard hit" by the recent recession. 364 Nevertheless,
the experience of the NEP suggests that narrowly tailored, interethnic
corporate restructuring may be a realistic goal in developing societies
with a market-dominant minority.
ii. Promoting an Interethnic Middle Class
Many observers have emphasized the central importance of creating
a middle class in developing societies, which historically have been
marked by a juxtaposition between massively wealthy elites and im-
poverished general populations. 365 This need is especially urgent in
developing countries with a market-dominant minority, where giving
significant numbers of the "indigenous" majority a stake in an
interethnic economy may be critical to mediating the paradox of free
market democracy. There is some evidence from countries with eco-
nomically dominant minorities that concerted efforts to promote an
interethnic middle class can be effective to a limited extent. In Que-
bec, for example, starting in the 1960s, aggressive affirmative action
policies appear to have played a substantial role in raising the eco-
nomic status of the severely economically disadvantaged French Cana-
dian majority vis--vis the economically dominant English-speaking
minority.366 Historically, French-Canadians, who comprise roughly
80%7 of Quebec's population, ran the government of Quebec and the
church in the French language, while "tt]he modern economy-banks,
insurance companies, trading and manufacturing firms-was domi-
nated by English speakers." 367 "As rural Quebec became overpopu-
lated, impoverished French Canadian peasants moved to urban areas,"
where they became an undereducated, "industrial proletariat," typi-
cally working "in firms owned by Anglo-Canadians, British, or Ameri-
cans and operated at management levels in English." 368
363. See Ganguly, supra note 55, at 263.
364. S. Jayasankaran, Recession Hits State-Aided Entrepreneurs Hard, FAR E. ECON. REv., May 6,
1999, at 50; see Glain, supra note 357, at A15.
365. See, eg., Fias, supra note 2; Tommasi and Velasco, supra note 320.
366. See Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics and Economic Power, 19 CoMP. POL. 395, 396-401,
410-12 (1987).
367. Id. at 396.
368. Id.
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In what has been called the Quiet Revolution, the Quebec govern-
ment sought "to put an end to the ethnic division of labor" and "to
insure the full participation of French Canadians in a modernized
economy."369 Along with aggressive language policies, 370 the Quebec
government embarked on a vast expansion of public francophone edu-
cation at all levels and adopted measures promoting French-speaking
firms and entrepreneurs "by facilitating their access to capital, by pref-
erential purchasing practices, and by helping them to locate export
markets." 371 In recent years, "French speakers have gained an expand-
ing beachhead" in Quebec's private sector, both "in higher level em-
ployment and to a lesser extent in the ownership of assets." 372 As of
1987, French-Canadians occupied 58% of all senior management posi-
tions, as compared with approximately 14% in 1964.373 Moreover,
"several large-scale French-owned enterprises have emerged in bank-
ing, construction, and manufacturing, complementing the large num-
ber of new francophone enterprises and services, such as advertising,
information processing, and small-scale manufacturing."374
Similarly, in South Africa between 1948 and 1976, aggressive gov-
ernmental intervention almost certainly assisted in transforming Afri-
kaners from a rural, economically "backward" community (vis-a-vis
the British) to one with a salient role in the modern private sector. The
Afrikaners, descendants of Dutch and French Huguenot settlers in the
seventeenth century, were traditionally farmers and cattle raisers. As
late as 1910, 90% of the Afrikaner labor force worked in agriculture,
while "the lucrative gold and diamond industries, manufacturing,
finance, commerce, and senior positions in the civil service were in the
hands of the British and other English speakers."3 75 In 1910 Afrikaner
per capita income was one-third of that of the British.376
After taking power in 1948, the Afrikaner-based Nationalist Party
"greatly expanded technical, vocational, and professional education for
Afrikaners in the Afrikaans language" and fostered Afrikaner participa-
tion in the private sector by directing substantial capital and govern-
ment supply contract opportunities to Afrikaner entrepreneurs.377 The
government also created a number of state-owned enterprises expressly
intended to help advance the economic position of the Afrikaners. By
1976, the income gap between the Afrikaner "majority" and the Brit-
369. Id. at 397.
370. The government "overturned the two centuries old practice of language parity and ele-
vated French to the status of sole official language." Id. at 411.
371. Id. at 399.
372. Id. at 400.
373. Id. at 401.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 406-07.
376. Id. at 407.
377. Id. at 408-09.
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ish "minority" had been closed, 378 and the "colonial mentality ...
among Afrikaners that they were culturally unequipped to be success-
ful in modern economic roles" had been largely eroded.
37 9
Obviously, conditions in Quebec and South Africa forty years ago
were in many ways more propitious than those currently prevailing in
the developing world.3 80 Once again, therefore, the case of Malaysia
may be more relevant. Under the NEP, in addition to restructuring
corporate ownership, the Malaysian government also implemented
strong affirmative action programs for the Bumiputra majority in sec-
tors such as education, business, employment, credit, and civil service
administration. 381
After 1969, the Malaysian government introduced a number of
sweeping educational reforms, including "preferential quotas and
scholarships for the Bumiputra, as well as generous scholarships and
bursaries for pursuing higher education abroad."382 "At the secondary
school level, elite boarding schools were set up exclusively for Malays.
In late 1995, close to 64 percent of the available positions at the uni-
versity level were reserved for Malays" (roughly proportional to their
percentage of the population). 383 At the same time, the government
established state-run banks to provide financial services to Malays.
38 4
"Quotas were set for the employment of Malays in commercial and
industrial firms." 38' In addition, non-Malay firms, including foreign
corporations, "were asked to devise plans for the training and promo-
tion of Malays to more skilled and upper management positions."
386
378. Id. at 410. Until the 1980s, "the nonwhite majority, including blacks, coloreds, and In-
dians and comprising roughly 80% of the population, was effectively disenfranchised." Id. at 407.
379. Id. at 408-09. In South Africa, as in Quebec, however, ownership and control of the pri-
vate sector remain predominantly in the hands of English-speaking minorities. Id. at 400, 409.
380. Quebec had the advantage of being a unit within a prosperous, industrialized country,
and the recipient of generous federal funding: The Canadian government contributed significant
funds to Quebec (viewed by the Ottawa elites as a "have not" province), in part "[t]o avert the
growth of secessionist sentiment in Quebec." Id. at 399. In South Africa, until the 1980s, Afri-
kaners (along with English-speaking whites) profited enormously from "the availability of a mass
of impoverished and powerless nonwhite workers" to occupy inferior niches in a split labor mar-
ket. Id. at 409-10. Indeed, both Quebec and South Africa were able dramatically to expand
educational opportunities for their disadvantaged "majorities" without "diminish[ingl existing
educational opportunities for the economically-dominant English-speaking minorities." Id. at
410. This will not be possible in most developing countries in the absence of enormous interna-
tional financial assistance.
381. See HoRoWrrz, supra note 139, at 654, 660-62, 666-69;JESUrASON, supra note 309, at
132; Ganguly, supra note 55, at 257-63.
382. Ganguly, supra note 55, at 259; see Horowitz, supra note 355, at 259. As a result, many (if
not most) Chinese Malays sent their children to universities abroad, where ironically they often
received a superior education. See id.
383. Ganguly, supra note 55, at 259.
384. See id. at 262.
385. Id. at 260.
386. Id.; seeJ.SuDASoN, supra note 309, at 137.
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It is safe to say that the NEP has failed to achieve some of its most
ambitious objectives. Despite inflated official claims, for example, the
NEP has not succeeded in eradicating poverty, one of its major
goals.387 Moreover, even after decades of sustained governmental inter-
vention, the Chinese minority generally remains economically domi-
nant vis- -vis the Bumiputra majority.388
Nevertheless, if the goal of the NEP is seen not as achieving "eco-
nomic parity between the races" but rather as promoting interethnic
stakeholding and thereby helping to negotiate the paradox of free
market democracy in the face of a resented, market-dominant minor-
ity, then the NEP may well have been extremely successfil. While the
NEP has not lifted the great majority of Malays (particularly in the
rural areas) out of poverty, it has helped to create a substantial Malay
middle class. 389 Between 1970 and 1992, the percentage of Malays
occupying the country's most lucrative professional positions went
from 6% to 32%.390 Specifically, over roughly the same period, "the
proportion of bumiputra doctors rose from 4 to 28 percent, dentists
from 3 to 24 percent, architects from 4 to 24 percent, engineers from 7
to 35 percent, and accountants from 7 to 11 percent." 391 "There is no
possibility that market mechanisms could have produced such re-
suts. "392
By creating a small but visible Malay economic elite393 and by
bringing Malay participation into important economic sectors-for
example, the construction, rubber, tin, shipping, banking, and com-
munications sectors (all formerly dominated by foreigners or Chinese
and Indian Malaysians)394-- the NEP has helped to promote a sense
387. See SowLL, supra note 308, at 48-50; Jill Eyre & Denis Dwyer, Ethnicity and Industrial
Development in Penang, Malaysia, in ETHNICITY AND DEVELOPMENT 181, 182-83 (Denis Dwyer
& David Drakakis-Smith eds., 1996). According to official figures, poverty in the Malay penin-
sula fell from 49% in 1970 to 15% in 1993. SeeJomo, supra note 303, at 244. "Much of this was
made possible by the extraordinary dynamism of the Malaysian economy in the 1980s and early
1990s." Ganguly, supra note 55, at 263. Further, these aggregate statistics conceal the much
higher incidence of poverty in rural areas. See, e.g., S. Husan All, Development, Social Stratifications
and Ethnic Relations: The Malaysian Case, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT 96,
109 (S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe & Reed Coughlan eds., 1991) (noting that in 1984 the inci-
dence of poverty was over 57% among rice farmers and over 43% among "rubber smallholders").
388. See JESUDASON, supra note 309, at 159-60; KUTGAARD, stupra note 296, at 192-93;
Jomo, supra note 303, at 244-45.
389. See Ganguly, supra note 55, at 261; see also Esman, supra note 366, at 405 (noting that
"tQhe NEP has ... spawned an increasingly confident managerial bourgeoisie with middle-class
incomes and a modem urban lifestyle, plus a small group of politicians, members of royal fami-
lies, and retired civil servants who have accumulated economic assets, in large measure due to
their connections with the government").
390. SeeJomo, supra note 303, at 244.
391. Ganguly, supra note 55, at 261.
392. Esman, supra note 366, at 406.
393. See Ganguly, supra note 55, at 262; S. Jayasankaran, The Chosen Few, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Dec. 21, 1995, at 30.
394. See Chua, supra note 169, at 247; Horowitz, supra note 355, at 264.
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among the Bumiputra that a market economy can benefit indigenous
Malays and not merely foreign investors and entrepreneurial "outsid-
ers." Even if the benefits of the NEP are not spread as widely as they
should be,39' the NEP serves a crucial symbolic ftinction. As Malaysia's
Prime Minister Mahathir put it, conceding that the NEP in its early
years may have "enrich[ed] a select few" Malaysians:
if these few Malays are not enriched the poor Malays will not gain
either. It is the Chinese who will continue to live in huge houses
and regard the Malays as only fit to drive their cars. With the ex-
istence of the few rich Malays at least the poor can say their fate is
not entirely to serve rich non-Malays. From the point of view of
racial ego, and this ego is still strong, the unseemly existence of
Malay tycoons is essential. 3
96
Today, in addition to the many Malay "tycoons," "[slome of the best
medical specialists, lawyers and architects in Malaysia today are Ma-
lay"-a fact acknowledged even among the Chinese, who in the 1960s
"viewed the Malays with condescension at best, scorn at worst."
397
Malaysia's NEP highlights two final points about the prospects of
ethnically targeted market interventions in developing societies with
economically dominant minorities. First, in assessing the efficiency
costs of such programs, 398 everything depends on "specifying the right
395. As critics of ethnically based preferences often point out, the NEP has tended to benefit
privileged and politically connected Malays (including members of the former aristocracy) far
more than the poorest of the population. See, eg., SOWELL, supra note 308, at 48-49. On the other
hand, the studies usually cited to show that the NEP has benefited only "the Malay elite-in the
name of the masses" are somewhat outdated (from the 1970s or early 1980s), see, eg., id. at 49;
Lim, supra note 359, at 269-70; Mavis Puthucheary, Public Policies Relating to Business and Land,
and the Impact on Ethnic Relations in Peninsular Malaysia, in FROM INDEPENDENCE TO STATEHOOD
147, 163 (Robert B. Goldmann & A. Jeyaamtnam Wilson eds., 1984), whereas the most substan-
tial gains of the NEP have taken place over the last 20 years.
396. SOWELL, supra note 308, at 49 (citation omitted). Along these lines, there is some evi-
dence that middle and lower class Malays have more favorable, even loyal, attitudes toward "Ma-
lay tycoons" than might be expected. JESUDASON, supra note 309, at 108. As one commentator
has written, the presence of such tycoons may suggest to ordinary Malays that they too "can be
economic achievers"-that perhaps "their chance will some day come." Id. at 109.
397. Murray Hiebert & S. Jayasankaran, Formative Fury: Affirmative action policies enacted after
riots 30 years ago still play a vital role in fostering racial harmony, FAR E. ECON. Rav., May 20, 1999,
at 45.
398. There is no question that the NEP entailed short-term efficiency costs, by increasing
official discretion and often promoting corruption and patronage. See Jomo, supra note 303, at
249. Moreover, after the enactment of the NEP, many of the largest Chinese companies in Malay-
sia diversified their investments abroad, most commonly to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Austra-
lia. See JESUDASON, supra note 309, at 154. Some of this "internationalization" almost certainly
would have occurred anyway, even without the NEE See id. Finally, many believe that the NEP
has encouraged Chinese Malays to pursue within Malaysia strategies of short-term profit maximi-
zation ("guerilla capitalism") contrary to the country's long-term interests: "Not surprisingly...
Chinese capital has gravitated toward finance and real estate, investments that offer fairly rapid,
attractive returns and relatively easy exit." Jomo, supra note 303, at 248-49.
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counterfactual." 399 If one assumes that in the absence of the NEP there
would have been perfectly efficient, optimal investment and alloca-
tions, then the NEP has by hypothesis hindered Malaysia's economic
growth and development. But this is almost certainly an unrealistic
assumption.400
Indonesia provides a useful counterpoint. The massive capital flight,
violence, and social dislocations recently suffered by Indonesia contrast
sharply with the situation in Malaysia, where, since the financial crisis
erupted two years ago, there has been no anti-Chinese reaction or eth-
nic rioting,40 ' no discriminatory ethnically targeted market interven-
tion,40 2 and very little capital flight.40 3 The comparison between Ma-
laysia and Indonesia has its limits: The two countries differ in impor-
tant respects,4°4 and there can be no proof that an NEP-style program
in Indonesia would have led to different results in recent years. Never-
theless, most contemporary analysts agree that Malaysia's systematic
interventions over the last thirty years helped "integrate and harmo-
nize a potentially volatile population."40 5 The increased Bumiputra
stake both in the overall economy and in Chinese-run business ven-
tures almost certainly helped dull the appeal of ethnonationalist, anti-
market extremism. In one observer's words,
There's a general feeling that people have a lot at stake in the
country .... Ethnic divisions are not as clear as they were before,
when you had Malay peasants, Chinese and Indian workers, the
399. Tommasi & Velasco, supra note 320, at 211.
400. Gob Ban Lee, Restructuring Society in Malaysia: Its Impacts on Employment and Inmsintent, in
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT, supra note 387, at 74,90-91.
401. Hiebert &Jayasankaran, smpra note 397, at 45.
402. During the recent financial crisis, Mahathir took pains to praise the Chinese community
for contributing to the strength of the national economy with their "wisdom and efficiency."
Adeline Ong, Be Disciplined to Ensure Growth, Bus. TIMES (Malaysia), Mar. 8, 1999, at 2. On the
other hand, Mahathir blamed Malaysia's economic problems on foreign "'rogues,' 'morons,' 'neo-
colonialists' and an imagined conspiracy of Jewish currency traders." Seth Mydans, Hard Times
Weaken a Malaysian Powerbroker, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at A12.
403. The capital controls imposed by the Malaysian government in September 1998 did "not
unleash the troubles many people initially feared. No blackmarket ... emerged and capital flight
[was not] a problem." S. Jayasankaran, Malaysia: Return of Optimism, FAR E. ECON. REv., Mar. 18,
1999, at 61.
404. For example, Malaysia has a much smaller absolute population than Indonesia. At the
same time, the Chinese community in Malaysia comprises a much larger percentage of the total
population (roughly 30%) than that in Indonesia (roughly 3%). There is also a large Indian
community in Malaysia, comprising about 10% of the population. See Lee Kam Hing, Malaysian
Chinese: Seeking Identity in Wawasan 2020, in ETHNIC CHINESE AS SOUTHEAST ASIANS, snpra note
340, at 72, 74. It should not automatically be assumed that the relatively large Chinese popula-
tion in Malaysia has been a factor ameliorating ethnic conflict. As Horowitz has suggested, the
relatively large size of a particular ethnic minority can also be a factor contributing to ethnic
conflict, to the extent that large groups are more likely than small groups to be perceived as
constituting a political threat. See DONALD HOROwirz, RIOTS (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript
at 25-35, on file with author) (discussing 1969 riots in Malaysia and ethnic politics in Fiji).
405. Glain, supra note 357, at A15.
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Chinese in business, Malays in government and all the rich were
exclusively Chinese. They now cut across ethnic lines.406
Indeed, Mahathir's recent reelection (which dismayed many Western
observers, because of his abysmal free-speech record) is significant in a
number of respects. Polls suggest that most Malays approve of Ma-
hathir's ethnic policies. Moreover, Mahathir had the support of large
numbers of Chinese Malays, including many influential members of
the business community.
From this point of view, it becomes much harder to conclude that
Malaysia's NEP has been inefficient or "growth-retarding." On the
contrary, to the extent that ethnically based market interventions help
reconcile poor majorities to the inequities of a market economy, pro-
viding a horizon of social stability for the implementation and oscilla-
tions of a market system, they are arguably a way not only of reconcil-
ing democracy and markets, but also of promoting long-term invest-
ment and economic growth.
Second, Malaysia's NEP, together with the affirmative action pro-
grams pursued on behalf of the francophones in Quebec and Afrikaners
in South Africa, suggest that ethnically based governmental interven-
tions need not entrench, but can instead ameliorate, ethnic division.
Granted, the dangers inherent in all ethnic preference programs should
not be taken lightly. There is a risk that such programs will increase
ethnic conflict. 40 7 Specifically, measures aimed (whether explicitly or
not) at eliminating or "shutting out" an economically dominant mi-
nority-whether from the economy as a whole or only from certain
sectors-should be rigorously avoided. 408 Indeed, this may be the real
406. Hiebert &Jayasankaran, supra note 397, at 45.
407. Thomas Sowell has argued that in Nigeria and a number of states in India, ethnically
based preferences for "backward" majorities have tended to increase group polarization and vio-
lence. See SowEL, supra note 308, at 15, 53, 57, 62, 74-75. Similarly, Myron Weiner and Mary
Fainsod Katzenstein, in a number of well-known studies, suggest that in Bombay, Andhra, and
Assam, ethnically based employment preferences may have "aroused more ethnic conflict than
they assuaged." HoRowiTz, supra note 139, at 671; see MYRON WEINER & MARY FAINSOD
KATZENSTEIN, INDIA'S PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: MIGRANTS, THE MIDDLE CLASSES, AND ETH-
NIC EQUALITY 147 (1981); Mary Fainsod Katzensrein, Preferential Treatment and Ethnic Conflict in
Bombay, 25 PUB. POL'Y 313 (1977). It is important to note that in all these cases, ethnic tensions,
ethnic resentment of the economically dominant minority, and ethnic violence all predated the
implementation of preferential programs, making it extremely difficult to assess the extent to
which these programs contributed to ethnic conflict. See HoRow'iz, supra note 139, at 244 (de-
scribing recurring ethnic violence, dating to at least 1945, involving the economically dominant
Ibo in northern Nigeria); SOWELL, supra note 308, at 57 (describing ethnic riots and arson in
Assam in the 1960s, before the enactment of preferential policies); id. at 62 (describing violence
in Maharashtra leading up to and accompanying calls for pro-Maharashtrian employment prefer-
ences). More important, the particular forms of preferential policies pursued in these countries
increased the likelihood that they would result in inflamed ethnic conflict. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 408-409, and note 409.
408. See Horowitz, supra note 355, at 268-70 (observing and critiquing the practice in Malay-
sia in the early 1970s of reserving entire economic sectors for Malays).
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lesson to take from the negative experiences of Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and
certain states in India.409 Instead, the operative goal in every case
should be to maximize interethnic economic cooperation." 10 Ideally,
preference programs should be limited to a discrete time frame and
implemented in such a way as to allow the market-dominant minority
to continue to exercise its wealth-producing skills while giving mem-
bers of the majority a real stake in the market-dominant minority's
economic success.
Moreover, every effort should be made to sever preferential programs
from ethnonationalist rhetoric and instead to root them in an ideology
consistent with an inclusive, "liberal" multiethnic state. Democratic
South Africa thus far provides an emulable model. Rising far above its
apartheid predecessors, the current government (first under Mandela
and now under Mbeki) has not wavered from its commitment to a
multiracial democracy, even as it implements strong, ethnically based
redistributive policies, including educational and employment prefer-
ences, ethnically based restrictions on privatization, nationalization of
water, and limited restrictions on land ownership.411 Some might ob-
ject to the use of race-conscious measures in a country where over-
coming a racist past is the national challenge. But it is naive to think
that "race-neutral" policies could eliminate the race consciousness of
South African society, and it is imperative for South Africa's govern-
ment, if it is to maintain popular support for its commitments to a
multiracial democracy, to address in a visible and significant fashion
the egregious racial disparities in wealth that persist there.412
409. The ethnic preferences pursued by Maharashtra and Nigeria in the 1960s were not de-
signed with interethnic objectives in mind. On the contrary, the thinly veiled (and sometimes
express) purpose of these measures was to shut out the economically dominant minority as much
as possible, in the name of"Maharashtria for Maharashtrians" and (in the case of Nigeria) "North-
ernization." The same was true in Sri Lanka, where the "Sinhala Only" campaign begun in the
1950s-including radical expropriations of land and industry as well as blatantly anti-Tamil
educational and language policies-provoked a "cycle of violence and revenge" that continues
even today. Amita Shastri, Government Policy and the Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka, in GOVERNMAINT
POLICIES AND ETHNIC RELATIONS, supra note 55, at 129, 154; see id. at 141-48, 162; Chua,
supra note 1, at 44-45. By contrast, the governmental interventions adopted on behalf of the
Quebe~ois, Afrikaners, and Bumiputra imposed limits on, but still strongly encouraged, com-
mercial activity by the "entrepreneurial" minority. The NEP, for example, generally permits
Chinese Malaysians to own 70% of business concerns, and at least in recent years, the government
has vigorously sought to promote "genuine partnerships" between Bumiputra and non-
Bumiputra entrepreneurs. Hamisah Hamid, Second Phase of Genuine Partnership To Be Launched in
November, Bus. TIMEs (Malaysia), Oct. 24, 1997, at 2.
410. See Horowitz, supra note 355, at 270.
411. See Chua, supra note 1, at 68-71.
412. In the words of South Africa's Minister ofJustice:
The apartheid state inculcated a culture of violence and divisiveness that is also our legacy.
The stark contrast between the opulence in which some few people lived and the poverty
and degradation of millions produced bitterness and hatred ....
... The privileges of the apartheid state are deeply embedded. Those who enjoyed them
during the apartheid years continue to enjoy most of those privileges today. Despite our commit-
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The recent cases of Malaysia and South Africa suggest that ethni-
cally based preferential programs are not necessarily, and need not be
presented as, a way of "shutting out outsiders."4 13 In fact, they can also
be understood as part of a liberal program: as a way of correcting long-
standing historical inequities (e.g., colonial divide-and-conquer poli-
cies, apartheid), reducing poverty among groups where it is most
acute, promoting equal opportunity, and creating the necessary pre-
conditions for a progressive, multiethnic state.
To be clear, I am not recommending ethnically based preferences for
all developing societies (not even for all developing societies with an
economically dominant minority). But where democracy pits an im-
poverished, self-proclaimed "indigenous" majority against a deeply
resented, market-dominant "outsider" minority, such preferences
should not be off the table. They may be the best "second-best" solu-
tion available.
iii. Worker Participation
Workplace relations are another obvious context for promoting
interethnic stakeholding in the marketplace. The challenge here is to
formulate strategies that do not exacerbate ethnic confrontation but
rather realign interests toward, and create incentives for, interethnic
cooperation.
Along these lines, what Mark Barenberg has described as the recent
"revival" and "spread" in industrialized countries of "cooperationist"
labor-management arrangements may provide fruitful models. 414 An-
other possibility might be the promotion of worker participation re-
forms, perhaps patterned on the E.U. requirement "that all transna-
tional corporations include mechanisms for consultation with worker
ment to build a non-racial society, South Africa remains highly race-conscious and race-
divided.
Hon. Abdullah Omar, Transformation of the South African System ofJustice, Edward A. Smith Lecture
at Harvard Law School (Apr. 9, 1998), <http:lwww.law.harvard.edulprograms/HRPI Publications/
dullahomar.html>.
413. Esman, supra note 366, at 395, 412-16. This is not to suggest that these programs have
produced only positive ethnic sentiments. In Malaysia, for example, "ft]here is little question that
the minority Chinese and Indian communities ... have resented these policies of ethnic prefer-
ence," Ganguly, stpra note 55, at 233, and many believe that it is well past time for these prefer-
ences to be phased out. Again, however, Chinese and Indian Malaysians continue to be relatively
economically successful, and there is also evidence that they view the NEP "restrictions as a small
price to pay for social stability." Glain, supra note 357, at A15.
414. Barenberg, supra note 45, at 1384, 1484. For examples of such cooperationist models, see,
e.g., MASAHIKO AoKI, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND BARGAINING IN THE JAPANESE ECON-
OMY 7-43 (1988) (discussing the "J-firm"); THOMAS A. KocHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 46-61 (1994) (discussing "team organization"); PIORE &
SABEL, snpra note 80, at 28-35 (discussing "flexible specialization"); and other sources cited in
Barenberg, supra note 45, at 1384 nn.9,10. Barenberg has argued that the Wagner Act scheme
was "profoundly cooperationist," not adversarial as is conventionally assumed. Id. at 1381.
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representatives." 41' If implemented successfully, such reforms would
have the potential not only to achieve redistributive gains, but also to
give workers belonging to an economically disadvantaged majority a
greater voice and stake in the market system.
There is one danger here to be noted. In certain circumstances in
ethnically divided societies, unionization or other forms of labor or-
ganization can become a vehicle for highly polarized ethnic confronta-
tion. In Indonesia, the early 1990s saw the rapid growth of the Serikat
Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (SBSI), "an independent labor union that
challenged the monopoly of the [Suharto] government's own corpora-
tist union."4 16 The Suharto government suppressed the SBSI "after a
massive labor protest in Medan, North Sumatra, in April 1994 turned
into a riot against the Sino-Indonesians."4 17 Where relevant, these con-
siderations point away from U.S.-style "adversarial" collective bar-
gaining models418 toward European-style codetermination strategies or
more innovative workplace collaboration proposals. 419
2. Political Checks and Ethnic Imbalances
As with Western-style redistributive institutions, the political insti-
tutions that have helped mediate the tension between markets and
democracy in the developed world may be unsuitable or inadequate in
the developing world. I certainly do not mean to discourage efforts to
promote an independent judiciary, effective constitutional review, the
rule of law, and human rights protections in developing and post-
socialist countries. But these familiar institutions of liberal democracy
must be tailored, and supplemented with other measures, in order to
deal with the often starkly different ethnoeconomic and ethnopolitical
conditions of the developing world.
The case of India-a rare example of stable democracy in the devel-
oping world-is suggestive. The Indian government's remarkable (but
by no means unqualified) success in preserving democracy, markets,
and national unity over the last fifty years, despite its extraordinary
ethnic diversity and pervasive poverty, is often attributed to its "liberal
constitutionalism."420 It is crucial to remember, however, that India's
415. Moberg, supra note 126, at 23.
416. Liddle, supra note 164, at 318.
417. Id. Even after the SBSI was suppressed, "the number of localized wildcat strikes, par-
ticularly against companies producing for export, continue[d] to grow." Id.
418. Barenberg, supra note 45, at 1495. In the United States, "management has historically
seen unionization as a fecund source of distrust and polarization." Id. at 1484. Barenberg has
argued that this "adversarial psychology" on the part of American management, which is "trace-
able in part to certain tightly intertwined historical institutional patterns," id. at 1495, is just
"the opposite of [Robert] Wagner's expectations of collective bargaining." Id. at 1484.
419. See supra text accompanying notes 78-85,415.
420. See Bajpai, supra note 102, at 33, 41, 79, 81; see, e.g., AcKERMAN, supra note 60, at 50
(noting that "the framing and adoption of the Constitution of India has, up to now, played a
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Western-style liberal constitutionalism has been supplemented by a
number of not-so-Western measures,421 including, for example, educa-
tion and employment quotas for India's lower castes and tribal groups
and other "backward" classes;422 a complex language policy, including
a flexible "three-language formula" for secondary education and civil
service examinations; 423 the reorganization of the country's major states
along linguistic lines;424 and power-sharing arrangements based on
group rights and devolution of authority to lower levels of govern-
ment.425 The point is not that all of these institutions have had
beneficial effects. Rather, the point is that in finding its way to these
policies, imperfect though they are, India had to deviate from Western
models and adapt the institutions of liberal constitutionalism to its
distinctive religious, caste, tribal, linguistic, and regional divisions.
While India certainly has its share of ethnic conflict and violence,426
its demographic profile offers "one source of stability: the absence of a
nationwide cleavage along ethnic lines." 427 Most ethnic crises in India
tend to be localized and thus more easily contained by the central gov-
ernment.428 By contrast, the dynamic in many developing countries
positive role in sustaining a liberal democratic order").
421. Of course, this may reflect a U.S.-centric view of what is "Western." Consider the ethni-
cally based language and other policies that Belgium has pursued. Se VAN DEN BERGHE, supra
note 217, at 201-04.
422. See Bajpai, supra note 102, at 53-55. India's reservations policy has been plagued by a
number of familiar problems. Its effect "on social attitudes has not been impressive. Violence
against and social stigmatization of the scheduled castes and tribes remain rampant." Id. at 54.
Moreover, those within the scheduled caste and tribe communities who have benefited from the
reservations have tended to be a small, self-perpetuating elite. Id. Once again, however, the main
benefits of India's affirmative action system "have been psychological and political: there is a
growing sense of personal and communitarian efficacy among these groups." Id. at 78. Neverthe-
less, the extreme material deprivation of the lower castes and tribes and the so-called "other
backward classes," which together constitute at least 70% of Indias population, remains a serious
source of political upheaval, particularly in light of the increasing political mobilization of all
three groups. See id. at 53.
423. Id. at 59-60. In 1961 the Indian government adopted a three-language formula in sec-
ondary education, under which students would be taught (i) the regional language and their
mother tongue if it was not the regional language; (ii) Hindi, or in Hindi-speaking areas, another
Indian language; and (iii) English or any other modern European language. Id. at 59. In 1967 the
Official Languages (Amendment) Bill added two other features: a two-language policy for official
business and a three-language policy for government public service examinations. Id. at 60. Ac-
cording to many, India's flexible national language policy "has contained one of the country's
most explosive ethnic challenges." Id. On the other hand, language has continued to figure
prominently in the bitter ethnic politics of a number of Indian states, where politically dominant
indigenous groups--eg., Assamese or Maharashtrians-demand that their language be given "its
rightful place," by which they mean exclusive official status. HOROWITZ, supra note 139, at 219.
424. See Bajpai, supra note 102, at 61-63.
425. See HOROWITZ, supra note 139, at 614; Bajpai, supra note 102, at 63-65.
426. For example, Kashmir, Punjab, and the Northeast States continue to suffer violence, re-
bellion, and secessionism, sometimes exacerbated by government counterinsurgency operations.
See Bajpai, supra note 102, at 63-74, 79.
427. Id. at 38.
428. See HOROWITZ, supra note 139, at 37-38; Bajpai, supra note 102, at 38.
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(including, for example, India's democratic neighbor Sri Lanka) is one
that pits a national self-proclaimed "indigenous" majority against an
economically dominant ethnic minority.429 In these cases, the formida-
ble challenge will be to devise political mechanisms capable of fore-
stalling the cascading formation of ethnonationalist movements430 and
blocking the worst expressions of ethnonationalist hatred directed at a
disproportionately wealthy "outsider" minority.
Along these lines, I will address two broad topics, both potentially
controversial: (i) the limits of state-building; and (ii) the question of
universal suffrage.
a. The Limits of State-Building: Against Ethnocracy
In many developing countries, including those with economically
dominant minorities, there is a powerful tendency toward what schol-
ars have called an "ethnocratic state," which acts as the agent of the
majority ethnic group with respect to ideology, social policy, and re-
source distribution.431 In an ethnocracy, all the principal arms of the
state-the executive, legislature, judiciary, civil service, police, armed
forces, etc.-are controlled by a single dominant ethnic group and
used to reinforce that group's monopolization of power.432
In this light, today's programs for the reform of political institutions
in developing societies may have to be rethought or at least supple-
mented. As already suggested, the basic thrust of current political re-
form in the developing world is democratic constitutionalism coupled
with rule of law, state-building, judicial reform, and anti-corruption
initiatives. These efforts are obviously essential. But without attention
to ethnic issues, the very success of these reforms could inadvertently
create a powerful engine for ethnonationalism. To begin with, com-
petitive democratic elections can facilitate the emergence of ethnona-
tionalist politics. 33 To cite only the most recent of examples, in the
non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union, elections virtually
429. As already mentioned, India does have economically dominant minorities at the regional
or state level. See supra note 140. Resentment and retaliation against these minorities persist in
the states of Assam and Maharashtra and in the Telangana region. See Chua, sipra note 1, at 23,
39,45.
430. See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27
J. LEGAL STD. 623 (1998).
431. DAVID BROWN, THE STATE AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 36-37 (1994);
see Myron Weiner, Political Change: Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, in UNDERSTANDING POLITI-
CAL DEVELOPMENT 33, 35-37 (Myron Weiner & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 1987).
432. See BROWN, supra note 431, at 35-37.
433. See Horowitz, supra note 355, at 249, 255-56; Fareed Zakaria, The Rise ofIlliteral Democ-
racy, 76 FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1997, at 22, 35. As many have recently observed, in divided
"societies without strong traditions of multiethnic groups or assimilation, it is easiest to organize
support along racial, ethnic, or religious lines." ld.; see Donald L. Horowitz, Democracy in Dividcd
Societies, 4J. DEMOCRACY 18, 19 (1993).
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without exception have been accompanied by slogans like "Estonia for
Estonians," "Georgia for the Georgians," "Kazakhstan-for-the-Kazakhs,"
"Latvia for Latvians," "Moldavia for Moldavians," and "Uzbekistan for
Uzbeks." In all of these cases, leaders from the majority ethnic group
have won the election.434
Once this kind of ethnopolitics begins, state-building becomes a
more dangerous proposition. All the institutions associated with state-
building can serve as vehicles for ethnocratic entrenchment, exclusion,
and even brutality. "The Third World is littered with the bloody
handiwork of strong states."435
It is tempting to think of constitutionalism, an independent judici-
ary, and the rule of law as solutions to this problem. But a constitu-
tional state can still be an ethnocratic state--depending on what is in the
constitution. The barely concealed thrust of all the Central Asian constitu-
tions, for example, notwithstanding "a litany of democratic affirmations,"
"is to ensure the political pre-eminence of the titular" ethnic group vis-a-
vis non-titular groups, including, most prominently, Russians.436
Moreover, a well-functioning, noncorrupt judiciary could still be an
ethnically chauvinist judiciary.437
Finally, even if a liberal constitution is initially enacted, the combi-
nation of a strong state with the ethnopolitical dynamic just described
can easily lead to the sweeping away of minority-protective guarantees
through constitutionally legitimate processes. This is more or less
what happened in post-colonial Sri Lanka. Upon achieving independ-
ence in 1947, Sri Lanka adopted a liberal constitution, containing im-
portant minority-rights protections. 438 The electoral system was sup-
posed to assure significant Tamil representation in parliament (up to
40% of the lower house), and "an independent judiciary was supposed
to rule on the constitutionality of all legislation."439 Over the next
twenty years, legislation passed by the majority-Sinhalese parliament
and upheld by the Sri Lankan judiciary and the British Privy Council
434. Chua, supra note 1, at 46 (citations omitted). In Africa, too, "[o)pposition movements,
armed rebellion, and coups ... have often been directed against ethnically based regimes, many
of which came to power through elections." Zakaria, supra note 433, at 35-36.
435. Zakaria, supra note 433, at 32.
436. GRAHAM SMiTH ET AL., NATION-BUILDING IN THE POST-SovIET BORDERLANDS 147,
148 (1998). Article 55 of Turkmenistan's constitution stipulates that the president of the country
must be a citizen "from amongst the Turkmen." Id. at 148. Achieving essentially the same effect
(at least thus far), the other Central Asian constitutions require that the president "have a fluent
command of the state language." Id
437. According to Horowitz, most studies do not show elites to be less ethnocentric than non-
elites, and some studies suggest that ethnocentrism actually increases with education. See Donald
L. Horowitz, Self-Determination: Politic, Philosophy, and Law, 39 Nomos 421,457 n.31 (1997).
438. See Shastri, supra note 409, at 137. These protections included an explicit constitutional
provision "prohibit[ing] the passage of any measure discriminatory to members of a particular
ethnic group." Id.
439. Id.
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(appeal to which was provided for in the 1947 constitution) gradually
undercut the electoral rules that worked to maintain Tamil representa-
tion in parliament.4 0 At the same time, genuinely contested elections
led the two principal Sinhalese parties "into a pattern of competitive
bidding for the support of the Sinhalese community" and of mounting
anti-Tamil rhetoric and ethnonationalist polarization. 441
In 1970, the radical populist United Front (UF) won a two-thirds
majority in parliament.4 42 With this majority, and in accordance with
the rules governing constitutional amendment, the UF promulgated in
1972 a new constitution, giving Buddhism a "foremost place" in the
country's religious hierarchy and making Sinhala the country's sole
official language. 44 3 Under the new constitution, the unicameral, Sin-
halese-dominated legislature became even more powerful, and the ju-
diciary was subordinated "to the majority will as expressed by the leg-
islature. In 1974, the legislature proclaimed that it would have the
right to interpret the meaning of its own laws. The constitutional pro-
vision that had explicitly prohibited discrimination against racial or
ethnic groups was done away with."444
Thus in Sri Lanka, highly competitive, majoritarian elections, cou-
pled with a strong state apparatus, assisted the formation of an ethno-
cratic takeover. Moreover, Sri Lanka's well-articulated constitutional
procedures did not prevent this result; on the contrary, they too may
have facilitated the emergence of ethnocracy by legitimizing constitu-
tional change. In any event, the case of Sri Lanka shows that "state-
building"--crucial for developing countries in so many other ways-
does not as such address the problem of ethnonationalism.
Thus it is a grave mistake to think of ethnic conflict as a problem to
be addressed after the process of state-building is successfully com-
pleted. Rather, the challenge is to try to structure developing-country
political institutions in such a way as to avoid ethnocracy to the extent
possible. In accordance with the previous Section, the effort must be to
promote interethnic solutions and institutions everywhere possible.
The question, of course, is how. One controversial possibility is
affirmative action for the economically privileged minority. This idea
may be counterintuitive, but affirmative action in the political sphere
(for a politically dominated minority) may be as important in the de-
440. See id. at 138-41. Among the first measures passed by the parliament in newly indepcnd-
ent Sri Lanka were the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 and the Indian and Pakistani Residents
(Citizenship) Act of 1949. These laws, upheld by the Privy Council, effectively disenfranchised
most Upcountry Tamils, greatly undermining the political position of the Tamil community as a
whole. See id at 138-39.
441. Id at 139-41.
442. See id. at 146.
443. Id. at 147.
444. Id.
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veloping world as is affirmative action in the economic sphere (for an
economically dominated majority). Affirmative action in the political
sphere can take a number of different forms, may be largely symbolic
or more substantive, and would translate differently in different parts
of government.
Ethnic "consociational" and "power-sharing" arrangements, which
may be constitutionally or statutorily mandated, are the starkest form
of ethnically based political resource allocation. Ethnic power-sharing
involves the allocation of certain government positions on the basis of
ethnicity.445 Consociationalism typically includes power-sharing, but
goes much further. It is
a form of consensual democracy, in which all major groups are
represented in governing grand coalitions in proportion to their
numbers, in which elections are conducted by proportional repre-
sentation in order to insure ethnic proportionality, in which major
decisions are made by consensus (and so groups are accorded ve-
toes over them), and in which matters of concern to only one
group are delegated for decision to that group.446
With respect to the executive, both power-sharing and consociation-
alism usually mean that certain key cabinet-level positions must be
held by members of certain ethnic minorities.447 South Africa's much
criticized interim constitution (1994-1997) contained such require-
ments, which the new constitution has discarded.448 Similar require-
ments at the legislative level might call for a certain percentage of
445. There are a number of different approaches to power-sharing. Horowitz, for example', has
advocated an incentive-based approach, distinct from consociationalism, that "aims at majori-
tarian decisions made by a moderate, interethnic center .... The objective is to make multieth-
nic participation and compromise rewarding to all the participants who practice it." Donald L.
Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, NoMos (forthcoming July 2000) (1998) (unpub-
lished manuscript at 8, on file with the author).
446. Id. at 4. For critiques of consociational approaches, see DONALD L. HOROwniz, A DEMo-
CRATIC SouTH AFRICA?: CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY 137-45, 167-
71 (1991); HoRowrz, supra note 139, at 568-76; Courtney Jung & Ian Shapiro, South Africa's
Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, and the New Constitutional Order, 23 POL & Soc'y 269
(1995).
447. See, ag., Thomas Koelble & Andrew Reynolds, Power-Sharing Democracy in the New South
Africa, 24 POL. & Soc'y 221 (1996). See generally AREND LijPHART, POWER-SHARING IN Soum
AFRICA (1985).
448. In the words of South Africa's Minister ofJustice, The Honorable Abdullah Omar:
Under the Interim Constitution, any political party enjoying a minimum percentage of sup-
port had the right to be part of the executive of the country. The National Party (NP) and
the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) both participated in the National Unity Government. The
NP of F.W. de Klerk withdrew at the time the new Constitution was ratified, because it
could not accept majority decision making in the cabinet. The IFP remains in government.
But with the next elections, this beast called "Government of National Unity" will come to
an end and the majority will have the right to form the executive of the country.
Omar, supra note 412, at 10-11 (explanatory footnote omitted).
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parliamentary or congressional seats to be allocated on an ethnic basis.
Fiji's new "multiracial" constitution, which stipulates that the Parlia-
ment be made up of 46 ethnically designated seats (23 Fijian, 19 Indo-
Fijian, and 4 others) and 25 "open-race" seats, recently resulted in the
historic selection of Fiji's first prime minister of Indian descent. 44 9
With varying degrees of success, ethnically based legislative reserva-
tions have also been tried in Lebanon and elsewhere.4 50
Affirmative action in the political sphere can also be accomplished,
however, without mandated quotas or ethnic "slotting." At the execu-
tive level, multiethnic cabinet representation can be achieved through
presidential or prime ministerial discretion. At the legislative level,
the ethnically conscious engineering of electoral systems may serve to
promote interethnic coalition-building without the use of explicit eth-
nic classifications or the reservation of designated ethnic seats. Among
the many strategies that have been debated (and in some cases tried)
are certain forms of proportional representation, 451 alternative voting
systems,452 and the ethnically conscious redrawing of electoral dis-
tricts.453
I will not pursue here a more detailed inquiry into the management
of ethnic conflict through the design of political systems, which is the
subject of an impressive, interdisciplinary, and often contentious litera-
ture.4 54 The appropriateness of any given strategy, of course, will be
highly context-specific. Instead, I want to highlight three points that
have received less attention.
First, the debate over ethnic gerrymandering and proportional rep-
resentation may be of relatively little importance in some of the coun-
tries discussed above, where the economically dominant minority
forms a tiny percentage of the population. In Indonesia and the Phil-
ippines, for example, where the Chinese make up only about three per-
cent of the population, proportional representation would do little to
affect the balance of ethnopolitical power, unless it were accompanied
by the creation of a "Chinese veto power," which, in addition to being
utterly unrealistic, would be indefensible and might even trigger a
majoritarian, ethnonationalist reaction.455 Thus, in some of the coun-
449. See Chaudhry Surn as Fiji's First Indian PM, EVENING PosT (Wellington), May 19,
1999, at 7. Mahendra Chaudhry was elected prime minister in May 1999, after years of military
rule and ethnic conflict between "indigenous" Fijians and the economically dominant Indo-Fijian
community. See Guyon Espiner, Constitution Works Wellfor Fiji-Sir Paul, EVENING POST (Wel-
lington), May 18, 1999, at 2.
450. See HoRowirz, supra note 139, at 633, 635, 647.
451. See, e.g., id. at 639-42; see generally GurNnR, supra note 53.
452. See, e.g., HoRowi-z, supra note 139, at 639-42.
453. See, eg., id. at 628-29.
454. See id. at 628-42.
455. The same holds in many of the countries of East Africa, for example, where economically
dominant South Asian minorities often comprise less than 2% of the population. See Yash Tan-
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tries most vulnerable to the ethnonationalist version of the paradox of
free market democracy, ethnic gerrymandering of the electoral system
may not be the place to focus reform energies.
Second, with respect to ethnic relations and ethnic conflict, the im-
portance of symbolism should not be underestimated. In Indonesia, for
example, newly elected President Wahid has admirably included in his
cabinet members of traditionally unrepresented ethnic and regional
groups, including a Sino-Indonesian minister "to oversee economic
policy."45 6 Similarly in newly democratized Fiji, the recently elected
Indo-Fijian prime minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, appointed two Fiji-
ans as his deputy prime ministers, affirming his commitment to
interethnic political coalition-building. 457 Needless to say, tokenism is
no answer to ethnic conflict. But because ethnonationalism necessarily
rests in part on the appropriation of political symbols, national ges-
tures that begin as merely symbolic may ultimately have substantial
effect.
Finally, in thinking about affirmative action in the political sphere,
it is important to focus not only on the "commanding heights" of ex-
ecutive and legislative power, but also on the lower echelons of the
power structure.458 There are obvious dangers if, for example, the mili-
tary, police, judiciary, and civil service in a particular country are ex-
clusively staffed by members of a politically dominant ethnic group.
Many developing countries that Western consultants and practitioners
are helping to democratize and marketize come close to demonstrating
this trait.459
b. Universal Suffrage: Against Hypocrisy
One of the reasons that Western law-and-development policy mak-
ers tend not to see the fundamental instability inherent in free market
democracy is because democracy in the developing world is so often a
sham. In Mexico, for example, for over 50 years, democracy notoriously
consisted of pre-ordained victories by the PRI in essentially uncontested
elections. Even in less egregious cases, the great majority of the im-
poverished electorate often do not have a substantial political voice,
whether because of the lack of "access to informational or decision-
making networks" or because the wealthy control the political process
through lobbying or corruption.460 "As in other aspects of life, the
don, A Political Survey, in PORTRAIT OF A MINORITY: ASIANS IN EAST AFRICA 65, 68 (Dharam P.
Ghai ed., 1965).
456. Nisid Hajari et al., Everybody Happy? Indonesian President Wahid puts together a cabinet that
is representative, but vastly untested, T-n, Nov. 8, 1999, at 18.
457. See Fiji Faces Tough Test, NEw STRmATS Times (Singapore), May 22, 1999, at 72.
458. SMITH ET AL., supra note 436, at 152, 154; see EsmA~N, supra note 229, at 228.
459. See, e g., SNTH FT AL., supra note 436, at 154; see also Liddle, supra note 164, at 309.
460. Tommasi & Velasco, supra note 320, at 220.
369
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poor are usually too poor to be politically important."4 61 This is true
even of "success stories" such as the Philippines, where, despite im-
pressive strides toward democracy in the last twenty years, it remains
the case that a few landowning, dynastic families, along with powerful
Chinese business interests, dominate the political process.
462
In other words, Western triumphalism about democracy in the de-
veloping world rests in part on a certain hypocrisy. If universal suffrage
were a reality rather than a sham, one might wonder whether most of
today's marketizers, foreign investors, and international organizations
would be supporting it. Indeed, even today, there are many within the
international development community who, at the first sign of a possi-
ble trade-off between markets and democracy, make clear that their
first commitment is to the former.4 63 Occasionally the anti-democratic
argument is made on economic grounds: Democracy will stifle cru-
cially needed economic reforms.46 Occasionally it is made on cultural
relativist grounds: Democracy is a Western value that should not in-
discriminately or ethnocentrically be imposed on the developing
world.4 65 Most often, the anti-democracy argument is expressed more
palatably as a matter of "sequencing": Market reforms must come first,
and democratization will naturally or more easily follow thereafter.
4 66
It is arguably better to be an open advocate of the priority of mar-
kets than to be a self-congratulatory advocate of sham democracy. But
a genuine commitment to democracy would be much more serious
about making universal suffrage a reality rather than a formality and
much more attentive to providing the poor majorities of the develop-
ing world with an effective political voice.4
67
461. Ricardo Hausmann, Sustaining Reform: What Role for Social Policy?, in REDEFINING THU
STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 174 (Colin A. Bradford ed., 1994); see Tommasi & Velasco, supra note
320, at 220.
462. See Florian Coulmas, Democracy in Asia?, Swiss Rav. WORLD Ai.s., Apr. 1997, at 5-6
(stating that most voters in the Philippines are uneducated tenant farmers who are dependent on
large landowners and who do not have the necessary political awareness to vote for their own
interests); see also PAUL D. HUTCHCROFT, BooTY CAPITALISM: THE PoLITICs oF BANKING IN
THE PHiLIPPINEs (1998); The Old Firms, EcoNomisT, May 11, 1996, at S10 (describing the
political influence in the Philippines of a few powerful Chinese, Filipino, and Spanish families).
463. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 191, at C4 (quoting aJ.P. Morgan currency strategist as say-
ing that democracy is not "necessarily the most efficient form of government").
464. See, eg., LAL, supra note 33, at 164.
465. See, e.g., What Would Confucius Say Now?,supra note 304, at 24-25.
466. See, e.g., Bhagwati, supra note 1, at 31-38; Samuel P. Huntington, Challcnges Pacing De-
mocracy: What Cost Freedom?, HARV. INT'L REV., Winter 1992/3, at 12; Minxin Pei, The Puzzle of
East Asian Exceptionalism, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 90 (1994).
467. Public campaign financing, for example, is often suggested as a reform. The lack of funds
and an accountable regulatory framework in most developing countries present tremendous ob-
stacles. Even in the United States, some have argued that public money might "be better spent
on a concerted official effort to encourage full political participation by making registration and
voting easier and by providing voters with opportunities for obtaining better information about
candidates, their supporters, and their records." Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 57, at 1736. For
a lucid discussion of political campaign finance reform including the developing world, see RosE-
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On the other hand, there is some truth in the warnings issued by
those concerned with the dangers of overly rapid democratization in
countries with limited democratic experience. The recent elections in
Cambodia and arguably the referendum in East Timor may be exam-
pies.46s If the commitment to democracy-on the part of both the
"democratizing" government and the international community-is not
real, the result of free and fair elections may be disastrous: the release
of "a myriad of long-suppressed demands by aggrieved groups," politi-
cal destabilization, and perhaps ultimately even "the reimposition of
authoritarian rule. '469
3. Ideology: Ethnic Conflict in a Market Culture
This Section will address the ideological dimensions of the paradox
of free market democracy in the developing world. I will first discuss
briefly the possibility of fostering market-compatible ideologies. I will
then turn to the more urgent challenge of forestalling potentially mar-
ket-subversive and ethnonationalist reactions against economically domi-
nant outsider minorities.
a. Market-Compatible Ideologies in the Developing World
The difficulties inherent in all top-down efforts at "ideology-
building" have already been mentioned, 70 but the phenomenon of eco-
nomically dominant minorities raises special problems. For example, it
is especially difficult to believe in an ideology of upward mobility if
you and everyone around you are mired in intractable poverty and the
only wealthy people in the country appear to be from a different ethnic
group. For this reason, the ethnically based preferences discussed above
have bearing here as well. If enough members of the poor majority see
more people of "their own kind" profiting from the market, it is possi-
ble that they would feel more of a stake in the market system, which
might in turn foster the hopes and beliefs necessary for an ideology of
upward mobility.
On the other hand, other market-compatible ideologies might turn
out to have more genuine purchase in developing countries. For exam-.- 471
ple, ideologies associated with self-reliance or worker participation
AcinasE , supra note 106, at ch.8.
468. In a U.N.-sponsored referendum held in August 1999, the population of East Timor
voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence. See Barbara Crossette, Security Council Presses
Indonesia to Restore Order, N.Y. TiF.s, Sept. 6, 1999, at A8. The results of the ballot prompted an
outbreak of violence and gross human rights violations, targeted at those who supported inde-
pendence and perpetrated by elements of the Indonesian security forces and different militia
groups. See ia; Respecting the Vote in East Timor, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 2, 1999, at A26.
469. Liddle, supra note 164, at 319.
470. Seesupra Part II.A.3.
471. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 80, at 305-06 (noting that contrary to cultural-determinist
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might be more realistically appealing-and less likely to foster dan-
gerously inflated expectations-than a (highly American) rags-to-
riches ideology.
Ultimately, even if some of the market-compatible ideologies from
the West do take hold in the developing world, they are likely to have
a different face. By far, however, the more pressing challenge for ethni-
cally divided developing countries pursuing free market democracy is
not promoting market-compatible ideologies, but forestalling or
breaking up the potentially market-subversive ideology of ethnona-
tionalism. This is the subject of the next Section.
b. Forestalling Ethnonationalist Retaliation Against Economically
Dominant Minorities
One of the ironies about economically dominant minorities is that
they are very often perceived as "draining away the [nation's] wealth"
or posing a "menace" to the economy 72 when in fact they are usually a
crucial source of national economic vitality and growth. 473 This irony
makes the problem of economically dominant minorities a special case
of ethnic conflict, presenting both distinctive obstacles and opportuni-
ties. The obstacles stem from the overlap of class and ethnic division:
In addition to all the usual problems of ethnic hatred, economically
dominant minorities face the specific problem of ethnoeconomic re-
sentment, often associated with stereotypes of greed, selfishness, dis-
loyalty, and exploitativeness. 474 The opportunities stem from the real-
ity that economically dominant minorities have the skills and re-
sources to contribute to economic growth and development.
In these circumstances, the challenge is to grapple with these obsta-
cles and take advantage of the opportunities. In what follows, I will
explore two questions relating to this challenge. The first question-
often left out of policy discussions-is whether the economically domi-
nant minority engages in objectionable practices that reinforce or exac-
erbate negative stereotypes. The second question is whether there are
affirmative measures that might be taken, whether by the state, inter-
national actors, or the minority itself, to foster the reality and the per-
theories, Japanese-derived "collaborative institutions at the workplace" have been adopted in
developing countries including Brazil and Malaysia).
472. Chua, supra note 1, at 38-39 (citations omitted).
473. See, eg., ROBERT G. GREGORY, THE RISE AND FALL OF PHILANTHROPY IN EAST AIIcA
Ti)E AsL, N CONTRIMUTON 203-04 (1992) (describing the crucial contributions to economic
development made by Asians in East Africa); G. Bruce Knecht, Wealth Hazards: Overseas Chinese
Have Made Crucial Contributious to Southeast Asia. But Their Success Has a Price, NAT'L Rnv., Nov.
21, 1994, at 57 (suggesting that Indonesian Chinese served as "miracle workers" for Indonesia's
economic development in the 1980s).
474. See Chua, supra note 1, at 37-41.
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ception of the economically dominant minority as a positive contribu-
tor to the economy and the nation more generally.
i. Objectionable Practices
It should be stressed at the outset that there are some economically
dominant minorities who are no doubt victimized solely because of
their ethnic difference and their (perceived or actual) disproportionate
wealth. It should also be stressed that even where objectionable prac-
tices by these minorities can be identified, they in no way justify or
excuse the kinds of violence and human rights abuses often inflicted on
them. On the other hand, it is unfortunately often the case in the de-
veloping world that some members of economically dominant minori-
ties engage in practices-such as bribery, discriminatory lending prac-
tices, and violation of workplace regulations-that not only are illegal
or otherwise objectionable in themselves, but also reinforce invidious
ethnic stereotypes. Although there is no guarantee that eliminating
these practices would improve ethnic relations, it seems important
nonetheless, given the special dangers associated with economically
dominant ethnic minorities, to identify such practices and take meas-
ures to curb them as much as possible.
Corrupt patronage relations between members of the indigenous
ruling elite and members of economically dominant minorities have a
long history in the developing world and invariably fuel bitter resent-
ment among the indigenous majority.475 To return to the example of
Indonesia, the intense anti-Chinese violence that erupted in May 1998
was inseparable from the association of a few Chinese magnates (such
as Liem Sioe Long and Bob Hasan) with the Suharto regime's "crony
capitalism. 476 As is sadly often the case, violent popular reaction un-
leashed itself not on the relatively few wealthy Chinese who were actu-
ally complicit (and who used their wealth to go into hiding abroad),
but rather on ordinary, struggling, middle-class Chinese-Indonesians,
whose shops were burned and looted.477 What has been written of
Southeast Asia is applicable to the developing world more generally:
"As political liberalization and pressures for greater democracy increase
... the willingness of [economically dominant minoritiesl to ally with
475. See, ag., Philip Gourevitch, The Poisoned Country, N.Y REv. BooKs, June 6, 1996, at 59,
60 (stating that in Rwanda and Burundi the Belgians pursued a policy of divide-and-conquer
that favored Tutsis over Hutus); Gary G. Hamilton & Tony Waters, Ethnicity and Capitalist Deel-
opment: The Changing Role of the Chinese, in ESSENTUL OUTsiDERS, sapra note 146, at 258, 271
(describing "symbiosis between Thai elites and Chinese businessmen" after the 1930s); PAUL
KENNEDY, AFRcAN CAPITALISM: THE STRUGGLE FOR ASCENDANCY 71-72 (1988) (noting that
in Uganda, officials in the Obore regime granted trade monopolies to prominent Indian busi-
nessmen in exchange for lucrative directorship positions).
476. See VATIKIOns, supra note 171, at 14,41,45, 50.
477. See supra text accompanying note 185.
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and support corrupt authoritarian regimes becomes both better known
and less tolerable to the general population."478
It is not only the wealthiest members of economically dominant
minorities who engage in illicit practices; the problem is often more
general. Throughout Southeast Asia, many Chinese-controlled firms
routinely violate tax laws, banking laws, including restrictions on self-
lending and discriminatory lending,479 and "laws concerning overtime
regulations, workers' compensation and protection, occupational
health and safety requirements, and building codes." 480 Similarly, alle-
gations that foreign multinationals-who again often occupy a role
analogous to economically dominant ethnic minorities-expose local
workers to hazardous and exploitative conditions are all too familiar;
Nike, for example, has recently come under attack.48' To be sure,
members of the "indigenous" business community may also be violat-
ing these laws, and "indigenous" political elites often tolerate such
violations in exchange for bribes or kickbacks. But the perception
among an economically disadvantaged majority that a disproportion-
ately wealthy minority disregards the country's laws and exploits the
indigenous population can only exacerbate ethnic resentment. 482
What to do about such illicit practices is less obvious. To begin
with, there is usually a collective action problem. The likely effect of
any single firm deciding to comply with workplace and other regula-
tions-if its competitors do not-is to put the compliant firm out of
business. Thus, calling on individual businesses to take corrective
measures is unlikely to have much effect. On the other hand, looking
to the state is not a complete answer either. One obvious problem is
that the governmental actors who would have to implement reform are
often the same ones corruptly benefiting from the violations. 483 Less obvi-
ously, in many developing countries, governmental "anti-corruption"
campaigns can provide a convenient excuse for state scapegoating and
confiscation of assets. One possible example occurred in Kenya in late
1998, when, following charges of corruption, Kenya's "Central Bank
took over three banks majority-owned by Asians [of Indian and Paki-
stani descent], including Trust Bank, the seventh-largest in Kenya." 484
Similarly, in 1993, when the Ramos government in the Philippines
478. Lim & Gosling, supra note 146, at 292.
479. See VxTmioTis, supra note 171, at 41.
480. Jomo, supra note 303, at 252.
481. Danielle Knight, Labor: Nike's Initiative to Improve Facory Conditions, INT3R PRESS SURv.,
May 12, 1998.
482, See Lim & Gosling, supra note 146, at 292.
483. See Mark Landler, Baligate and Wy It Matters: Indonesia's Recovay, and Dcmocrac; Tested by
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1999, at C1; see also ROSE-ACKER AN, supra note 106, at 226.
484. Organized Panic, EcoNonsr, Sept. 11, 1999.
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undertook an anti-tax evasion campaign, its six targets were all ethnic
Chinese. 48
Because of these and other problems, anti-corruption campaigns for
the developing world, even those supported by major international
institutions, cannot be expected to have immediate transformative ef-
fects. An as yet unexploited resource here may be the surprisingly
strong intra-ethnic organizations, both commercial and social, that
many economically dominant minorities already have in the develop-
ing world.48 6 The success of these organizations in overcoming collec-
tive action problems in a variety of commercial contexts-through a
combination of "trust" and superior monitoring capacities-has been
widely observed.48 7 If leaders of the minority communities in a given
developing country can be persuaded of the importance of, and overall
gains to be had from, eliminating corrupt or illicit business practices,
these organizations may have the right set of incentives and capabili-
ties to play a significant role. In the context of the illegal importation
of cheap labor, these organizations could be very useful.
For example, in Southeast Asia there have been complaints about
the influx, particularly in Thailand and the Philippines, of "tens if not
hundreds of thousands of illegal migrant workers from the PRC, most
of whom are likely to be employed in small, Chinese-owned enter-
prises."488 As in the developed world, "local workers resent the compe-
tition [from illegal immigrants] and the resulting downward pressure
on their wages." 489 Indeed, in Indonesia, where roughly six million
working-age Indonesians (almost all pribumi) were unemployed in
1996, the violent protest that erupted when a Chinese conglomerate
imported 1000 illegal workers from China seems understandable. 49 °
Surely a better model for economically dominant outsider groups can
be found in the example of the Madhvanis, owners of "the largest in-
dustrial, commercial, and agricultural complex in East Africa," who
not only "provid[ed] educational, health, housing, and recreational facili-
ties for [their] African employees," but also "employed Africans in top
management" and initiated a number of wealth-sharing schemes.491 Fac-
tory workers, for example, were offered the right to purchase "non-
voting but high-interest-bearing shares" in the Madhvani companies,
while agricultural employees could participate in an "'outgrowers'
485. See Lim & Gosling, supra note 146, at 302-03.
486. See, e.g., GREGORY, supra note 473, at 26-36 (describing intra-ethnic commercial and so-
cial organizations in East Africa); Lee Kam Hing, supra note 404, at 92-93 (describing similar
organizations in Malaysia).
487. See supra text accompanying notes 305-306, 314-315.
488. Lim & Gosling, supra note 146, at 293.
489. Id.
490. See Leah Makabenta, Indonesia: Ethnic Chinese Economic Success Fuels Racial Tension, INTER
PRESS SERV., Mar. 25, 1993.
491. GREGORY, supra note 473, at 55.
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scheme' providing loans, training, and encouragement for Africans to
produce cane for the sugar factories. 4 92
Finally, and most difficult, economically dominant minorities some-
times engage in behavior that indigenous majorities find "objection-
able" but for reasons that may themselves be suspect. For example,
economically dominant minorities are often criticized for acting "in-
sularly," for indulging in "conspicuous consumption," or for
"flaunting" their ethnic pride.493 Relatedly, such groups often establish
institutions-e.g., private schools, religious institutions, philanthropic
organizations, social clubs-for members of their own ethnic group.
To a considerable extent, social mores are beyond the effective reach of
policy engineering. Moreover, it is hardly clear that forced assimilation
and acculturation, even if it were possible, would be desirable. Never-
theless, as will be discussed in the next Section, there are important
constructive measures that economically dominant outsider groups
might take to counter the dangerous perception (justified or not) of
their insularity and indifference to the welfare of the nation.
ii. Affirmative Measures
Those with disproportionate economic power--especially if they are
"outsiders," as economically dominant ethnic minorities and foreign
investors are often perceived to be-should be encouraged to make
significant, visible contributions to the local economies in which they
are thriving. Although such efforts to date have been extremely few
and by no means always effective in promoting goodwill, some valu-
able models can be found. In East Africa, powerful families of Indian
descent-not only the Madhvanis but also the Aga Khans, Mehtas,
and Chandarias-made immense contributions to their local commu-
nities, often concentrating heavily on indigenous African welfare and
development. 494 Prominent was "the Asians' role in creating the Uni-
492. Id.
493. Lim & Gosling, supra note 146, at 292. A few years before Suharto's resignation, Dewi
Fortuna Anwar, a pribumi political scientist with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, suggested,
For the Chinese to enjoy long-term security, they must open up their society and side with
the Indonesian middle class .... The Chinese who aren't doing business, like the badmin-
ton stars, are very much accepted. It's only when they become crony capitalists they are
hated.
Peter Waldman & Jay Solomon, As Good 77mes Roll, Indonesia's Chinese Fear for Their Future, WALL
ST. J., June 5, 1997, at A18. According to an ethnic Chinese economist from the same institu-
tion,
I see the problem through the eyes of my pribumi friends: I see the shopping malls, the posh
restaurants, the hotels and lavish weddings, full of young Chinese who don't seem to have
any interest in national problems. These people don't know they're living on a time bomb.
They don't mix with native Indonesians, so they don't know how much they're envied and
resented.
Id.
494. See GREGORY, supra note 473, at 43-65.
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versity of Nairobi, East Africa's first nonracial institution of higher
education." 495 In Mexico City, foreign multinationals played a crucial
role in funding the building of El Papalote, one of the world's out-
standing children museums. Roughly five thousand poor and lower-
middle class children from all parts of the country visit the museum
each day and, rightly or wrongly, associate the prominently displayed
names of Hewlett-Packard and Proctor & Gamble with the beneficial
496dispersion of science and education.
Ideally, such contributions would be highly visible and directed at
large numbers of ordinary members of the disadvantaged majority. To
be sure, any material redistribution effected by these contributions
would itself be desirable, but as a practical matter the more important
consideration may well lie in their symbolic implications. As noted
above, a principal focus of nationalist and ethnonationalist anti-market
reactions in the developing world has been the domination by "outsid-
ers" of the nation's economic symbols: oil wells in Latin America, gold
mines in South Africa, forests in Burma and Indonesia, Lomonosov
porcelain in Russia,497 or other sectors that have come to be associated
symbolically with national identity. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
ownership restrictions in these nationally prized sectors may be
strongly advisable. 498 But for present purposes, the point is that the
symbolic dimension of how economically dominant groups use their
wealth may be deployed constructively as well.
For example, although they may have come too late, the Suharto-
supported proposals in late 1995 and 1996 that Indonesia's largest
companies (apparently both Chinese- and foreign-owned) set aside two
percent of their net profit for indigenous welfare projects were well-
conceived.499 Another way to approach this problem might be to ask
whether there are, in a given developing country, important national
sectors or symbols to which economically dominant minority business
communities could make visible, valuable contributions. Thus, such
communities might learn from the recent example of a number of
wealthy businesspeople in the United States, who, in several highly
publicized gestures, have donated tens of millions of dollars toward
scholarship funds for inner-city children. Along similar lines, it might
be an important demonstration of national solidarity for an economi-
495. Id. at 205.
496. See Anthony DePalma, In Mexico City, A State-of-the-Art Children's Museum, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1993, at C4; Christine MacDonald, Hands-On Museum Catches Kids' Fancy, DALLAS
MORNING N ws, Dec. 21, 1993, at C5.
497. See Jeanne Whalen, Russia Ousts Foreign Owners of Prized Factory, WAL ST. J., Oct. 12,
1999, at A19.
498. I have made this argument at greater length elsewhere. See Chua, supra note 169.
499. See Mely G. Tan, The Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, in ETHNIC CHINESE AS SOUTHEAST
AsINs, supra note 340, at 33, 53.
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cally dominant "outsider" group-almost always urban-centered-to
fund rural development projects. Major conspicuous contributions to
infrastructure providing tangible benefits to ordinary citizens are an-
other possibility.
Given the extraordinary needs and deficits of developing societies,
the opportunities for building interethnic goodwill are plentiful, and
there is considerable room for creativity. For example, many have ob-
served the tremendous unifying power of sports, across both class and
racial lines, in countries ranging from the United States and France to
South Africa and the countries of Latin America. 500 Odd or trivial as it
may seem, contributions by "outsider" groups to a national sport or
team-whether by funding the acquisition of a star soccer player or by
donating athletic facilities-may be a way of deploying the power of
national symbols constructively. Mandela's unifying gesture, five years
ago, in embracing South Africa's largely white rugby team is notewor-
thy here, 50 1 and economically dominant minorities throughout the
developing world might do well to consider the wisdom and power of
his example.
IV. CONCLUSION
In many respects, markets and democracy mutually reinforce each
other. Indeed, it is in part because markets and democracy appear, at
least at first glance, so luxuriously compatible throughout the devel-
oped world that the neoliberal consensus has such grip. But there is
also a deep tension inherent in free market democracy. Part I of this
Article suggested that in all the developed nations this tension has
been alleviated by a host of material, political, and ideological institu-
tions and devices, not all of which have been admirable, and many of
which may not be transplantable. These mediating devices and institu-
tions have included not just the welfare state (in its widely varying
forms) and constitutional rule-of-law protections, but also racism and,
historically, massive exclusions from suffrage.
Part II addressed the developing world. Although rarely acknowl-
edged by international policymakers, the conflict between markets and
democracy in the developing world is real, combustible, and some-
times lethal. The mediating devices found in the developed world are
generally absent from developing societies-an absence made espe-
cially problematic given the extent of poverty and the rapidity of de-
mocratization in the developing world. Moreover, in some developing
countries, free market democracy faces an additional, formidable struc-
500. See, e.g., France: United by Rugby?, ECONOMISr, Oct. 30, 1999, at 58.
501. See Ian Thomsen, Rugby: South Africa Ascends World Stage, N.Y. Tm ,s, May 26, 1995, at
B9.
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tural problem: the problem of market-dominant ethnic minorities.
This distinctive mapping of ethnicity onto class-generally not seen in
the developed world today-pits an impoverished "indigenous" ma-
jority against an economically dominant "outsider" minority, convert-
ing the paradox of free market democracy into an engine of potentially
catastrophic ethnonationalism.
Part III turned to policy. While there can be no "one-size-fits-all"
solution, all developing and transitional countries pursuing markets
and democracy--even countries without market-dominant minori-
ties-will have to find ways to mediate the basic tension between these
two goals. In this light, the design of all of the measures comprising
today's prevailing development paradigm must be reexamined. For
example, today's rule-of-law, anti-corruption, and free-and-fair-election
initiatives are aimed principally at facilitating market activity and
promoting democratic accountability. To the extent that such initia-
tives succeed, they will accomplish tremendous achievements, but if
care is not taken, they may in the process intensify the contest between
unequal wealth and majoritarian politics. Problems of ethnic conflict,
moreover, complicate many of today's institution-building initiatives.
In ethnically divided societies, it is entirely possible for a strong state
to be an ethnocratic state; for an independent judiciary to be an eth-
nonationalist judiciary; for a thriving civil society to be an ethnically
mobilized civil society.
As we enter the new millennium, some of the optimism about the
immediate prospects of markets and democracy in the developing
world has worn off. The Asian financial crisis, turmoil in Russia and
other post-Soviet states, and heightening ethnic conflict the world over
have made plain that merely privatizing and holding elections will not
turn developing societies into "developed" ones. But rather than facing
up to the painful, often awkward realities of the developing world, the
international community has tended instead to grasp for new cure-alls
and buzzwords. There is no question that rule-of-law, anti-corruption,
civil-society, and other reforms will be essential in the developing
world. Indeed, if properly designed, all these reforms could ultimately
play a valuable role in mediating the paradox of free market democ-
racy. The challenge for law and development today is to think candidly
and creatively about reconciling the realities of market-generated ex-
treme wealth disparities with the aspirations of democratic politics.

